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Abstract
This dissertation is motivated by the 2008 financial crisis and consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I
show that the cooperative objective of credit unions enabled them to lend significantly more than profit-
maximizing banks during the Great Recession. Loan growth rates were higher for the $1.3 trillion credit union
industry by as much as 10 percentage points at the peak of the crisis. Using a newly constructed database
containing balance sheet information and loan-level activity, I compare institutions that faced identical
borrowers in the same local credit markets and control for crises exposures to show that the effect is supply-
driven. Further, the lending difference was sustained by 15-20 percent lower profit margins. Loan pricing,
informational advantages, taxes, or the regulatory environment do not explain the results. Rather, member-
oriented objectives precluded the slow economic recovery of credit unions after the financial crisis.
In the second chapter, which is joint work with Yasser Boualam, we document that higher measures of
liquidity risk on banks balance sheets are associated with lower expected stock returns. We first calculate a
measure of liquidity risk which reflects how much of a bank's volatile liabilities are covered by its stock of
liquid assets. We show that the standard factor models do not fully explain the cross section of bank stock
returns. A portfolio that is long in low liquidity risk banks and short in high liquidity risk banks delivers a
statistically significant alpha of 6 percent annually. This effect is not driven by bank characteristics such as size,
profitability, leverage, or asset quality, but appears to be partly connected to the degree of bank complexity and
potential valuation errors pre-crisis.
In the third chapter, I compare traditional banking and shadow banking based on the type of security that
funds them: money funds the former while money-like liabilities fund the latter. I show the following key
findings. First, using a parsimonioius two-sector model of non-balanced growth that captures structural
changes within the financial sector, I measure the time series relative productivity of shadow banking to
traditional banking. In the 1960's shadow banking sector productivity started at around 0.6 relative to
traditional banking, which peaked to 1.2 starting in the 2000's. Second, growth in money-like liabilities lag
growth in output, contrary to the well-known leading relationship between traditional monetary aggregates
and output growth.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL BANKING
Anna D. Cororaton
Joao Gomes
Michael Roberts
This dissertation is motivated by the 2008 financial crisis and consists of three chapters. In
the first chapter, I show that the cooperative objective of credit unions enabled them to lend
significantly more than profit-maximizing banks during the Great Recession. Loan growth
rates were higher for the $1.3 trillion credit union industry by as much as 10 percentage
points at the peak of the crisis. Using a newly constructed database containing balance sheet
information and loan-level activity, I compare institutions that faced identical borrowers in
the same local credit markets and control for crises exposures to show that the effect is
supply-driven. Further, the lending difference was sustained by 15-20 percent lower profit
margins. Loan pricing, informational advantages, taxes, or the regulatory environment do
not explain the results. Rather, member-oriented objectives precluded the slow economic
recovery of credit unions after the financial crisis.
In the second chapter, which is joint work with Yasser Boualam, we document that higher
measures of liquidity risk on banks balance sheets are associated with lower expected stock
returns. We first calculate a measure of liquidity risk which reflects how much of a bank’s
volatile liabilities are covered by its stock of liquid assets. We show that the standard factor
models do not fully explain the cross section of bank stock returns. A portfolio that is
long in low liquidity risk banks and short in high liquidity risk banks delivers a statistically
significant α of 6 percent annually. This effect is not driven by bank characteristics such
as size, profitability, leverage, or asset quality, but appears to be partly connected to the
degree of bank complexity and potential valuation errors pre-crisis.
v
In the third chapter, I compare traditional banking and shadow banking based on the type
of security that funds them: money funds the former while money-like liabilities fund the
latter. I show the following key findings. First, using a parsimonioius two-sector model of
non-balanced growth that captures structural changes within the financial sector, I measure
the time series relative productivity of shadow banking to traditional banking. In the
1960’s shadow banking sector productivity started at around 0.6 relative to traditional
banking, which peaked to 1.2 starting in the 2000’s. Second, growth in money-like liabilities
lag growth in output, contrary to the well-known leading relationship between traditional
monetary aggregates and output growth.
vi
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CHAPTER 1 : The Impact of Firm Objectives on Lending: Banks and Credit
Unions in the Great Recession
1.1. Introduction
Recently, there has been renewed interest in understanding how profit-maximizing firm ob-
jectives affect economic activity and welfare (e.g., Magill et al., 2015; Hart and Zingales,
2017). As in most of the literature in economics and finance, prior research has focused
on traditional shareholder-owned firms. While goals such as corporate social responsibility
and community development are often included as part of stated objectives (Kitzmueller
and Shimshack, 2012), firms are assumed to prioritize profit-maximization to provide share-
holders with returns to investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, there are a
significant number of firms with alternative objectives and ownership structures. Examples
include non-profits and cooperatives which are prevalent in health care, housing, utilities
and agriculture, and employ 13 percent of the workforce (U.S. Census, 2014). The owner-
ship structure of these firms provides stronger institutional support for pursuing objectives
that are not purely profit-driven (Hansmann, 1996). Despite their prevalence, relatively
little is known about these firms and their behavior.1
In this paper, I use the traditional financial sector as a laboratory to investigate the
role of firm objectives in decision-making. This sector is comprised of two main types of
firms—commercial banks and credit unions—that provide highly similar financial services
to households but have different objectives as a consequence of their ownership structures.
Whereas commercial banks are owned by shareholders and maximize profits, credit unions
are non-profit cooperatives designed to provide financial services to its member-owners,
who are also its depositors and borrowers. Although the majority of lending in the financial
sector is done by commercial banks, credit unions oversee $1.3 trillion in assets for over 110
1Hansmann (1996) also argues that ”... one need not have a strong interest in alternative forms of
ownership to find the comparative study of organizational types instructive. We learn much more about
[investor-owned firms] by comparing them with other forms of enterprise.”
1
million members across the country as of 2017.
I use the Great Recession as a profitability shock to investigate differences in lending behav-
ior between banks and credit unions. Using a rich and unique dataset, I show the following
key findings. Credit unions, relative to banks, were less sensitive to the financial crisis. The
average growth rate in total lending for credit unions was 6-10 percentage points higher
compared to banks at various points during the crisis. Figure 1 illustrates the aggregate
implications of this striking result and demonstrates that the slow recovery of lending af-
ter the crisis was disproportionately concentrated within the for-profit banking industry.
Second, credit unions operated under lower profitability margins in the post-crisis period.
These results draw attention to a well-established industry that provided a form of borrower
protection to households, which a major initiative of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act.2
Figure 1: Total lending by commercial banks and credit
unions
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This graph shows total loans and leases of the commercial banking industry and the credit union
industry, with levels normalized to 100 in 2008-Q3. Source: FL764023005 and FL474023000 from
Flow of Funds.
2See Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act entitled the “Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010” that
created a bureau for regulating consumer financial products and services. Also see Title XIV entitled
the “Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act” that imposes regulation on loan origination and
underwriting standards.
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To understand the economic mechanisms behind these results, this paper faces empirical
challenges that arise from the non-random assignment of objectives to firms. I address
many of these challenges with an empirical strategy that is backed by a simple conceptual
framework and that takes full advantage of rich micro data available for both types of
institutions. I perform several falsification tests to further support the results. These tests
mainly involve disentangling supply-side from demand-side forces, which is particularly
important since the crisis heavily affected both borrowers and lenders.
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I construct a comprehensive dataset covering
credit market outcomes from various angles. To measure financial health, investment deci-
sions, and performance, I link quarterly regulatory call report data for all chartered banks
and credit unions. While previous research has used commercial banking data extensively,
credit union data are relatively understudied in the literature.3 To capture demand-side
forces, I link regulatory data to over 100 million loan applications from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) between 2000-2014. To distinguish between changes in prices and
quantities, I also analyze survey data on offered interest rates for various lending and saving
services.
Second, I focus on the recent crisis as a shock to profitability. The main insight from
my analysis is that differences between for-profit and non-profit firms following a similar
profitability shock reflect the effective importance of the profit motive. To motivate this
empirical strategy, I provide a conceptual framework which shows that firms with an ad-
ditional non-profit objective continue to lend to its customers despite facing profitability
shocks. Conducting the analysis during the crisis is also useful for the following reasons.
The data provide reasonable measures of bank and credit union exposures to the crisis
through their participation in financial markets that eventually collapsed during this time.
This allows me to compare institutions that were similarly exposed to the shock. In addi-
tion, the crisis stemmed from sectors outside of traditional banking, while banks and credit
3One recent exception is Ramcharan et al. (2016), who study the effect of MBS losses on lending using
institutional features of credit unions. However, they effectively consider credit unions to be similar to banks.
3
unions perform traditional financial services.4 Finally, the occurrence and severity of the
crisis was relatively unexpected and previous research has used this event as a source of
variation.5
Third, I perform a difference-in-differences specification with sample restrictions which be-
gins to disentangle supply forces from demand forces. In the baseline regression, I estimate
the average difference in bank and credit union mortgage lending on an institutional-level
to borrowers located within the same county. I focus on a standardized loan — a conven-
tional, owner-occupied, 1-to-4 family, first lien, conforming purchase mortgage — to ensure
that lending is issued to borrowers of the same profile. In addition, I control for average
applicant economic and demographic characteristics that an institution faces within each
county. Time-varying local economic conditions are captured by county-year fixed effects.
On the lender side, I saturate the model with numerous pre-crisis balance sheet character-
istics such as size, leverage, profitability, and delinquencies. I also control for the degree
of exposure to repo markets, participation in secondary loan markets, commercial paper
markets, off-balance sheet commitments, and valuation of private-label mortgage backed
securities. This mitigates the concern that banks might have been disproportionately af-
fected by the crisis, and ensures that the comparison is for similarly-exposed institutions.
Any unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics are controlled for using firm fixed effects.
The baseline regressions show that average lending growth rates were 12 percentage points
higher for credit unions relative to banks in the post-crisis period, and was as high as 40
percentage points in 2008 at the onset of the crisis. I also provide evidence suggesting that
bank and credit union lending growth rates were trending in parallel prior to the crisis, and
only started to deviate from this trend starting in mid-2008 when Lehman Brothers failed.
Further, lending by banks that were heavily exposed to the crisis fell more compared to
4See Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton (2009), Krishnamurthy (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2012b), Pur-
nanandam (2011), who investigate different financial markets that collapsed during the Great Recession.
5See Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), who investigate the effect of a funding shock on the syndicated
corporate loan market in 2008, Santos (2011) who looks at loan pricing following the crisis and Aiyar (2012)
who looks at the transmission of financial shocks in the US on global banks. Chodorow-Reich (2014) and
Greenstone et al. (2014) have explored the real effects of the crisis on firm outcomes and employment.
4
their credit union counterparts, suggesting that banks were more sensitive to the shock.
Nevertheless, credit union lending was sustained at the cost of lower profitability margins.
The average quarterly return on assets for credit unions declined by around 0.05 percentage
points more than for banks relative to a pre-crisis average of 0.22. These results are consis-
tent with the idea that the non-profit motive of credit unions insulated its member-owners
from the adverse financial shock.
The remaining identification threat is that borrowers might have differential sensitivities to
local economic conditions. These differences would be concerning if the borrower clientele of
banks and credit unions were different to begin with. However, demographic and economic
characteristics of bank and credit union borrowers were similar in the pre-crisis period.
I further address this concern by performing several falsification tests. First, differential
demand could result in borrowers seeking different forms of credit, or more specifically,
bank borrowers might not have applied for the standardized type of loan described above.
However, I show that results are robust across different loan categories such as home equity
and refinance mortgages, as well high-priced and non-conventional loans. Results continue
to hold across aggregated loan categories such as consumer credit, business and off-balance
sheet markets. Second, the differential response of banks and credit unions may have
led borrowers to switch towards credit unions. While this reallocation would not fully
undermine the supply-side story, it may strengthen the observed effect through an increase
in demand. If this were the case however, credit unions would have experienced a surge in
new accounts during the crisis; however, this was not observed in credit union membership
data. In addition, growth rates for applications, rather than originations, were similar
for banks and credit unions, suggesting that both types of firms faced similar demand
conditions. To emphasize that firm objectives matter, I also compare credit unions to
banks with assigned social responsibility scores and show that results are stronger when
compared to banks with lower scores.
I invalidate alternative supply-side mechanisms by analyzing important institutional differ-
5
ences between banks and credit unions: interest rates, informational advantages through
membership requirements, taxes and regulation. First, using interest rate data, I show that
the fixed mortgage rate offered by banks and credit unions did not differ significantly in
the post-crisis period, suggesting that the results are driven by changes in quantities rather
than in prices. Second, the common bond of a credit union, which is a pre-specified re-
lationship with its borrowers, might alleviate the firm’s information asymmetry concerns.
This would lower the screening and monitoring costs that a credit union faces. I show
that this information channel does not explain the lending results which continue to hold
when focusing on credit unions whose membership restrictions are only based on borrower
location. Third, credit unions are tax-exempt due to their non-profit status which may
provide them with an unfair competitive advantage. I show that the effect is still positive
and statistically significant even after controlling for state tax rates or effective taxes paid.
Lastly, I investigate possible differences in the regulatory environment, and find that both
receive similar regulatory treatment. In particular, both types of institutions receive deposit
insurance with the same insurance limits, can access the liquidity facilities provided by the
government, and are required to satisfy similar capital requirements.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first micro-level analysis comparing the
lending behavior of banks and credit unions in the Great Recession.6 I provide a novel
perspective to the extensive literature on the Great Recession which has typically focused
on traditional banks and shadow banking industries. I highlight that the slow recovery in
lending, which has puzzled researchers and policymakers alike,7 was mostly driven by for-
profit banking institutions. While this paper focuses on the crisis due to data limitations,
aggregate industry data show that credit union lending was also less sensitive than bank
6There is little empirical research on credit unions especially in the last few decades. Black and Dugger
(1981) and Kaushik and Lopez (1994) provide a description of the growth of credit unions prior to the
1980’s. Frame et al. (2002) look at the effect of regulations expanding membership of credit unions but
do not compare activity with banks. Feinberg and Rahman (2006) compare interest rates offered by credit
unions to those of small banks, but do so for a different time period.
7See also, a speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Janet Yellen in Jackson Hole in August 2016, nine years
after the start of the crisis: ”In light of the slowness of the economic recovery, some have questioned the
effectiveness of asset purchases and extended forward rate guidance.”
6
lending in the previous recession (see Figure 2). Relaxing limits to credit union lending,
such as to business investment or membership requirements, may potentially be beneficial.
However, this statement is subject to a number of caveats. First, this paper does not explore
how firm objectives explain pre-crisis characteristics, but rather compares the post-crisis
behavior of institutions that were similar at the time of the financial shock. In addition,
this paper does not address whether encouraging household debt is beneficial from a general
equilibrium or welfare perspective. Future research pursuing these lines of investigation can
provide additional policy insights.
Figure 2: Annual growth rate of loans by commercial banks and credit unions since
1998
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This figure shows the annual growth rate of total loans and leases for banks (solid) and
credit unions (dashed) starting in 1998, when a major amendment to the Federal Credit
Union Act was passed establishing the current legislation on credit union membership.
Source: FL764023005 and FL474023000 from Flow of Funds.
This paper helps fill the gap in the literature that investigates the real effects of firm ob-
jectives. As previously mentioned, prior research has mostly focused on shareholder-owned
firms. For example, Hart and Zingales (2017) argue that maximizing shareholder welfare is
not the same as maximizing shareholder value when profits and externalities are insepara-
ble. Magill et al. (2015) propose a theory of a stakeholder rather than a shareholder firm.
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Empirically, the link between corporate and social performance for shareholder-owned firms
is found to be positive but small (Margolis et al., 2009). The influential idea of maximizing
shareholder dividends traces back to Friedman (1962), who argued that businesses are not
individuals and should not be concerned about corporate social responsibility.8 Lazonick
and O’Sullivan (2000) document the rise of maximizing value as a prominent corporate
governance principle starting in the 1970’s.
While research has mostly focused on shareholder-owned firms, a few papers have investi-
gated alternative types of firms. On the empirical side, Adelino et al. (2015), investigate
investment decisions of non-profit hospitals. On the theoretical side, Fama and Jensen
(1985) explore the objectives of non-profits. Hart and Moore (1996) and Hart and Moore
(1998) differentiate a profit-maximizing firm from a non-profit cooperative through their
ownership structures, which is consistent with banks and credit unions in my analysis.
Although this paper focuses on the financial sector, it encourages the discussion on the
importance of objectives and ownership structures for firms in other industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the credit
union industry. Section 2.2 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 1.4 describes
the empirical framework and Section 2.3 discusses the results. Section 1.6 investigates
alternative supply-side mechanisms. Section 2.6 provides policy implications and Section
2.7 provides concluding remarks.
1.2. Background and Conceptual Framework
In this section, I characterize banks and credit unions under seminal theories of the firm.
I then provide a conceptual framework that is in line with these theories and captures the
difference in objective functions in a simple manner. This motivates the empirical strategy
discussed in Section 1.4 and provides the main hypothesis being tested. Lastly, to provide
8This also follows a long literature as characterized by Jensen (2002): “200 years worth of work in
economics and finance indicate that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy maximize
total firm value.”
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a complete overview of the industry, I describe important institutional features besides
objectives and ownership structures.
1.2.1. Profit-maximizing Firms vs Cooperatives: Control View of Ownership
Banks and credit unions provide similar credit and depository financial services to house-
holds, yet follow different objectives as a consequence of their ownership structures.9 Theo-
retically, Hart and Moore (1998) characterize the difference between banks and credit unions
as the difference between outside ownership and inside ownership. Under this framework,
bank shareholders are primarily viewed as capital providers and do not directly consume
the financial services produced by the bank. As such, they are considered outside owners of
the firm. In contrast, members of credit unions directly receive financial services from the
institution, and are then considered inside owners.10 Following the theory of the control
view of ownership that emphasizes the owner’s residual rights of control (Grossman and
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), it is immediately clear that the objectives of these two
institutions are closely aligned with the incentives of their respective owners. In particu-
lar, banks are profit-maximizing for outside shareholders who receive dividends in return
for their investment. Credit unions are non-profits for inside member-owners, who receive
benefits in the form of access to credit, lower borrowing rates and higher savings rates. The
ownership structures of these institutions provides institutional support for pursuing and
implementing different objectives.
1.2.2. Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis
I present a stylized framework that captures the distinction in objectives and ownership
structures of banks and credit unions discussed in the previous section. Consider a financial
9See Chapter 12 of the US Code for laws regarding both banks and credit unions. Credit unions are
chartered as financial cooperatives under the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934.
10Hansmann (1996) provides an extensive discussion of how and why firms with different ownership struc-
tures arise in finance and in other industries.
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institution that chooses the amount of loans L to maximize
max
L
(1− λ) π(L) + λ U(L).
This objective is a weighted average of profits, π(L), and the utility that borrowers derive
from consuming loans, U(L), and nests the case of the bank and a credit union.11 The
parameter λ ∈ [0, 1) determines the type of the firm: banks have λ = 0 while credit
unions have λ > 0. As I show in a proposition in the Appendix, under typical assumptions
on utility and profits, this simple framework embedded in a dynamic partial equilibrium
setting delivers an intuitive empirical prediction: a profitability shock affects the lending
decision of a bank and a credit union differently. More specifically, credit union lending is
less sensitive to shocks due to the additional benefit that they provide to their member-
owners. In the empirical analysis, I focus on the recent financial crisis as a large shock to
profitability to test whether credit unions sustained lending to borrowers in the face of large
profitability shocks.
1.2.3. Institutional Features of Banks and Credit Unions
Table 1 summarizes important institutional features of banks and credit unions.
Membership. Members of a credit union are united under a common bond that is stip-
ulated in its charter bylaws, which can be anything from a common occupation, religious
association, or well-defined community. In contrast, banks do not have limits to member-
ship.
Governance. Credit unions are governed under the one person, one vote principle. Banks
are governed by shareholders, whose influence is proportional to the size of ownership stake.
Deposit insurance. The U.S. government provides and fully backs deposit insurance
11This idea is similar to Smith et al. (1981) who provide a framework where credit unions maximize gains
on saving and loans in addition to profits.
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Table 1: Institutional Background
Commercial Banks Credit Unions
Objective Profit-maximizing Cooperative
Ownership Equity, outside Members, inside
Owner benefit Dividends Access to credit, Better rates, services
Governance Proportional to shares One member, one vote
Borrower access No limits Common bond membership
Source of equity Retained earnings or Retained earnings
raised externally
Capital requirements 4-8% 6-7%
Deposit insurance Yes Yes
Corporate taxes Not exempt Exempt
for both institutions. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures banks,
while the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) insures credit unions. To
alleviate bank run concerns during the recent crisis, the insured deposit limit was raised
from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor for both banks and credit unions in 2008.
Capital requirements. Banks and credit unions are both subject to capital requirements.
Before the financial crisis, bank capital requirements were at 8 percent when using total
capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2), and 4 percent when using Tier 1 capital.12 Credit unions
were categorized as well-capitalized with an equity-to-assets ratio of 7 percent, and larger
institutions were required to satisfy a risk-based net worth of 6 percent.13 These are re-
ported to their respective regulators. Credit unions are regulated by the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), while banks are regulated by the (FDIC), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or the Federal Reserve.14
Equity. Banks and credit unions can increase their equity base using retained earnings,
12See Final Rule on Risk-Based Capital Standards (Federal Register Vol. 72, No. 235) from December
2007.
13See 2007 annual edition of the Code of Federal Regulations §702.102.
14Both types of institutions also have the option to be chartered at the state level and be regulated by
their corresponding state financial regulators. 37 percent of credit unions are state chartered. In terms of
total assets, 51 percent were held by state-chartered credit unions.
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however banks have the additional option of raising capital from outside investors. As a
result, there are more limits to growth of total assets for credit unions.
Investments. Both banks and credit unions can engage in consumer and mortgage lending
without limits. However, the Credit Union Act imposes some restrictions on other types of
loans and investments. For example, it limits the ratio of business lending to total assets to
12.25 percent, limits holdings on certain types of financial investments, and sets a maximum
interest rate that it may charge on loans.
Taxes. As a non-profit cooperative under Section 12 of the U.S. Code, credit unions are
exempt from paying federal, state and local income taxes. Banks and banking associations
often argue that the tax exemption of credit unions provides them with a distinct advantage
in the market for providing financial services.15
1.2.4. History of the Credit Union Industry
The first credit unions in the U.S. were established in the early 20th century. These institu-
tions rose to prominence during the Great Depression when President Roosevelt passed the
law authorizing federally-chartered credit unions. By the 1960’s, the vast majority of credit
unions active today had been established.16 Historically, credit unions were established
under a single common bond. For example, public school teachers, policemen or military
employees grouped together to form credit unions. In the last few decades however, the
definition of a common bond has been expanded for credit unions under the Credit Union
Membership Access Act passed by President Clinton in 1998. This Act allowed smaller
single-bond groups to combine to form multi-bond institutions, and also expanded the ge-
ographic coverage of community-based credit unions.17
Figure 3 shows the rise in the share of the credit union industry to the commercial banking
industry from around 3 percent in 1985 to around 8 percent in 2010. Once a credit union
15See, for example, the December 7 2016 lawsuit filed by the American Bankers Association against the
credit union regulatory agency, National Credit Union Administration: “Because federal credit unions are
exempt from federal taxes and most state taxes, restrictions on the size of federal credit unions are essential
to prevent credit unions from obtaining an unfair competitive advantage over banks and other financial
12
Figure 3: Relative size of credit unions to banks
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This graph shows the ratio of total assets in the credit union industry to total
assets in both banking and credit union industries starting in 1985. Shaded
quarters refer to recessions. Source: Flow of Funds.
is chartered, it rarely switches to becoming a bank charter. Between 1995-2007, Wilcox
(2007) identifies 33 credit union conversions to other charters (banks or mutual thrifts).
For perspective, there were over 20,000 institutions between 2003-2013. However, there has
been heavy merger activity within each sector, which has led the number of institutions to
drop by approximately half in the last few decades.18
1.3. Data
In this section, I describe the sample construction using regulatory reports and loan-level
data. This data provide information on the dispersion of credit union membership across
institutions that do not enjoy tax-exempt status.”
16In the data, 87 percent of credit unions were established before 1970. As of 2003, over 99 percent of
credit unions had been established.
17The Act allowed for select employee groups (SEG’s) to attach to larger established credit unions. As
of 2016, 18 percent of credit unions have a community bond, 17 percent have a single bond (including
employee-, faith- and association-based), 27 percent have multiple common bonds, and 39 percent are state
chartered.
18Since 2003, 86 percent of event types associated with credit unions have been mergers, 7 percent have
been conversions (not necessarily to banks, but also to mutual thrifts), and the rest have been liquidations,
cancellations, purchase and assumptions.
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the U.S.
1.3.1. Financial Statements
I obtain quarterly financial data from income statements, on-balance sheet and off-balance
sheet statements on an institutional-level from regulatory call reports (FFIEC 031 for banks,
Form 5300 for credit unions). These reports are different for banks and credit unions but
contain comparable information. I carefully ensure that variables used in the analysis are
consistently defined across the two types of institutions for the entire sample period. All
variables and corresponding dates are defined in the Appendix. The sample period starts
in Q2-2002, for which quarterly data is available for both banks and credit unions. The
sample period ends in Q4-2013, several years after the crisis and due to significant reporting
changes for commercial banks. I exclude observations with missing total assets and quarters
involving merger activity. I only consider financial institutions located in the 50 U.S states
and Washington D.C. Variables are deflated using the Consumer Price Index, normalized
to 2009 dollars. All variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level at the tails.
1.3.2. Loan-level Lending Activity
To gauge lending activity on a borrower-level, I obtain data from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) collected by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC).19 HMDA requires mortgage lending institutions above a certain size threshold
and with offices in metro areas to disclose information on a loan application level each
year.20 The data provides information such as the type, purpose and lien status of the
loan, economic and demographic characteristics of the applicant, and whether the loan was
originated or denied. Importantly, I observe the financial institution associated with the
loan, and the location of the property underlying the mortgage. I merge in annual averages
19I use the Loan Application Register (LAR) ultimate public releases from the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) which are available at National Archives at https://www.archives.gov/research/catalog.
2091 percent of real estate loans in credit unions is captured in HMDA. From the 2000-2013 sample period,
the threshold for reporting to HMDA rose from $33 million to $44 million in total assets.
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of balance sheet data from the regulatory call reports to the loan-level data in HMDA.21
1.3.3. Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for balance sheet data in the pre-crisis period, which
include quarters until Q4-2006. I present averages for all institutions, and for institutions
that appear in the HMDA dataset. This shows that only half of banks and under one-fifth
of credit unions are required to report their mortgage lending activities due to the size cutoff
defined by HMDA. The latter sub-sample are the focus of the analysis. I also split the bank
sub-sample into the largest 25 banks categorized by total assets in each quarter and the
rest of the sample which are referred to as community banks.22 Data show that banks are
almost three times as large credit unions, with average bank assets at $697.1 million on
average compared to credit union average assets at $257.1.
Leverage ratios are similar for both institutions, with credit union funding coming more
from deposits. The composition of both assets is similar between banks and credit unions:
institutions hold around 63-64 percent of their assets in loans and leases. Much of bank
lending is backed by real estate. Non-business real estate lending is 37.1 percent of total
assets for banks and only 24.9 percent for credit unions. Credit unions focus their lending
around consumer loans, which account for 37.4 of assets. Consumer credit includes auto
loans, student loans, home equity lines of credit, and unsecured loans. Banks engage in
more business lending, which accounts for 12.3 of assets. Lastly, the data suggest that
credit unions engaged in slightly higher off-balance sheet lending such as undrawn lines of
credit and loan commitments compared to credit unions.
21I am grateful to Robert Avery for providing the link file between HMDA and regulatory call reports
data.
22These institutions account for 60 percent of total assets within banks. According to the latest Flow
of Funds release, total assets of all credit unions amounted to $1.3 trillion, while total assets of depository
institutions amounted to $15.1 trillion. Around three-quarters of banks control $100 million or more in
assets, while only one-quarter of credit unions are above this threshold. There are over 230 credit unions
with assets over $1 billion, making them comparable in size to the largest 10 percent of banking institutions.
The top 3 largest credit unions are Navy Federal Credit Union ($81B), State Employees Credit Union ($37B)
and Pentagon Federal Credit Union ($23B).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: Balance Sheet Characteristics
This table presents summary statistics for balance sheet information an institution-quarter level for the pre-crisis period from Q2-2003 - Q4-2006. Institutions reporting
to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) are determined by a reporting size threshold. Community banks exclude the largest 25 banks categorized by total
assets in each quarter. All variables except for total assets are winsorized at the 1 percent level.
All Institutions Institutions in HMDA
Banks Credit Unions Banks Credit Unions
Variable Largest 25 Community
Total Assets, (Mil, 2009 $) 1,030.8 80.3 171,792.1 697.1 257.7
Log(TA) 4.7 2.4 11.5 5.1 4.7
Total Liabilities/TA 88.9 86.4 89.0 89.5 88.6
Deposits/TA 82.5 85.3 70.4 82.8 87.0
Cash/TA 5.1 13.4 6.5 4.8 8.8
Lending Categories
Total Loans/TA 61.9 58.5 65.7 64.5 63.3
Real Estate Loans/TA 38.8 13.2 28.9 43.2 25.7
Real Estate Non-Business/TA 34.5 12.9 26.1 37.1 24.9
Consumer Loans/TA 6.7 45.0 10.4 6.3 37.4
Business (C&I) Loans/TA 12.0 0.7 21.6 12.3 1.2
Off-Balance Sheet/TA 10.7 7.3 39.0 12.7 14.6
Performance Measures
Return on Assets 0.26 0.16 0.38 0.25 0.22
Return on Equity 2.71 1.38 3.55 2.81 2.04
Net Interest Margin 0.93 0.88 0.76 0.94 0.84
Retained Earnings/TA 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.17
Delinquencies 0.90 1.04 1.35 0.83 0.50
Net Chargeoffs 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.08
Crisis-Related Exposures
Loans for Sale/TA 0.23 0.04 2.34 0.30 0.12
Private-label MBS/TA 0.18 0.46 1.44 0.20 1.31
Federal Funds and Repos/TA 1.55 0.01 8.32 1.81 0.02
Other Debt (Incl CP)/TA 3.83 0.36 11.01 3.86 0.83
No. Institutions 11,090 11,360 37 6,070 2,158
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Profitability, as measured by return on assets and return on equity is higher for banks
both in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Banks appear to be more profitable despite
having higher delinquencies for outstanding loans on their balance sheets. Lastly, this table
shows the minimal exposures of average banks and credit unions to each of the markets that
eventually collapsed during the crisis—investments in private-label MBS, loans sold on the
secondary loan market, federal funds and repo markets, and commercial paper markets. As
of the end of the sample in 2013, there were 7,091 active commercial banking institutions
and 6,668 credit unions operating in the U.S.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for mortgage loans that banks and credit unions re-
ceived for the pre-crisis period from 1999-2006. This again breaks down the sample for
commercial banks into the largest 25 by total assets at the end of each year, and commu-
nity banks. The former processed 38.4 million mortgages during this time, more than the
34.4 million mortgages for the latter. In contrast, credit unions received 4.5 million loans.
This table shows that banks engaged in more purchase lending while credit unions focused
on home equity loans. Both processed similar amounts of refinances. Credit unions did
not have as many jumbo and high-priced loans. In addition, less of its portfolio was sold
within the same reporting year.23 Turning to borrower characteristics, credit unions have
slightly lower incomes on average, have lower borrowing loan amounts and hence lower debt-
to-income (DTI) ratios. Lower amounts are partly driven by the fact that credit unions
engage in more home equity lending, which are typically second liens and are for lower loan
amounts. Borrower demographics appear to be similar across banks and credit unions. On
average, 11 of the largest 25 banks serve in each county, which process an average of 142
loans per county. There are an average of 34 community banks with 40 loans and 10 credit
unions with 20 loans.
23HMDA only requires that institutions report whether the loan was sold within the same calendar year.
Loans can still be sold in the following years, but are not observed in HMDA.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Mortgage Loan Activity
This table presents summary statistics for observations on an institution-county-year level for the pre-
crisis period from 1999-2006 taken from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Community banks
exclude the largest 25 banks categorized by total assets in the fourth quarter of each year. Some mortgage
characteristics are only available from HMDA from 2004 onward (*).
Banks Credit Unions
Largest 25 Community All
Loan Type
Purchase Loans, % 0.32 0.36 0.20
Home Equity Loans, % 0.11 0.12 0.26
Refinance Loans, % 0.57 0.52 0.53
Conventional, % 0.94 0.93 0.98
Owner Occupied, % 0.92 0.90 0.96
First Lien, % (*) 0.80 0.81 0.60
1-4 Family, % (*) 0.97 0.96 0.97
Jumbo, % 0.08 0.05 0.02
High Priced, % (*) 0.13 0.11 0.03
Spread if High Priced, pp (*) 5.39 4.91 5.28
Loan Sold within Year, % 0.44 0.47 0.19
Loan Sold to GSE within Year, % 0.68 0.56 0.51
Loans Originated, % 0.72 0.79 0.89
Borrower Characteristics
Average Income of Borrower ($ Thous) 89.63 80.04 76.24
Average Loan Size ($ Thous) 148.48 122.73 95.81
Average Debt-to-Income 1.98 1.81 1.45
Male, % 0.62 0.66 0.62
Race, White, % 0.66 0.71 0.71
Race, Black, % 0.08 0.06 0.05
Ethnicity, Hispanic, % (*) 0.12 0.10 0.07
Lender Information
Avg. No. Institutions per Cty-Yr 11 34 10
Avg. No. Loans per Inst-Cty-Yr 142 40 20
Total No. Loans (Mil.) 38.37 34.43 4.52
Avg. Counties per Inst-Year 1,743 29 17
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1.3.4. Dispersion of Credit Union Membership in the U.S.
The maps in Figures 4 and 5 show the dispersion in membership of credit unions in 2006,
the year prior to the start of the financial crisis. Figure 4 shows the share of total assets in
credit unions across states according to the headquarters of the institution. Figure 5 shows
the percent of mortgage originations in credit unions by county according to the location
of the borrower. These calculations exclude the largest 25 banks. Both figures show that
the presence of credit unions was not concentrated in certain regions of the country. More
importantly, these figures show that there was variation in membership both across states
and within states that were heavily affected by the recent financial crisis (for example
Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada). As of 2017, credit unions report to have 110
million members across the country.
Figure 4: Percent of Total Assets in Credit Unions Relative to Banks, 2006
This figure shows the percent of total assets in credit unions by state, as of Q4-2006.
Location is assigned according to the state of the institution headquarters. Calculations
are for 8,536 credit unions and 8,148 banks. Largest 25 banks categorized by total assets
are excluded. Source: Author’s calculations, Call Reports (FFIEC 031 and Form 5300).
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Figure 5: Percent of Mortgage Originations in Credit Unions Relative to Banks, 2006
This figure shows the percent of loan originations in credit unions by county of borrower
location, taken from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 2006. Calculations
are for 1,775 credit unions and 3,818 banks. Largest 25 banks categorized by total assets
are excluded. Source: Author’s calculations, Call Reports (FFIEC 031 and Form 5300),
HMDA.
1.4. Empirical Strategy
Establishing the causal effect of firm objectives on real outcomes requires random assign-
ment to firms, yet this ideal experiment is difficult to conduct in reality. A reasonable
alternative is to use a source of variation that directly affects profitability, which is the key
characteristic of interest that differentiates banks and credit unions. The Great Recession
offers exactly this source of variation. I set up a difference-in-differences specification com-
paring lending activity before and after the crisis that takes full advantage of the richness
of the balance sheet and HMDA datasets. This specification is motivated by the simple
economic framework provided in Section 1.2. Using this episode however, also raises the
difficulty of disentangling supply-side from demand-side forces. This is a particularly im-
portant concern since both sides were likely to have been heavily affected during the crisis.
I begin to address these concerns and isolate supply-side mechanisms by focusing on a spe-
cific type of loan, which homogenizes the riskiness of the borrower profile. The remaining
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identification threat in this setting are potential differential sensitivities of demand to local
economic conditions. In the results in Section 2.3, I perform falsification tests to address
these concerns.
1.4.1. Difference-in-differences Specification
I use a difference-in-differences specification and compare measures of lending activity across
commercial banks and credit unions before and after the financial crisis. In particular, I
estimate regressions of the following form:
yict = β postt · CUi + γ postt ·Xi + γb borrowerict + ηct + ηi + εict. (1.1)
The main dependent variable, yict, is the log differences in total loan amounts originated
by institution i to borrowers located in county c between year t − 1 and t. CUi is an
indicator for credit unions and postt is an indicator that equals 1 for time periods starting
in 2007, Xi is a vector of institution-level controls reflecting pre-crisis averages, borrowerict
refers to average applicant demographic and economic characteristics that are county- and
institution-specific, ηct are county and year interacted fixed effects and ηi are firm-level fixed
effects. To account for serial correlation and state-specific random shocks, I cluster standard
errors at the institution level.24 The main coefficient of interest is β, which measures the
difference in the change in the growth rates of lending before and after the crisis for credit
unions relative to banks. Detailed definitions of all variables that are described in the rest
of this section are found in the Appendix.
More specifically, I include county-year fixed effects, ηct, to capture time-varying local de-
mand shocks faced by all banks and credit unions operating in the same county. This also
controls for the possibility that credit unions are systematically located in either higher or
lower lending growth rate areas relative to banks. I include firm-level fixed effects, ηi, to
account for institution-specific differences across firms that may lead to constant differences
24Results are robust to clustering at the state level.
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in the level of lending growth rates across all the counties that they lend to. Unobservable
time-invariant factors that are captured by these fixed effects include operational, manage-
rial and cultural practices within an institution, to the extent that their effects on lending
activity did not change during the crisis. Borrower characteristics in the regression include
the average income, loan amount and debt-to-income ratios of the pool of applicants that
each institution receives within each county in each year.
The controls, Xi, include firm characteristics and crisis exposure controls. For firm char-
acteristics, I include size (log of total assets), book leverage (ratio of total debt to total
equity) and the share of assets invested in loans (ratio of total loans to total assets). Crisis
exposure controls include measures that capture the participation of institutions in financial
markets that eventually collapsed during the crisis. Including these controls mitigate the
concern that banks might have been disproportionately affected by the crisis. I rely on pre-
vious literature that has extensively studied the sources of the crisis and how it transmitted
through various financial markets.25 In particular, I include the amount of loans sold in
secondary loan markets, investments in private-label mortgage-backed securities, funding
obtained through federal funds and repurchase markets, funding through other forms of
debt such as commercial paper, and off-balance sheet activities such as unused commit-
ments and undrawn lines of credit. The data suggest that a good fraction of both banks
and credit unions participated in these markets. Asset categories are normalized by total
assets, while liability categories are normalized by total liabilities. I also include the follow-
ing crisis exposure controls that are specific to the firm: profitability (ratio of net income to
lagged total assets), delinquencies (ratio of loans up to 90-days delinquent to lagged total
assets), and write-downs (ratio of net charge-offs to lagged total assets).
I define the control variables as indicators (-1 for lowest one-third, 0 for middle, 1 for
25Krishnamurthy (2010) describes the collapse in various debt markets, valuation in asset-backed and
mortgage-backed securities, and large write-downs on loans. Gorton and Metrick (2012b) look specifically at
the collapse of repurchase markets. Purnanandam (2011) describes the collapse in the secondary loan mar-
kets, or the originate-to-distribute process of lending. They highlight that financial markets that eventually
failed during this time were concentrated in shadow banking sectors, rather than on traditional institutions
which are the focus of this paper.
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top) based on whether the pre-crisis average characteristic of an institution. I look at
the combined distribution of the variable for all institutions and only include institutions
that appear in HMDA. I assign all counties for that institution the same bin. For size, for
example, large institutions will naturally lend to more counties, all of which will be assigned
as large. I use pre-crisis averages since most of these controls might suffer from the bad
controls problem, meaning that they likely respond to the financial crisis shock. I interact
these indicator variables with postt to allow pre-crisis characteristics to explain any changes
in the post-crisis period.
Balance Sheet Regressions. The main analysis focuses on mortgage lending using the
HMDA dataset since it allows for a strict set of borrower controls. However, it will also be
informative to run regressions using quarterly balance sheet data, which provides aggregated
information on an institutional level. These regressions are of the following form:
yict = β
f postt · CUi + γf postt ·Xi,t + ηct + ηi + εict (1.2)
where county c refers to the location of the headquarters of the institution rather than
the borrower as in Equation 1.26 Borrower controls on a firm level are not available in
the balance sheet data and are dropped from the regression. The superscript f on the
coefficients reflect that these are based on firm-level data. I define the post-crisis period to
be quarters starting in Q2-2007. Growth rates are calculated as 4-quarter log differences
of deflated values, which mitigates seasonality. For variables defined as ratios, I calculate
4-quarter moving averages. I use the standardized values of the controls in the pre-crisis
period and hold their values fixed at their pre-crisis averages during the post-crisis period.
I do this for all variables except profitability and delinquencies on outstanding loans, which
are likely to be realizations of adverse shocks rather than endogenous decisions. All other
variables defined as in the previous section. I exclude quarters that involve merger activity.
26According to the HMDA data, 70 percent of institutions perform the majority of their mortgage lending
in the county of the headquarters. Results are robust when looking at only these institutions.
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In balance sheet regression, standard errors are clustered at the state level. As in the loan-
level analysis, I estimate a dynamic version of this regression, where the Q1-2007 is the
left out quarter. In the analysis, I will clarify whether the regressions are estimated using
HMDA or balance sheet data.
1.4.2. Financial Crisis as a Shock to Profitability
Was the financial crisis indeed a shock to profitability? Previous research has shown that
the crisis directly affected firms’ profitability prospects from various angles. In particular,
costs of funding spiked, the valuation and returns on existing assets declined, more loans
defaulted, the quality of real investment opportunities either faded or became more costly
to ascertain, and there were unexpected draw downs on off-balance sheet commitments
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2009; Krishnamurthy, 2010; Purnanandam, 2011; Gorton
and Metrick, 2012b). All of these factors directly affected the firm’s profitable prospects.
In addition, exogeneity in the occurrence and the timing of the crisis is an important
assumption to ensure that observed changes in lending are responses to this episode, rather
than to a different shock occurring at the same time. Since the financial crisis was large
and broad, it is unlikely that another shock would have caused the observed widespread
changes in lending. Previous research has also used the failure of Lehman Brothers as an
unexpected exogenous shock (e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2014),
with Q3-2008 as the crisis event date. Nevertheless, other research looking at sources of
the crisis have also pointed to evidence that the crisis started in mid-2007, when several
mortgage-backed securities could not be valued. Banks who were exposed to these markets,
especially the large ones, might have started to change their lending behavior starting in
mid-2007.27 To be conservative and to preclude responses in 2007 to bias the results, I
define the post-crisis period to be quarters starting in Q3-2007 for quarterly data, and 2007
for annual data. Still, results using quarterly balance sheet data in Section 2.3 show that
lending growth rates for banks and credit unions started to diverge starting in Q3-2008,
27See, for example, Acharya et al. (2009).
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when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
1.4.3. Homogeneous Borrower Profile
As previously noted, a crucial part of the analysis involves disentangling supply-side from
demand-side forces. If borrowers of either banks or credit unions were differentially affected
by the crisis and the recession, then observed differences in lending outcomes might be at-
tributed to borrower profiles rather than to supply-side decisions. To mitigate this concern,
I further control for unobserved borrower-level characteristics by calculating originations for
a standardized set of loans in HMDA. In particular, I focus on the sample of conventional,
conforming (non-jumbo), owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first lien purchase mortgages within
the dataset.28 These loans are often purchased for securitization by the government spon-
sored enterprises (GSE’s), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and are considered to be relatively
safe loans with a standardized borrower profile. This ensures that lending for banks and
credit unions are being compared for a similar set of borrowers.
1.4.4. Parallel Trends Assumption
The identifying assumption in a difference-in-difference specification is that the outcome of
interest would have evolved in parallel absent the treatment. I provide suggestive evidence
of this assumption by plotting the average growth rate in lending for the standardized loan
type described above for banks and credit unions relative to its own industry’s 2006 growth
rate in Figure 6. This shows that growth rates tracked each other closely in the pre-crisis
period and only started to diverge from each other starting in 2007 during the first signs of
the crisis. I provide further suggestive evidence of parallel trends in a dynamic regression
specification in Section 2.3.
While I refer to the empirical specification above as a difference-in-differences framework,
it is different from the typical setting. The typical framework typically measures the effect
28Conventional mortgages are those not guaranteed by the government either through the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), Veteran’s Administration (VA), Farm Service Agency (FSA) or Rural Housing Ser-
vice (RHS). Conforming loan limits are set by the government sponsored enterprises (GSE’s), Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, and are taken from https://www.fanniemae.com/content/fact sheet/historical-loan-limits.pdf.
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Figure 6: Average Mortgage Lending Growth Rates
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This graph shows the average lending of banks and credit unions relative to its own in-
dustry’s lending in 2006 on a institution-county-year level taken from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). Only conventional, conforming, 1-4 family, owner-occupied, first-
lien, purchase loans, are included. Source: Author’s calculations, HMDA.
of a treatment that splits observations into treatment and control groups. In my setting
however, while I consider the financial crisis to be the shock that determines the pre- and
post- periods, I do not strictly categorize firms into those affected by the crisis (treatment)
and those not affected by the crisis (control). Instead, I categorize firms into effectively
treated and effectively control groups using an economically motivated framework described
in Section 1.2.29 The parallel trends identifying assumption still applies: that bank and
credit union lending growth rates would have evolved in parallel absent the financial crisis.
29Alternatively, this exercise can be viewed as a triple differences exercise where I measure the hetero-
geneous response of banks and credit unions to the financial crisis shock. I would then compare lending
before and after the financial crisis (first difference) for affected and unaffected firms (second difference) and
analyze the heterogeneity of responses by type of institution (third difference). However, the financial crisis
is an aggregate shock rather than a shock that split firms into treatment and control groups. Under this
characterization, I still only calculate differences on two dimensions, the first difference is pre- and post-crisis,
and the second difference is for banks and credit unions.
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1.5. Results
Arguing that firm objectives played a significant role in credit provision involves two key
steps. The first step is that supply-side forces need to be disentangled from demand-side
forces at play. The second step involves providing evidence that profit-maximization was
the underlying economic mechanism. Using the difference-in-differences specification and
sample restrictions described in Section 1.4, I first present the key finding lending growth
rates were higher for credit unions relative to banks. The identification threat that could
invalidate a supply-side story in this set-up is that demand forces could potentially have
differential sensitivities to local economic conditions. I address these concerns by performing
falsification tests to show that these concerns do not appear to be of first-order importance. I
then show that credit unions operated under significantly lower margins, consistent with the
idea that credit unions sustained lending at the cost of lower profitability. In addition, banks
that were more severely affected by the financial crisis withdrew lending more compared to
less affected banks, while credit unions appear to absorb the crisis shocks. These results
are again consistent with the idea that the non-profit motive of credit unions played a key
role in credit provision. In following this exposition, note that the analysis will move back
and forth between mortgage-level results and balance sheet results. This will be made clear
in each table description.
1.5.1. Lending Growth Rates
Table 4 presents the estimates reflecting the change in credit union lending growth rates
relative to the change in bank lending growth rates after the financial crisis. This is the
coefficient β in Equation 1.1. This table shows that the estimate is positive and statisti-
cally significant as controls are added slowly. The effect strengthens from 0.101 to 0.134
when adding county-year fixed effects capturing for local demand conditions, and allowing
for institution-specific intercepts with institution fixed effects. Lastly, I add the full set
of controls in Column (4) and estimate a statistically significant coefficient of 0.118. All
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that credit unions contin-
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ued to lend their member-owners while banks withdrew credit to their borrowers, for the
standardized loan type in focus.
Table 4: Growth Rate of Mortgage Lending
The unit of observation is institution-county-year. The dependent variable is difference in the log of
conventional, conforming, owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first-lien purchase mortgage originations for year t
and t− 1 taken from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). postt equals 1 starting in 2007. County
refers to the location of the borrower. Controls include firm characteristics and crisis exposures. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
institution level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
yict = β postt · CUi + postt ·X
′
iγ + borrower
′
ictγb + ηi + ηct + εict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post*CU 0.101*** 0.093** 0.134*** 0.118**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.058)
County-year FE × × ×
Institution FE × ×
Controls ×
N 686,020 686,020 686,020 686,020
R-sq 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.17
1.5.2. Dynamic Effects
To assess whether the effects vary over time, I run a dynamic specification. I include time
dummies instead of a post-crisis indicator: βt · δt ·CUi instead of β · postt ·CUi in Equation
1.1, where δt denotes annual time dummies. 2006 is the left-out year. The βt coefficients
measure the differential trend of lending for credit unions before and after the crisis and can
provide suggestive evidence for parallel trends. If banks and credit unions have common
pre-trends in the growth rates of their lending behavior, then the coefficients βt should be
equal to zero for time periods prior to the crisis. Observing divergence in the coefficients
once the crisis occurs also helps verify that the crisis is a reasonable setting for the analysis.
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Figure 7: Dynamic Regressions: Mortgage Loans in HMDA
This figure plots results for dynamic regressions. Conventional, conforming, 1-4 family, owner-occupied, first-lien, purchase loans, for
banks and credit unions are included. The unit of observation is county-institution-year. The dependent variable is the difference in log
of originated loan amounts between t and t − 1 for institution i for borrowers located in county c for institutions in the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). The left panel shows results for the regression including the credit union indicator, year dummies, and year
dummies interacted with the credit union indicator. The right panel plots coefficient estimates βt for the regression which includes
county-year fixed effects, institution fixed effects and balance sheet controls. Controls Xi,t include indicator variables for balance sheet
characteristics interacted with postt, borrowerict includes average demographic and economic characteristics of the pool of applicants. For
both regressions, the sample is from 2000-2014 and left-out observations are from 2006 represented by the dashed line. Error bars around
the markers reflect the 95% confidence interval around the estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level.
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These dynamic coefficients are plotted in Figure 7. The panel on the left shows results for the
regression with only a credit union indicator, year dummies and year dummies interacted
with the credit union indicator. The panel on the right shows the coefficients including
the full set of controls and fixed-effects. Coefficients in the pre-period hover around zero,
suggesting lending was growing at a consistent rate during that time period. This provides
suggestive evidence that the parallel trends assumption holds. Coefficients in the post-crisis
period show the lending growth rates for credit unions was higher relative to banks between
2007-2010, in the depths of the financial crisis.
1.5.3. Identification Threats from Differential Demand Sensitivities
The main identification threat in the empirical set-up which could invalidate a supply-side
story is that borrowers of banks and credit unions were differentially sensitive to local
economic conditions. This would lead borrowers to demand credit differentially, which
would bias the coefficient estimates. I address this concern through various tests in this
section.
Alternative Loan Types. It is possible that demand for the type of mortgage loan being
analyzed dropped more for banks than for credit unions. This could occur despite focusing
on a homogeneous and relatively safe borrower profile, and after controlling for a rich set of
borrower characteristics an institution faces within a county in each year. One consequence
of differential demand would be that borrowers seek alternative types of loans. If this were
indeed occurring, then results should not be consistent across different loan categories. I test
this by performing similar regressions for other loan types that both banks and credit unions
issue, and show that this is not the case. Table 5 presents results for purchase loans, home
equity loans, and refinance loans that are still conventional, conforming, owner-occupied,
1-4 family, first lien mortgages, so that the borrower quality continues to be controlled for.
Credit unions sustained lending relative to banks across all loan categories.
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Table 5: Growth Rate of Mortgage Lending: By Type of Loan
The unit of observation is institution-county-year. The dependent variable is difference in the log of
conventional, conforming, owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first-lien mortgage originations for year t and t − 1
taken from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). postt equals 1 starting in 2007. County refers
to the location of the borrower. Controls include firm characteristics and crisis exposures. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the institution
level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
yict = β postt · CUi + postt ·X
′
i,t−1γ + borrower
′
ictγb + ηi + ηct + εict
(1) (2) (3)
Purchase Home Equity Refinance
Post*CU 0.118** 0.225*** 0.153***
(0.058) (0.065) (0.057)
County-year FE × × ×
Institution FE × × ×
Other Controls × × ×
N 686,020 326,927 827,774
R-sq 0.17 0.24 0.25
Major Lending Categories on Balance Sheet. I further test this by analyzing major
lending categories observed on balance sheet. Table 6 presents results for consumer credit,
real estate lending, business lending including commercial and industrial loans, and off-
balance sheet activity including unused commitments and undrawn lines of credit. Table
6 shows that results are consistently positive and significant across different loan types.
In fact, the results here are weakest for real estate loans, and are stronger for consumer
credit, business lending and off-balance sheet lending. Note that consumer credit accounts
for around three-quarters of credit union lending. A downside of using balance sheet data
is that I cannot control for local economic conditions facing borrowers and lenders to the
level of detail available in HMDA. As a robustness, I verify that these balance sheet results
hold when focusing on institutions whose majority of HMDA lending is the headquarters
of the institution, which is true for 70 percent of institutions in the data.
Dynamic Effects for Total Lending. Lastly, I run regressions for log differences in total
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Table 6: Breakdown by Type of Lending on Balance Sheet
The unit of observation is institution-quarter. The dependent variable is difference in the log of total
loans and leases for quarter t and t − 4 for four main categories of lending and for total lending taken
from Call Report data. postt equals 1 starting in 2007-Q3. The county of an institution is based on
the location of the headquarters. In addition to size, leverage, and share of loans to total assets, control
variables include all crisis exposure variables. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates.
yict = β
f postt · CUi + postt ·X
′
i,tγ
f + ηct + ηi + εict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total RE Consumer Business Off-BS
Post*CU 0.0593*** 0.0189** 0.0416*** 0.0834** 0.122***
(0.0073) (0.00705) (0.00797) (0.0357) (0.0152)
County-quarter FE x x x x x
Institution FE x x x x x
Controls x x x x x
N 626,842 518,303 623,224 341,693 493,053
R-sq 0.4751 0.419 0.303 0.385 0.294
loans and leases on balance sheet as the dependent variable. The difference-in-differences
coefficient is also reported in Table 6. Total lending growth rates were higher for credit
unions relative to banks by around 6 percentage points in the post-crisis period. I also run
the dynamic regression, where the first two quarters of 2007 are left out. The coefficients
plotted in Figure 8, where the panel on the left only includes the simple regression with no
controls while the panel on the right includes the full set of controls. These figures show
that bank and credit union lending growth rate trends started to diverge in Q3-2008, when
Lehman Brothers collapsed. As of the end of 2013, bank lending growth rates were still not
back to their pre-crisis averages. In both cases, lending growth for credit unions was higher
by as much as 10 percentage points relative to banks, and remains consistently positive and
statistically significant around this level throughout the post-crisis period.
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Figure 8: Dynamic Regression: Balance Sheet Data
This figure plots results for dynamic regressions. The unit of observation is institution-quarter. The dependent variable is the difference
in the log of total loans and leases for quarter t and t − 4 taken from Call Report data. The left panel shows results for the regression
including the credit union indicator, quarter dummies, and quarter dummies interacted with the credit union indicator. The right panel
plots coefficient estimates βt for the regression which includes county-quarter fixed effects, institution fixed effects and balance sheet
controls. The county of an institution is based on the location of the headquarters. In addition to size, leverage, and share of loans to
total assets, control variables include all crisis exposure variables. For both regressions, the sample is from 2003-Q2 and 2013-Q4 and the
left-out observations are from quarters Q1-2007 and Q2-2007 represented by the dashed line. Error bars around the markers reflect the
95% confidence interval around the estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Credit Union Membership and Total Demand. Differential borrower sensitivities
could manifest in borrowers switching towards credit unions, especially given tight lending
conditions from banks. If this were occurring, then credit union membership should surge
during the financial crisis. This does not appear to be borne in the data however. This
is consistent with the existing evidence of a sticky relationship between borrowers and
lenders. Recent surveys conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau suggest
that borrowers do not shop around for mortgages and 80 percent apply for just one mortgage
(CFPB, 2013-2015). Further, for those borrowers who apply for more than one mortgage,
few do so because of a previous denial. While this may not be rational from the perspective
of the borrower, it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate borrower behavior. Taken
at face value, these results suggest that borrowers who are denied credit by banks remain
shut out of credit markets for some time.
1.5.4. Profitability
In this section, I show using balance sheet data that credit unions operated under lower
profitability margins. Results are shown in Table 7. The first two columns analyze measures
of profitability: return on assets defined as quarterly net income in t divided by total
assets at t − 1 expressed in percent. The data suggest relative to their pre-crisis averages,
profitability was lower for credit unions than for banks in the post-crisis period. Both are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Again these results strongly suggest that
credit unions are less concerned about profits compared to their banking counterparts. I
also analyze leverage, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets t. Results show that
on average, leverage did not change for both types of institutions. Lastly, I look at the share
of cash-like assets to total assets and show that investments in these safe assets declined
for credit unions relative to banks. Together with the previous results on total lending, this
suggests a strong flight-to-quality effect for banks in which they shifted investments from
loans to cash-like assets. In contrast, credit unions investments continued to be in loans to
their member-owners.
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Table 7: Profitability
The unit of observation is institution-quarter. The dependent variables are (1) ROA: quarterly net income
in t divided by total assets at t− 1, (2) leverage: total liabilities divided by total assets t, (3) cash holdings
divided by total assets at t. All variables are in in percent and taken from Call Report data. postt equals
1 starting in 2007-Q3. The county of an institution is based on the location of the headquarters. Control
variables include size and all crisis exposure variables. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates.
yict = β
f postt · CUi + postt ·X
′
i,tγ
f + ηct + ηi + εict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA ROE
Post*CU -0.1051*** -0.0440*** -0.5156*** -0.3301***
(0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0988) (0.1067)
County-quarter FE × × × ×
Institution FE × × × ×
Size, Delinq × × × ×
Other Controls × ×
N 257,997 257,997 257,997 257,997
R-sq 0.70 0.76 0.73 0.76
1.5.5. Heterogenous Responses to Financial Crisis Shocks
So far, the effects of pre-crisis balance sheet characteristics are assumed to be the same
for banks and credit unions. I relax this assumption by adding a triple interaction term of
the above-median indicator for the control variables, postt and the credit union indicator.
The results revert back to the HMDA data. This allows the lending of banks and credit
unions to respond differentially depending on their pre-crisis balance sheet characteristics.
Analyzing the coefficients from these regressions also allow us to decompose any effect for
credit unions that is in β, and to understand potential mechanisms. Specifically, I run the
following regression:
yict =βpostt · CUi + postt ·X ′iγ1 + postt · CUi ·X ′iγ2 + borrowerict + ηi + ηct + εict (1.3)
The coefficient estimates for γ1 and γ2 are presented in Table 8. To understand the results,
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let us first look at size. Holding all other variables fixed, the point estimate for bank size
is negative at -0.47, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Lending for
large credit unions was positive however, as evidenced by the 0.54 coefficient on the triple
interaction term. Adding these two coefficients together result in the total effect for credit
unions. This shows that lending growth rates for large credit unions did not decline relative
to its pre-crisis averages, while large bank lending did. Looking at the results across all
controls shows that credit unions responded differently to the financial crisis, conditional
on having similar pre-crisis average balance sheet characteristics. In particular, lending
growth also declined for banks that were highly levered, while lending for highly-levered
credit unions was unchanged.
Turning to the profitability measures, banks with high net income and high net interest
margins lent relatively more once the crisis hit. These characteristics also did not seem
to affect credit union lending, suggesting that credit unions supplied credit to borrowers
regardless of their profitability in the pre-crisis period. In addition, lending for banks with
above-median average pre-crisis charge-offs fell significantly more relative to those with
below-median charge-offs. Again, this does not appear to be an important variable driving
credit union lending. Lastly, the coefficient estimates on the crisis exposure variables reveal
that lending for banks that were more heavily affected by the crisis declined significantly
compared to those that were less affected. The coefficients on the off-balance sheet activities,
holdings of private-label MBS, participation in secondary loan markets and repo markets are
all negative and statistically significant for banks. In contrast, lending for credit unions that
were exposed to these markets did not decline, and if anything the total effect was positive
for exposure to these markets. These results suggest that the transmission of financial crisis
shocks are less severe for credit unions than for banks.
These results are only economically meaningful to the extent that there is an overlapping
distribution for both banks and credit unions for these characteristics. To provide a sense
for this distribution, I show the fraction of county-year observations with above-median
characteristics. Recall that these indicator variables are assigned at the institution level,
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Responses to Financial Crisis Shocks
The unit of observation is institution-county-year. The dependent variable is difference in the log of conventional,
conforming, owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first-lien purchase mortgage originations for year t and t − 1 taken from
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). postt equals 1 starting in 2007. County refers to the location of
the borrower. Controls include firm characteristics and crisis exposures. Triple interaction terms are included to
decompose β through various balance sheet mechanisms. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level and are reported in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates.
yict =βpostt · CUi + postt ·X′iγ1 + postt · CUi ·X′iγ2 + borrowerict + ηi + ηct + εict
Variable γ1 Estimate (std) γ2 Estimate (std)
Firm Characteristics
Post*Size -0.047* (0.025) 0.054* (0.033)
Post*Leverage -0.098* (0.054) 0.106* (0.058)
Post*Loan Share -0.003 (0.056) -0.060 (0.058)
Post*Real Estate Share 0.109 (0.075) -0.057 (0.075)
Post*Cash -0.001 (0.064) 0.041 (0.070)
Net Income -0.010 (0.031) -0.002 (0.036)
Post*Net Income 0.126** (0.052) -0.101 (0.064)
Post*Net Interest Margin 0.092** (0.041) -0.080* (0.045)
Post*Retained Earnings -0.063 (0.072) 0.083 (0.075)
Delinquencies -0.003 (0.031) -0.053 (0.055)
Post*Delinquencies -0.030 (0.049) 0.096 (0.069)
Post*Charge-offs -0.112*** (0.033) 0.068* (0.039)
Post*Off-balance Sheet -0.136*** (0.050) 0.085 (0.054)
Post*Private MBS Holdings -0.080** (0.034) 0.083** (0.039)
Post*Loans for Sale -0.142*** (0.020) 0.095*** (0.027)
Post*Repos -0.026 (0.023) -0.032 (0.035)
Post*Other Debt 0.010 (0.024) -0.010 (0.032)
Other Variables
Average Income 0.001*** (0.000)
Average DTI 0.052*** (0.006)
Average Loan Size 0.005*** (0.000)
Share Male 0.032*** (0.009)
Share White 0.029* (0.016)
Share Black 0.031 (0.026)
Share Sold within Year 0.129*** (0.026)
Post*CU -0.109 (0.096)
Mean of Indicators, by Type
Size Leverage Loan share Real estate share Cash
Banks 0.93 0.60 0.64 0.57 0.34
Credit unions 0.84 0.45 0.69 0.28 0.73
Net income Net interest margin Retained earnings Delinquencies Chargeoffs
Banks 0.75 0.24 0.43 0.81 0.75
Credit unions 0.55 0.39 0.66 0.29 0.85
Off balance sheet Private MBS held Loans for sale Repos Other debt
Banks 0.66 0.72 0.89 0.93 0.91
Credit unions 0.28 0.76 0.63 0.15 0.36
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and not at the observation level. This tables shows that all indicator variables have an
overlapping distribution for banks and credit unions. Taken together, the heterogeneous
response of banks and credit unions to financial crisis shocks are consistent with the idea
that profits are ultimately what drives bank decision-making. This provides strong evidence
that the non-profit objective of credit unions sustained their lending during the crisis.
Table 9: Breakdown by Type of Bank
The unit of observation is institution-quarter. The dependent variable is difference in the log of total loans
and leases for quarter t and t − 4 taken from Call Report data. Credit unions are compared to different
types of banks: (1) public banks which have stock return data, (2)-(3) low and high social responsibility
scores defined using the KLD data. postt equals 1 starting in 2007-Q3. The county of an institution is
based on the location of the headquarters. In addition to size, leverage, and share of loans to total assets,
control variables include all crisis exposure variables. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates.
yict = β
f postt · CUi + postt ·X
′
i,tγ
f + ηct + ηi + εict
(1) (2) (3)
Publicly-Traded Banks
All Low KLD High KLD
Post*CU 0.0578*** 0.0534*** 0.0427**
(0.0095) (0.0145) (0.0200)
County-quarter FE × × ×
Institution FE × × ×
Controls × × ×
N 597,670 327,587 327,023
R-sq 0.4782 0.3766 0.3823
1.5.6. Bank Objectives
To further show that firm objectives matter, I link bank data to a corporate social responsi-
bility scores assigned by the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) Index.
I define a total score for each bank, which is the sum of product, community, environment,
employee, diversity scores. Table 9 presents the results. In Column (1), I compare credit
unions to all publicly-traded banks, since all banks are assigned social responsibility scores.
Credit unions have the highest coefficient relative to this sub-sample. Columns (2)-(3) show
results comparing credit unions to banks with scores. Results are stronger when compared
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to banks with lower scores, suggesting that banks with higher social responsibility scores
continued to lend slightly more than those with low scores. This provides further evidence
consistent with the idea that firm objectives matter for credit provision.
1.5.7. Robustness
Differences in firm and loan characteristics for banks and credit unions may still raise some
concerns about the robustness of the results (See Figures 2 and 3). To address this, I
perform a matching exercise using a matched sample of banks and credit unions using a 1-1
propensity score matching method where sampling is done without replacement with caliper
of 0.05. While a matching exercise still relies on using observables to create the matched
sample and may suffer from omitted variable bias, it still somewhat alleviates the concern
that the difference in balance sheet characteristics are driving the results. I perform the
baseline regression focusing on conventional, conforming, owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first-
lien purchase, home equity and refinance loans mortgage originations in the HMDA data.
Characteristics of the matched sample and results from the regression are shown in Table
10. This exercise shows that credit unions continued to lend significantly more relative to
banks post-recession.
1.6. Alternative Mechanisms
The analysis in the previous section has shown that differences in lending behavior of banks
and credit unions stem from supply-side forces. I have further provided several pieces of
strong suggestive evidence that the non-profit motive of credit unions sustained its lending
in the Great Recession. To make the results more compelling, I invalidate alternative
mechanisms stemming from various institutional differences that could potentially drive
the results. I show that differences in interest rates offered to borrowers, informational
advantages that credit unions may have through the common bond requirement, taxes and
the regulatory environment do not explain the results.
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Table 10: Robustness: Propensity Score Matching
Panel A presents the characteristics of a matched sample of banks and credit unions using a 1-1 propensity
score matching method. Sampling is done without replacement with caliper of 0.05. Panel B presents
results using the matched sample. The unit of observation is institution-county-year. The dependent
variable is difference in the log of conventional, conforming, owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first-lien purchase,
home equity and refinance loans mortgage originations for year t and t− 1 taken from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). postt equals 1 starting in 2007. County refers to the location of the borrower.
Controls include firm characteristics and crisis exposures. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level and are reported in
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
Panel A. Characteristics of Matched Sample
Banks Credit Unions Difference t-test
Size 4.13 4.08 0.05 0.67
Leverage 87.01 87.05 -0.03 -0.11
Loans/TA 59.96 60.62 -0.66 -0.76
Real Estate Loans/TA 30.36 29.88 0.48 0.56
Cash/TA 7.85 8.72 -0.87 -2.39
Net Income 0.19 0.19 0.00 -0.14
Net Interest Margin 0.87 0.87 0.00 -0.18
Retained Earnings 0.12 0.13 -0.01 -0.63
Delinquencies 0.90 0.92 -0.02 -0.34
Chargeoffs 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -1.69
Off-balance sheet/TA 11.23 11.68 -0.45 -0.93
MBS/TA 14.24 14.26 -0.02 -0.02
Private-label MBS/TA 0.30 0.40 -0.10 -1.63
Loans for Sale 0.12 0.15 -0.04 -1.43
Other debt 2.10 1.79 0.30 1.73
N 830 830
Panel B. Regression Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Purchase Home Equity Refinance
Post*CU 0.2238** 0.5570*** 0.1878*
(0.1116) (0.1050) (0.1062)
County-year FE × × ×
Institution FE × × ×
Other Controls × × ×
N 53,372 33,653 88,819
R-sq 0.3221 0.3767 0.3737
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1.6.1. Prices vs Quantities
To distinguish between prices and quantities, I obtain offered interest rates on various asset
and liability products from SNL Financial.30 The data is a survey collecting weekly interest
data across bank and credit union branch locations, and starts in the beginning of 2007. I
calculate the spread of the interest rates over 1-month LIBOR. Using regulatory identifiers,
I merge this data to the Call Report data described above. Table 11 shows the results using
interest rates as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows that fixed-rate on mortgages
offered by banks and credit unions did not differ significantly in the post-crisis period,
suggesting that the results presented above are driven by changes in quantities rather than
on prices. Banks are relatively active in the real estate market, and credit unions do not
appear to compete with them in terms of offered interest rates. Column (2)-(3) shows
the results for home equity lines of credit and new auto loans respectively. Credit unions
lowered interest rates on these types of loans more relative to banks. These loan rates were
on average lower to begin with in the pre-crisis period.
1.6.2. Informational Advantages
Credit unions are established with a common bond among its member-owners, such as a com-
mon industry, employer, or location. The single-bond type of credit union have the strictest
membership requirements and require a single well-defined commonality across members.
Multi-bond credit unions are those that allow for groups of many different associations to
join. These are typically larger credit unions that allow membership for employees in small
businesses to join established institutions as a select employee group (SEG). These mem-
bership requirements potentially restrict the types of borrowers that can approach a credit
union and may lead to systematic matching to lenders, so that observed differences in lend-
ing across institutions is still demand-driven. More importantly, credit unions may have an
informational advantage over banks, which potentially lower the screening and monitoring
30Interest rate data from SNL Financial is formerly known as Datatrac. Coverage for liability products
is between 30-40 percent for banks and 20-30 percent for credit unions, while coverage for asset products is
15-25 percent for banks and 15-20 percent for credit unions.
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Table 11: Interest Rates on Borrowing and Saving
The unit of observation is institution-week. This table presents coefficient estimates of a differences-in-
differences specification using data on interest rates from SNL Financial. The dependent variables are (1)
30-year fixed-rate mortgage rates, (2) interest rates for home equity lines of credit (HELOC) (3) 60-month
new auto loan interest rate . Data sample is from 2007-2013. postt equals 1 starting in 2008 Q3. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
institution level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
yict = β
f postt · CUi + postt ·X
′
i,tγ
f + ηct + ηi + εict
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed Mtg HELOC New Auto
CUi · postt -0.139 -0.288** -0.673***
(0.118) (0.124) (0.120)
County-month FE × × ×
Institution FE × × ×
Controls × × ×
N 456,144 710,013 946,420
R-sq 0.95 0.92 0.95
costs of borrowers. However, there are credit unions with membership requirements that
are only based on geography—community credit unions. Anyone who lives, works or goes to
school in a specified geographical area is eligible to open an account in a community credit
union, similar to opening an account at a bank. Therefore, the costs to acquiring borrower
information are presumably similar for community credit unions and banks. In addition,
the two types of institutions are equally accessible from the perspective of the borrower.
As shown in Panel A of Table 12, the change in lending growth for credit unions was higher
relative to banks across all types of credit unions. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient
is smallest for community credit unions, yet it still statistically significant at 0.045. Single-
bond, multi-bond and state-chartered credit unions all have coefficients over 0.06. In Panel
B, I show the results for the standardized of purchase mortgages in HMDA. Results continue
to hold when focusing on community credit unions within HMDA.
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Table 12: Community Credit Unions
In Panel A, the unit of observation is institution-quarter. The dependent variable is difference in
the log of total loans and leases for quarter t and t−4 taken from Call Report data. Credit unions
are compared to different types of banks. postt equals 1 starting in 2007-Q3. The county of an
institution is based on the location of the headquarters. In addition to size, leverage, and share
of loans to total assets, control variables include all crisis exposure variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. In
Panel B, the unit of observation is institution-county-year. The dependent variable is difference
in the log of conventional, conforming, owner-occupied, 1-4 family, first-lien purchase mortgage
originations for year t and t − 1 taken from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). postt
equals 1 starting in 2007. County refers to the location of the borrower. Standard errors are
clustered at the institution level and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
In both panels, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Panel A. By Type of Credit Union
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Community Single-bond Multi-Bond State
Post*CU 0.0445*** 0.0664*** 0.0653*** 0.0693***
-0.0092 -0.0111 -0.0095 -0.0083
County-quarter FE x x x x
Institution FE x x x x
Controls x x x x
Controls*Post x x x x
N 325,992 346,763 372,225 411,975
R-sq 0.5802 0.5475 0.5600 0.5382
Panel B. Estimates using HMDA data
(1) (2)
All CU’s Community CU’s
Post*CU 0.118** 0.147**
(0.058) (0.061)
County-year FE × ×
Institution FE × ×
Controls × ×
N 686,020 608,628
R-sq 0.17 0.18
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1.6.3. Taxes
Credit unions are tax-exempt due to their non-profit cooperative status. The banking
industry has often lobbied against credit unions by arguing that banks are burdened by
taxes, which limits their lending activity. I also perform a triple differences exercise using
variation taxes paid by banks and show the results in Table 13. In Column (1), I categorize
states into high and low tax rates based on the 2007 state tax rates for financial firms.
In Columns (2)-(3), I categorize banks according to their pre-crisis average effective taxes
paid, as a ratio to total assets. These results suggest that while β becomes muted for high
tax states, it is still positive and statistically significant. The change in the growth rates in
lending for credit unions was higher across high and low tax states.
Table 13: Mechanisms: Taxes
The unit of observation is institution-quarter. The dependent variable is difference in the log of
total loans and leases for quarter t and t− 4 taken from Call Report data. The definition of high
tax rates are calculated in the following ways: (1) institutions are assigned to a high or low taxed
states, (2)-(3) effective taxes for banks are calculated using reported taxes paid on balance sheet.
postt equals 1 starting in 2007-Q3. The county of an institution is based on the location of the
headquarters. In addition to size, leverage, and share of loans to total assets, control variables
include all crisis exposure variables. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates.
yict = β CUi · postt + β1 CUi ·HighTaxt + β1 CUi ·HighTaxt · postt + X
′
i,tγ + ηi + ηct + εict
(1) (2) (3)
LHS: Total Lending Growth Sub-sample of Banks
Low Tax Paid High Tax Paid
Post*CU 0.0799*** 0.0777*** 0.0245***
(0.0070) (0.0110) (0.0074)
County-quarter FE x x x
Institution FE x x x
Controls x x x
Control: Hi State Tax x
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1.6.4. Regulatory Environment
One might be concerned that the regulatory response was different for the two institutions,
so that exposures to the crisis may have been alleviated or exacerbated for some institutions
more than others. I investigate possible differences in the regulatory environment, and find
that both receive similar regulatory treatment. One of the main ways in which the govern-
ment provides support to financial institution is by backing deposit insurance. Both receive
deposit insurance backed by the full-faith of the U.S. government. In 2008, limits on insured
deposits for both banks and credit unions were raised at the same time from $100,000 to
$250,000 per depositor. Both institutions also had access to the Federal Reserve’s discount
window, and liquidity programs implemented during the crisis such as the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) were available to both institutions. In addition, both institutions
are required to satisfy similar capital requirement levels. To eliminate any differences in
government support provided to larger banking institutions, I verify that results hold when
excluding them.
1.7. Policy Implications
By highlighting a growing and well-established part of the traditional financial sector that
sustained lending during the recent financial crisis, this paper has implications for future
policy. First, the data suggest that credit unions provided a level of consumer protection to
households during the crisis, which is one of the major goals of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Policymakers may then want to consider providing
support to the credit union industry to mitigate the transmission of adverse financial shocks
to the real economy. Second, policy makers might want to consider relaxing current limits
to growth on credit union lending, such as limits to business investment or membership
requirements. However, this is subject to a number of caveats. In particular, this paper
does not directly explain the ex ante firm characteristics based on their ownership structure
and how the risk-taking of these institutions might differ. In addition, this paper does
not address whether encouraging household debt is beneficial from a general equilibrium or
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welfare perspective.
More broadly, this paper encourages the discussion on how the ownership structure matters
for firms in other industries. In particular, according to the latest Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) release in 2016, the percent of households directly owning equity stock is
at 14 percent, suggesting that ownership and control of corporations is limited to this small
fraction of the population. However, the statistics of US Businesses (SUSB) show that em-
ployment in corporations is over 70 percent. This data also shows that non-profits, which
include cooperatives, account for 13 percent of employment. There are further research op-
portunities to understand firm-decision making of the typical investor-owned firms by com-
paring them to alternative firms that are organized differently. Research on the Economic
Impact of Cooperatives conducted by the University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives
has in fact accounted for close to 30 thousand cooperatives in the services, utilities and
health care sectors.
1.8. Conclusion
Much of the literature in economics and finance focuses on the traditional shareholder-owned
firm. The literature that seeks to understand the effect of the profit-maximizing firm objec-
tive on real economic activity has been limited to these types of firms. I provide empirical
evidence on the effect of firm objectives on decision-making by comparing profit-maximizing
firms to alternative types of firms in an industry where this distinction is prominent—the
traditional financial sector. In particular, I provide strong evidence that firm objectives
played a role in credit provision of these firms during the Great Recession. Using a rich and
comprehensive dataset including balance sheet information, loan-level activity and interest
rates on an institutional level, I show that lending growth rates were higher for credit unions
by as much as 6-10 percentage points in the post-crisis period starting in mid-2007. Results
hold when comparing firms facing the same borrower profile within the same local credit
market, and despite similar exposures to non-traditional financial sectors that collapsed
during the crisis. Further, results are not driven by differences in loan pricing, informa-
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tional advantages, taxes or the regulatory environment. Taken together, results suggest
that the cooperative nature of credit unions played a significant role in sustaining lending
in the Great Recession.
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CHAPTER 2 : In Search of Liquidity Risk in Bank Stock Returns (with Yasser
Boualam1)2
2.1. Introduction
Banking theory has long recognized that liquidity risk—shortages arising from owning long-
term assets and issuing short-term liabilities—can generate episodes of financial stress.3 In
the 2008 financial crisis, these liquidity shortages were widespread and appeared in various
forms: from the freeze in interbank markets, to the collapse of the asset-backed commercial
paper markets, to the surge in withdrawal from pre-committed credit lines.4 This has
motivated recent literature to quantify liquidity risk on bank balance sheets (Berger and
Bouwman, 2009; Bai et al., 2014). Given this progress, one of the natural next steps in
understanding it is to investigate how liquidity risk is perceived and priced by financial
markets. In this paper, we use the well-established empirical asset pricing methodology to
test whether investors command a premium for liquidity risk. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper that empirically examines the link between liquidity risk and bank stock returns.
Our main result is that banks with higher balance sheet measures of liquidity risk have
significantly lower expected risk-adjusted returns. In particular, a portfolio that is long in
banks with low liquidity risk and short in banks with high liquidity risk earns an annual
average risk-adjusted return of 6 percent. This striking result goes against the intuition that
higher risk should be compensated for with higher risk premia. The paper is then devoted
towards establishing the robustness of this result and to investigating various potential
explanations for this phenomenon.
2The authors thank Jeannie Bai, Laurent Fresard, Joao Gomes, Itay Goldstein, Mete Kilic, Christian
Opp, Ilya Strebulaev, Tanju Yorulmazer, Deming Wu, and seminar participants at INSEAD, North Carolina
State University, Wharton, the 2017 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, the 10th
Swiss Winter Conference on Financial Intermediation, and the 2018 Conference on New Frontiers in Banking
Research (Sapienza University). The authors are also grateful to Sam Rosen for his excellent research
assistance.
3The seminal paper in the literature, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), argues that this mismatch in assets
and liabilities can lead to bank runs. See surveys in Allen and Babus (2009) and Allen et al. (2013).
4See for example, Gorton and Metrick (2012a) and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).
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We show that α’s are statistically significant after controlling for a number of risk factors
that are standard in the literature, such as the Fama-French factors, bond and credit risk
factors, and the Pastor-Stambaugh market liquidity factor. We examine bank characteristics
correlated with LG that could potentially drive our results. We show that findings continue
to hold even after controlling for bank characteristics such as size, profitability, leverage,
asset quality or default likelihood. In addition, we use several different measures of bank
liquidity risk, including our preferred constructed measure, since recent literature has shown
that quantifying it from bank balance sheets is not straightforward and each measure has
benefits and limitations (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Bai et al., 2014).
Our data suggest that banks with higher measures of liquidity risk are less profitable, have
higher leverage and more volatile earnings. In addition, they have relatively higher risk-
weighted assets, z-scores, and more charge-offs and defaulting loans. While our results
overall hold across the distribution of these characteristics, they are more pronounced for
less profitable and highly leveraged banks. In other words, the difference in stock returns
is more prominent for banks with deteriorated balance sheets. Again, this is counter to
the standard intuition that riskier institutions should be compensated for with higher risk
premia and lower stock prices.
We explore several potential reasons behind these results. First, we examine bank size in
the context of the too-big-to-fail story first proposed in Gandhi and Lustig (2015). They
show larger banks are associated with lower risk premia and attribute this to government
subsidies for these banks. Because size is highly correlated with measures of liquidity risk,
this could potentially explain the observed pattern in stock returns. While we confirm
their results in our data, we continue find statistically significant α’s even after controlling
for size. We also control for the financial firm size-factor constructed in their paper and
continue to find similar results.
Second, we examine the possibility of endogenous sorting among banks whereby banks that
are in fact the most exposed to a systematic liquidity risk endogenous choose to keep their
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liquidity mismatch low and thus appear as safe. If this theory holds, we would expect a
portfolio that is long in low liquidity risk banks and short in high liquidity risk banks to
perform badly during recessions. However, we observe that this portfolio actually performed
well at the onset of the recent financial crisis.
Third, a closer analysis across multiple sample periods suggests that the liquidity risk and
risk premia relationship disappears starting in 2010. This suggests that investors may have
underestimated the importance of or mismeasured liquidity risk prior to the crisis. To
this end, we investigate the effect of complexity of banking organizations on our results.5
Controlling for complexity, we show that the α of a long-short portfolio based on liquidity
risk declines by about 40 percent. This suggests that the complexity of banking organization
plays a key role in assessing the liquidity risk of given institution. In particular, as banks
become more complex and opaque, investors may be more likely to underestimate the
inherent liquidity risk and thus more prone to valuation errors.
We contribute to the discussion on optimal liquidity policy and the role of the newly im-
plemented liquidity requirements.6 Since the financial crisis, policymakers have since im-
plemented new regulatory ratios mitigate fragility arising from the liquidity risk embedded
in bank balance sheets. In particular, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requires that
banks have a sufficient stock of liquid assets on their balance sheets to withstand sudden
withdrawals in funding, while the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) regulates the pro-
portion of long-term assets funded by long-term and stable funding. In order for these
regulations to be effective however, policy makers need to understand the role that liquidity
risk plays in the context of larger financial markets. The results in our paper suggests that
this relationship is not completely straightforward.
There are two ways to interpret our results in the context of assessing the new liquidity
regulations. First, we consider a world where in markets are efficient and investors are
5See Gorton (2008) for a discussion related to information asymmetry due to bank opacity and complexity.
6See Allen (2014) and Diamond and Kashyap (2015) and surveys in Allen and Babus (2009) and Allen
et al. (2013).
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correctly pricing the relevant risks faced by banks. Our results suggest that investors
command premia for risks that are negatively correlated with measures of liquidity risk. An
important implication of this is that by focusing on the LCR, policymakers might not be
fully accounting for all risk sources. Second, consider the case of potential valuation errors,
which is possible given the results on bank complexity. This implies that banks might
not face the appropriate cost of capital when making financing decisions, and policymakers
should be concerned about over- or under-investment of banks depending on the degree
of liquidity risk observed on their balance sheets. Unless investors make the appropriate
adjustment to price in liquidity risk going forward, the tightening of bank requirements may
be inefficient in curtailing financial fragility.
Our paper relates to literature from three different fields: theories on the financial fragility
of banks, the measurement of bank liquidity risk, and empirical asset pricing. While the
theoretical link between bank liquidity and financial fragility has been studied quite ex-
tensively, bank stock returns have traditionally been ignored in the empirical asset pricing
literature. A few exceptions that have looked at bank stock returns include Gandhi and
Lustig (2015) who show that bank size is a risk factor and captures a too-big-to-fail sub-
sidy on large banks, and Baker and Wurgler (2013) who show a low-risk anomaly and its
implication for banks cost of capital.7 Our paper focuses specifically on the role of liquidity
risk in explaining the cross-section of bank stock returns, which appear to contain a wealth
of information on how markets perceive bank risks.
Our paper extends the small but growing literature starting with Berger and Bouwman
(2009) which measures liquidity mismatch from the entire balance sheet. They document
the build-up in liquidity mismatch leading up to the recent financial crisis.8 While these
papers have measured and analyzed liquidity risk carefully, they have not yet analyzed the
asset pricing implications of this risk.
7Other papers include Schuermann and Stiroh (2006) and Adrian et al. (2014).
8Other papers include Berger and Bouwman (2013), Berger et al. (2014). Bai et al. (2014) used market
based weights to create a more nuanced measure. Also see Brunnermeier et al. (2014) for a theoretical
exposition.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and the
construction of the liquidity risk measure. Section 2.3 presents the empirical results while
Section 2.4 explores the relationship between liquidity risk and various bank characteristics.
Section 2.5 provides a discussion of potential underlying mechanisms while Section 2.6
discusses policy implications. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. Data
Liquidity risk arises due to the mismatch in the availability of safe assets to cover sudden
withdrawals, or the inability to roll over liquid liabilities. In order to measure the effect of
this risk on stock returns, we first need detailed information on bank balance sheets. We
use granular accounting information from the Y-9C reports to the Federal Reserve between
1991-2016 and from COMPUSTAT prior to 1991 to measure liquidity risk at Bank Holding
Company level. We define a measure called the Liquidity Gap (LG) as the difference
between highly volatile liabilities and liquid assets, normalized by total liabilities. This
section carefully describes the data construction process.
2.2.1. Liquidity Gap
Bank Holding Companies (BHC) provide detailed information on their balance sheets,
income statements, and off-balance sheet activities to the Federal Reserve each quarter
through the FR Y-9C reports. BHC’s with assets consolidated from all legal subsidiaries
that exceed $500 million are required to file these reports. Since the Y-9C forms have
changed over time, we ensure consistency of the data series by using definitions given by
the Fed’s data dictionary and by going through the archived forms available on their web-
site.9 All variables are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The
Appendix provides the mnemonics for the different data series used.
In our final sample, consistent data series based on the Y-9C reports are available starting
in Q1-1991. Although different types of financial holding companies are required to report
9The data dictionary and historical forms are available at the Federal Reserve Board’s website.
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Table 14: Summary Statistics
Panel A presents summary statistics for balance sheet and income statement variables for portfolios for the sample
between 1991 and 2016 (based on 33,168 BHC-quarter observations). We sort bank holding companies into quintiles
according to the LG in Q4 of year date t. Averages are calculated on an equally-weighted basis. Panel B presents
summary statistics for balance sheet and income statement variables for portfolios for the sample between 1974 and
1990 (4,621 BHC-year observations). We sort bank holding companies into quintiles according to the predicted LG
measure in Q4 of year date t. Source: Federal Reserve Y-9C reports and Compustat.
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 Mean Std Dev
Panel A. 1991-2016 (Y-9C Data)
Balance Sheet Items
Assets, Bil. $ 4.16 8.15 14.04 23.11 73.51 24.60 149.98
log(Assets) 21.16 21.22 21.53 21.81 22.62 21.66 1.61
Market Cap, Bil. $ 0.60 1.10 1.75 2.80 8.35 2.92 16.31
Book-to-Market 97.20 97.71 97.47 97.37 97.57 97.46 5.07
Deposits/Assets, % 81.74 80.07 78.71 76.41 69.5 77.28 9.41
Core Deposits/Assets, % 70.45 68.06 66.24 63.23 54.37 64.47 13.28
Equity/Assets, % 9.72 9.63 9.38 9.27 9.00 9.40 2.41
Loans/Assets, % 54.80 63.80 67.52 70.13 70.84 65.45 11.86
Real Estate Loans/Assets, % 38.04 44.83 47.64 49.71 48.5 44.86 15.10
C&I Loans/Assets, % 9.81 10.90 11.34 11.79 11.55 11.08 7.38
Consumer Loans/Assets, % 4.75 5.73 5.97 6.15 6.16 5.75 6.18
Income Statement Items
Net Interest Margin/TA, % 3.75 3.84 3.77 3.81 3.54 3.74 1.18
Non-Int. Income/Income, % 58.46 56.87 58.2 59.46 72.23 61.04 61.06
Return on Assets, % 3.44 3.00 2.60 2.60 2.40 2.80 7.60
Return on Equity, % 8.66 6.95 6.10 6.56 5.91 6.83 26.51
Charge-offs/TA, % 0.33 0.47 0.55 0.58 0.68 0.52 0.96
Risk Characteristics
Tier-1 Capital/Assets, % 9.23 9.09 8.79 8.68 8.37 8.83 2.21
Risk-weighted Assets/Total Assets, % 64.41 70.74 73.46 75.36 77.58 72.33 11.59
Std Dev of ROA 1.56 1.84 2.08 2.12 2.32 2.00 4.12
Std Dev of ROE 4.69 5.51 6.33 6.83 7.24 6.12 1.03
Tail Risk 5.00 5.30 5.35 5.18 5.22 5.21 3.29
Z-score 3.47 3.35 3.29 3.27 3.19 3.31 1.46
Liquidity Characteristics
Liquidity Gap Measure -0.37 -0.25 -0.19 -0.13 -0.02 -0.19 0.16
Volatile Liabilities/Liabilities 0.083 0.099 0.115 0.141 0.228 0.13 0.12
Liquid Assets/Liabilities 0.448 0.342 0.299 0.268 0.249 0.32 0.13
Percent with Mismatch > 0 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.39 0.10 0.30
Bank Organization Characteristics
No. of Banking Subsidiaries 2.02 2.20 2.49 2.94 3.09 2.55 4.97
Complexity 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.3 0.45 0.25 0.49
Panel B. 1974-1990 (Compustat)
Assets, Bil. $ 2.42 4.07 5.18 13.79 23.13 9.73 20.84
Market Cap, Bil. $ 0.16 0.23 0.30 0.53 0.87 0.42 0.73
Equity/Assets, % 6.77 6.20 5.84 5.51 5.10 5.88 1.6
Debt in Current Liabilities/Assets, % 5.98 8.99 10.74 12.72 16.56 11.01 6.51
Long-Term Debt/Assets, % 1.27 1.42 1.71 1.98 3.12 1.90 1.64
Investment and Advances/Assets, % 26.30 21.11 18.27 15.44 12.85 18.76 7.30
Return on Assets, % 0.77 0.76 0.58 0.57 0.50 0.64 0.97
Liquidity Risk Measure -0.36 -0.26 -0.20 -0.13 -0.02 -0.19 0.13
Cash/Assets 9.08 9.35 9.50 9.75 8.66 9.27 3.79
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the Y-9C, we restrict our sample to bank holding companies, and exclude savings and loan
holding companies and securities holding companies.10 In the baseline analysis, we exclude
the following observations: (1) real estate or C&I loans are less than 0; (2) deposits are
less than 0; (3) equity is less than 0; (4) consumer loans are more than 50 percent; and (5)
non-typical BHC’s.11
The various supporting schedules in the Y-9C reports provide enough granularity for us to
calculate different measures of liquidity risk. For this study, we are particularly interested in
measuring banks’ ability to cover sudden withdrawals and to finance day-to-day operations
without any distress, inline with the liquidity coverage ratio. This includes the ability to roll
over short-term debt to fund asset holdings or purchases and the provision of pre-committed
liquidity guarantees. As such, we define the liquidity gap as follows:
LG =
Volatile Liabilities− Liquid Assets
Total Liabilities
,
where we identify volatile liabilities and liquid assets from balance sheet data. The difference
between these two particular categories captures whether a BHC’s liquid assets are sufficient
to service its volatile liabilities, and hence reflects liquidity risk. We normalize by total
liabilities.12
We classify items on the balance sheet as volatile when they are characterized by relatively
high volatile inflow and outflow rates using the following methodology. We first calculate the
time-series standard deviation of the growth rates over four quarters of each major type of
liability for each BHC.13 We then define flow volatility as the cross-sectional average of these
standard deviations across banks. Table 15 ranks the different types of liabilities on a bank’s
10Savings and loan holding companies and securities holding companies comprise less than 1 percent of
the observations in the merged CRSP-Y-9C sample.
11We also exclude the following institutions: Metlife (RSSD9001 = 2945824) which is primarily an in-
surance company, Goldman Sachs Group (2380443) and Morgan Stanley (2162966) which became BHC’s
in 2008, and American Express Company (1275216) and Discover Financial Services (3846375) which are
primarily consumer loan banks.
12Results are robust to alternative normalization variables.
13We remove seasonality and smooth growth rates by calculating growth =
xt−xt−4
0.5(xt+xt−4)
.
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balance sheet and their corresponding volatilities.14 We include the top four most volatile
liabilities in the liquidity measure.15 This includes trading liabilities, other borrowed money
including commercial paper, overnight federal funds purchased and repurchase agreements,
and non-interest bearing deposits and balances in foreign offices. Standard deviations of the
annual growth rates of these items range from 0.52-0.61. On average, volatile liabilities have
a standard deviation of 44 percent, while non-volatile liabilities have a standard deviation of
around 11 percent. In the aggregate, this covers around 33 percent of the total liabilities of
all bank holding companies. On an equal-weighted basis, volatile liabilities average around
11 percent across banks. Excluding data from 2008 onwards does not change the relative
ranking of the different types of liabilities according to volatility.
Table 15: Volatility of Liability Types
This table presents the volatility of major liability categories (deposit categories are broken down into foreign
vs domestic offices and commercial vs non-commercial subsidiaries) in the Y-9C Federal Reserve quarterly
reports from 1991-2016. (1) is the average of the standard deviation of the cross-section 4-quarter growth
rates; (2) is the average 4-quarter growth rates; (3) is the share of each liability category to total capital
(liabilities plus equity) in the aggregate; (4) is the average share of each liability category to total capital
(liabilities plus equity) across banks. Source: Federal Reserve Y-9C reports.
Item Std Dev Mean VW Share EW Share
Trading Liabilities 0.616 0.126 0.044 0.016
Other Borrowed Money 0.556 0.101 0.119 0.074
Deposits, Foreign 0.537 0.100 0.111 0.067
Federal Funds Purchased and Repos 0.516 0.074 0.084 0.048
Volatile Liabilities 0.439 0.106 0.327 0.120
Other Liabilities 0.414 0.083 0.054 0.014
Subordinated Notes and Debentures 0.256 0.052 0.024 0.018
Non-interest Bearing Deposits, Domestic 0.204 0.095 0.125 0.125
Equity 0.150 0.080 0.103 0.095
Interest Bearing Deposits, Domestic 0.127 0.071 0.369 0.642
Non-volatile Liabilities and Equity 0.112 0.076 0.673 0.880
Deposits in non-commercial banks 0.338 0.049 0.026 0.250
Deposits in commercial banks 0.120 0.077 0.488 0.759
Off-Balance Sheet 0.740 -0.068 0.033 0.037
We define liquid assets as assets that can easily and immediately be converted to cash
without loss of value. Consistent with the classification proposed in Berger and Bouwman
(2009), these assets include cash and balances due from other institutions including reserves
14An alternative way of calculating volatility is to calculate for each bank the standard deviation of the
annual growth rates for each major liability category which measures the degree of inflow and outflow for
each category and take an average across banks. This alternative calculation ranks the different types of
liabilities according to volatility similarly and in particular, the top volatile liability categories are the same.
15While the cutoff for specifying whether a certain type of liability is volatile is arbitrary, we use different
cutoffs in the analysis as a robustness measure.
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at the central bank, all securities, trading assets, federal funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to resell.
Our LG measure is closely related to the definition of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
defined in Basel III and by the Federal Reserve and builds on the definition of volatile
liabilities mentioned in the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on large
BHC’s. Consistent with the LCR, we focus specifically on volatile liabilities rather than all
liquid liabilities. This excludes “liquid” but stable liabilities such as insured deposits but
still captures major sources of funding for banks.16 The LCR also measures the amount of
high quality liquid assets (HQLA) available to service liquid liabilities that can be withdrawn
within the next 30 days. In other words, the regulation specifies weights on each liability
category depending on how likely it is to be withdrawn and on each asset category depending
on how easily it can be converted to cash taking into account price impact, similar to our
measure. We define LG since calculating the LCR according to the proposed regulations
requires a level of detail not available in the Y-9C reports.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) (BB thereafter) provides an alternative measure referred to as
liquidity mismatch, which incorporates all on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities
of a bank. BB classifies all asset, liability, equity and off-balance sheet items reported in
Y-9C as either liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid. Illiquid assets and liquid liabilities worsen
liquidity mismatch while liquid assets, illiquid liabilities and equity improve liquidity mis-
match. An important distinction between our measure of liquidity risk and BB comes from
the interpretation of the weights that are assigned to the different items on the balance
sheet. In particular, they assign a positive weight on illiquid assets which is interpreted
to mean that the bank has created illiquidity. However, we are more concerned about the
servicing of liabilities while taking into account the resale value of assets to do so. Hence,
in our definition, we assign a zero resale value to illiquid assets. This does not imply a
16For example, “stable deposits” enter the calculation of LCR with a weight of 3 percent only. For
further details, see the GAO report on bank holding companies dated July 2014 and available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665162.pdf and the liquidity coverage ratio section of the Federal Regis-
ter dated May 2015 and available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-05-28/pdf/2015-12850.pdf.
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zero resale value generally, but only for the immediate servicing of volatile liabilities. We
think that this is reasonable considering that volatile liabilities have very short duration
and selling illiquid assets might not be feasible immediately. Similarly, Bai et al. (2014)
derive a model-based measure of liquidity risk called the Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI).
As in the LCR, they calculate the LMI using time-varying weights on each liability item
reflecting the likelihood of withdrawal on each asset item reflecting convertibility to cash.
In essence, this measure captures the shortage of liquid assets available to service liquid
liabilities. However, as in the BB measure, they assign a positive weight to illiquid assets.
2.2.2. Liquidity Risk Measure Before 1991
Given the limited availability of detailed balance sheet data from the Y-9C reports prior to
1991, we use annual accounting variables from COMPUSTAT to start our analysis in 1974.
We first combine COMPUSTAT with the Y-9C reports using a link table constructed by
the New York Fed.17 We then run a regression of LG on COMPUSTAT variables for the
sample after 1991 and use the regressions coefficients to predict LG prior to 1991 for BHC’s
with a three-digit header SIC code corresponding to 602 or 671.18 Using this method, we
extend the sample back to 1974.19 Variables in this regression are chosen to maximize
the sample both before and after 1991 - a large overlap between Y-9C and COMPUSTAT
variables after 1991 is crucial to get precise coefficient estimates, but at the same time these
variables should be available for many BHC’s prior to 1991.20 The Appendix provides the
list of variables in COMPUSTAT used in the regression. Not surprisingly, cash, and debt in
current liabilities and long-term debt are some of the key accounting variables that explain
the liquidity gap measure.
17The merger between the BHC identifier RSSD9001 from Y-9C to PERMCO from COMPUSTAT is
based on the version of the link table dated March 2014.
18Note that 97 percent of the merged CRSP and Y-9C data between 1991-2014 has an SIC code of 6020.
19Studies which Stock return data for a large number of financial firms are not available prior to 1970’s.
Papers which use bank s Ghandi and Lustig (2015) use data starting 1972 while Baker and Wurgler (2014)
use data starting 1971.
20While we use the projection exercise to obtain liquidity gaps ratios prior to 1991, we also calculate
predicted ratios for banks after 1991 for which Y-9C data is not available but COMPUSTAT is available.
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Figure 9: Liquidity Gap Distribution
This figure plots the liquidity gap ratio over the period 1992-2016. The solid black line
represents the median of our sample, while the dashed lines represent the 10th and 90th
percentiles respectively. Source: authors’s calculations based on Federal Reserve Y-9C
filings data.
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Figure 10: Share of Banks with Positive Liquidity Gap
This figure plots the share of banks with positive liquidity gap over the period 1992-2016.
Source: authors’s calculations based on Federal Reserve Y-9C filings data.
For the projection exercise, we run both an OLS regression and a panel regression with
bank fixed effects. We first run a regression for the sample from 2000-2016 where both
Y-9C and COMPUSTAT data are available, use the sample from 1991-1999 as an out of
sample test of the regression where both datasets are still available, and impute LG from
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Figure 11: Aggregate Liquidity Gap
This figure plots the aggregate dollar amount of volatile liabilities less liquid assets over
the period 1992-2016, using data from the Federal Reserve Y-9C. Volatile liabilities in-
clude trading liabilities, non-interest bearing balances in domestic non-commercial bank
subsidiaries, other borrowed money including commercial paper, overnight federal funds
purchased and repurchase agreements, and non-interest bearing deposits and balances in
foreign offices. Liquid assets include cash and balances due from other institutions, all
securities, trading assets, federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements
to resell.
1974-1990 where only COMPUSTAT data is available. In particular,
LGi,t =
N∑
j=1
βjxj,i,t if year > 2000
L̂Gi,t =
N∑
j=1
β̂jxi,j,t if year < 2000.
Here, LGi,t is the liquidity risk for each bank i at time t, xj,i,t is the j
th explanatory variable
where j = 1...N and βj are the coefficients. Table A4 shows results from this projection
exercise. COMPUSTAT variables can largely explain movements in LG as seen in the
R-squared of the OLS regression at 91 and the R-squared of the panel regression at 88.
We use predicted values from the OLS regression throughout the paper, and use the pre-
dicted values from the panel regression as a robustness exercise. To gauge out-of-sample
performance, we run a regression of actual liquidity risk on predicted liquidity risk between
1991-1999. Table A4 shows that the coefficient on predicted LG is highly statistically in-
significant from 1 and R-squared values are around 85 percent, suggesting that the predictive
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regressions perform very well. Coefficients from these regressions shed light on which vari-
ables affect LG. The types of liquid assets or volatile liabilities available may have changed
before and after 1991, however we assume that the response of banks in terms of liquidity
management has remained the same.
2.2.3. Descriptive Statistics for Overall Sample
Table (14) presents summary statistics for balance sheet items, income statement items,
liquidity characteristics and bank organization characteristics on an equal-weighted bases
using both the Y-9C reports and COMPUSTAT. Definitions of the variables are provided
in the Appendix. Over the post-1991 sample period, there were 33,168 BHC-quarter obser-
vations, while over the pre-1991 period, there were 4,621 BHC-year observations. Over the
entire sample period, there were 1,091 unique BHC’s. In the following analysis, we focus
mostly on the summary statistics in Panel A from the Y-9C reports. Panel B presents
descriptive statistics from COMPUSTAT data.
Total bank assets have averaged around $24.6 billion, however the median has been around
$1.77 billion highlighting the skewness of the distribution of banks size. In 2014-Q4, the
top 5 percent of BHC’s held 78 percent of total assets in the sample. On the liabilities side,
77 percent of funding comes from deposits while on the assets side, 65 percent are held in
loans. On average, 25 percent of banks are considered complex by regulators and each BHC
has an average of 2-3 banking subsidiaries.
Liquidity gap is -0.19 on average, where the negative sign suggests that banks have held
enough liquid assets against liquid liabilities over the entire sample period. There is a
substantial amount of heterogeneity across banks and over time as shown in Figure 9. A
majority of banks have negative liquidity gap ratios on their balance sheet over the sample
period, while over half of the observations in the highest portfolio have positive liquidity gap.
Throughout the period 1992-2016, about 10% of banks in our sample experience a positive
liquidity mismatch in a given year. This number peaks to 27.5% during the financial crisis,
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as exhibited in Figure 10. While we would also expect higher measures of liquidity risk
during the build-up to the savings and loan crisis in the early 1990’s, it is important to note
that we only include public financial firms with a three-digit header SIC code corresponding
to 602 or 671 (commercial banks) and we exclude savings and loan holding companies from
the Y-9C sample.
At the aggregate level, Figure 11 shows that there are periods when the total liquidity gap
turns positive, suggesting that the banking system as whole does not hold enough liquid
assets to withstand extensive cash outflows related to volatile liabilities. These episodes
have occurred during recessions and are most pronounced during the recent financial crisis.
2.3. Liquidity Mismatch Effect in Bank Stock Returns
This section investigates the (risk-adjusted) returns of portfolios of bank stocks sorted
with respect to our liquidity mismatch measure. We first merge monthly data on bank
stock returns obtained from CRSP to the combined Y-9C and COMPUSTAT dataset.21
Following Fama and French (1993), we sort banks according to LG and form our stock
portfolios monthly as of December of the previous year. In particular, December accounting
information in year t−1 is used to sort monthly stock returns from January to December of
year t. Portfolio rebalancing occurs on a yearly frequency. LG uses accounting information
available six-months prior to when returns are measured to avoid look-ahead bias, so that
the release of accounting variables and the sorting of returns ensures that the information
has been fully disseminated to the public.22 We then form 5 quintile portfolios sorted
according to LG. As in Campbell et al. (2008), we limit turnover costs by holding the
constructed portfolios for a year, and by excluding stocks with price below $1 at the date
of formation. The final sample consists of about 155,000 BHC-month observations from
January 1974 - December 2016. Over this time period, we observe 1,092 unique BHC’s, and
21This merge uses the same link table provided by the New York Fed used to merge the Y-9C and
COMPUSTAT datasets.
22Information from the Y-9C reports are available on the Chicago Fed’s website around 24 hours after the
reports are received. We perform a robustness check where stock returns from January-December of year t
are sorted based on liquidity gap computed as of June of year t− 1.
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an average of around 300 unique BHC’s per year.
2.3.1. Main Specification
To see which systematic factors explain the cross section of bank stock returns, we run
linear factor regressions rep,t+1 = αp + β
′
pft+1 + εp,t+1, where r
e
p,t+1 are monthly excess
returns for each liquidity-gap-sorted portfolio p, ft+1 are the risk factors, and βp represent
the loadings on the factors. We analyze the cross-section of bank stock returns through
the lens of the following factor model specifications: (i) raw excess returns, (ii) CAPM,
(iii) Fama-French three-factor model, (iv) Fama-French five-factor model augmented with
two bond risk factors and Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. The 4th specification above
represents our baseline factor model. It nests model specifications (i), (ii), and (iii) and has
the following eight factors:
ft = [market smb hml rmw cma ltg crd ps]
The first five factors [market smb hml rmw cma] correspond to the standard five
Fama-French factors reflecting the market return, size (small minus big), value (high minus
low), profitability (robust minus weak), and investment (conservative minus aggressive),
available from Ken French’s website and WRDS. Similar to Gandhi and Lustig (2015), we
also include two bond risk factors, namely ltg (excess returns on the US 10-year Government
Bond Total Return Index obtained from Global Financial Data) and crd (excess returns
on an index of investment grade corporate bonds (CRD) generated by Dow Jones). These
bond factors capture banks’ potential exposure to maturity and credit risks. Lastly, we add
the Pastor-Stambaugh traded liquidity factor ps obtained from WRDS, in order to control
for banks’ exposure to market liquidity.
We report our results on a value-weighted basis using market capitalization in Table 16
and on a equal-weighted basis in Table 18. These results cover our four factor model
specifications with returns expressed in annualized percentage points, Newey-West standard
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errors corrected with 6 lags, and t-statistics shown in parentheses. The first five columns
show results for each of the quintile portfolios. The last column shows the long-short
portfolio that goes long the stocks with the lowest liquidity gap and short the stocks with
the highest liquidity gap.
Given that the results are overall similar across both weighting schemes, we focus below
on describing the patterns obtained on a value-weighted basis. Panel A first reports un-
conditional excess returns which are declining almost monotonically with the level of LG.
The average excess return for the low LG portfolio is 9.6 percent, while the average excess
return for the high LG portfolio is 6.3 percent. The long-short portfolio yields an average an
annual return of 3.3 percent. We also show α’s obtained from CAPM and the three-factor
Fama-French model. These specifications all show an even more striking alpha pattern as
the relative performance of high-liquidity gap stocks actually worsens as we control for the
risk factors. The long-short portfolio reflects an average excess return of 5.5 percent (with
a t-stat of 2.8) for the CAPM and 7.3 percent (with a t-stat of 3.7) for the three-factor
Fama-French model. Lastly, we show the α’s for our baseline specification which includes
eight factors, described above. Results show that the α on the long short portfolio is 6.0
percent and is still statistically significant (with a t-stat of 2.9).
The widening of these differences is better understood in light of the factor loadings. Panels
B and C reports the associated coefficients for the CAPM and three-factor Fama-French
specifications, respectively, while Panel D reports the factor loadings for our eight-factor
baseline model. Overall, our results show that the loadings on the market are (almost)
monotonically increasing with the liquidity gap measure, ranging from 0.88 to 1.29 in our
main specification. The fact that high liquidity gap banks are more exposed to aggregate
market risk can be partly attributed to the fact that these banks tend to be more levered.
The factor loadings on hml are also similarly increasing in liquidity gap, going from 0.62
for the first portfolio to 1.26 for the fifth one. The loading patterns on smb however
exhibit a hump shape, first increasing between the first (0.16) and second portfolio (0.26),
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Table 16: Returns on Liquidity Gap-Sorted Stock Portfolios - Value-Weighted
Panel A presents raw excess returns (i) and risk-adjusted returns (α) of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for CAPM (ii),
3-factor Fama-French(iii), and 5-factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity factor
ps (iv). Panels B-D present the factor loadings on these models. Sample period: 1974 - 2016. Standard errors are
Newey-West corrected with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Portfolio returns are annualized and value-weighted
based on market capitalization.
Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Panel A. Alphas
Excess Returns 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.081** 0.063 0.033
(3.29) (2.99) (2.61) (2.46) (1.60) (1.61)
CAPM alpha 0.037* 0.033 0.021 0.013 -0.017 0.055***
(1.86) (1.46) (0.95) (0.50) (-0.67) (2.84)
3-factor alpha 0.004 -0.004 -0.024 -0.028 -0.069*** 0.073***
(0.25) (-0.21) (-1.33) (-1.22) (-3.54) (3.73)
8-factor alpha 0.017 -0.001 -0.009 -0.018 -0.043∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.91) (-0.04) (-0.42) (-0.77) (-2.17) (2.93)
Panel B. CAPM
βM 0.827*** 0.792*** 0.902*** 0.953*** 1.132*** -0.305***
(18.17) (18.51) (16.22) (13.81) (14.30) (-4.46)
Panel C. 3-Factor Fama-French (regression coefficients)
βM 0.892*** 0.871*** 1.025*** 1.116*** 1.321*** -0.430***
(18.61) (20.94) (23.12) (16.76) (20.01) (-6.41)
βsmb 0.179*** 0.172*** 0.091* -0.158 -0.124* 0.303***
(3.17) (2.68) (1.93) (-1.42) (-1.73) (4.71)
βhml 0.536*** 0.612*** 0.788*** 0.785*** 0.971*** -0.435***
(7.81) (9.59) (11.60) (7.92) (8.88) (-3.61)
Panel D. 5-Factor Fama-French + ltg + crd + ps (regression coefficients)
βM 0.880*** 0.873*** 0.992*** 1.122*** 1.286*** -0.406***
(18.88) (24.26) (24.52) (17.06) (20.25) (-7.06)
βsmb 0.164** 0.264*** 0.129** -0.036 -0.069 0.233***
(2.53) (4.94) (2.25) (-0.36) (-0.87) (3.12)
βhml 0.619*** 0.744*** 0.958*** 0.974*** 1.261*** -0.642***
(7.29) (9.61) (9.99) (7.84) (9.05) (-4.21)
βrmw -0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.002** -0.000 -0.001
(-0.85) (2.66) (0.43) (2.39) (-0.02) (-0.64)
βcma -0.002 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.006*** 0.004**
(-1.26) (-2.60) (-2.71) (-2.19) (-3.42) (2.23)
βltg 0.011 0.145 0.075 0.200 0.250* -0.238
(0.09) (1.31) (0.79) (1.31) (1.75) (-1.50)
βcrd -0.070 -0.134 -0.017 -0.210 -0.228 0.158
(-0.41) (-0.76) (-0.09) (-0.88) (-0.95) (0.69)
βps -0.054 -0.118** -0.177*** -0.233*** -0.210** 0.156**
(-1.23) (-2.29) (-2.61) (-2.78) (-2.49) (2.00)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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before continuously declining until the last portfolio (-0.07). The factor loadings (and their
differences across portfolios) on profitability rmw and investment cma appear to be quite
marginal. This suggests that such factors have little power in explaining common variations
in financial stock returns (as opposed to non-financials), and could technically be omitted
without much impacting our results.
With the exception of portfolio 3, we also observe overall increasing patterns for ltg suggest-
ing that that banks with highest liquidity gap tend to be more exposed to long-term bonds.
This is not surprising given that the liquidity mismatch on banks balance sheets tend to be
positively correlated with their maturity gap. Conversely , we observe a decreasing pattern
in crd (with the exception of portfolio 3) suggesting that high liquidity-gap banks are less
exposed to credit market relative to low liquidity-gap banks. This however seems at odd
with the results in Table 14 which show that banks with the highest liquidity mismatch tend
to have higher charge-offs and risk-weighted assets. Finally, the loadings on the liquidity
factor ps also exhibit a clear pattern showing that banks with the largest liquidity mismatch
tend to be much more negatively exposed to market liquidity compared to banks with the
lowest mismatch.23
23Results for portfolio deciles provide similar results and are reported in Table 17 for our main specification.
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Table 17: Returns on Liquidity Gap-Sorted Stock Portfolios - Deciles
This table presents risk-adjusted returns (α) and regression coefficients of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for the 5-factor Fama-French model augmented with bond
factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity factor ps (specification iv), and including a financial size factor. Sample period: 1974 - 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected
with 6 lags. Portfolio returns are annualized and computed as value-weighted based on market capitalization (Panel A), and equal-weighted (Panel B).
Panel A: value-weighted
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High Low-High
alpha 0.022 0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008 -0.019 -0.026 -0.062*** -0.036 0.058**
βM 0.790*** 0.918*** 0.819*** 0.912*** 0.924*** 0.994*** 1.076*** 1.140*** 1.200*** 1.320*** -0.530***
βsmb 0.238*** 0.213*** 0.316*** 0.277*** 0.164* 0.184*** 0.150 -0.030 -0.068 -0.044 0.281***
βhml 0.556*** 0.733*** 0.747*** 0.764*** 0.735*** 0.996*** 1.034*** 0.976*** 1.080*** 1.291*** -0.735***
βrmw -0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002 0.000 0.003*** 0.003** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
βcma -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.007*** 0.006***
eβltg 0.028 0.038 0.146 0.150 0.073 0.056 0.309* 0.199 0.184 0.276 -0.249
βcrd -0.074 -0.106 -0.044 -0.173 0.061 0.002 -0.316 -0.210 -0.132 -0.255 0.181
βps -0.006 -0.134** -0.095 -0.132** -0.059 -0.213** -0.200** -0.213*** -0.171** -0.205** 0.200**
Panel B: equal-weighted
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High Low-High
alpha 0.044*** 0.029* 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.019 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009 -0.033 0.078***
βM 0.581*** 0.679*** 0.662*** 0.719*** 0.748*** 0.780*** 0.869*** 0.891*** 0.967*** 1.039*** -0.458***
βsmb 0.433*** 0.468*** 0.442*** 0.477*** 0.435*** 0.467*** 0.450*** 0.400*** 0.297*** 0.287*** 0.146**
βhml 0.510*** 0.630*** 0.662*** 0.681*** 0.739*** 0.801*** 0.805*** 0.887*** 0.889*** 0.925*** -0.414***
βrmw 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002* 0.000
βcma -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** 0.002*
βltg 0.009 0.025 0.025 -0.020 0.016 0.012 0.174* 0.085 0.213** 0.160 -0.151*
βcrd 0.119 0.118 0.180 0.152 0.188 0.227 -0.040 0.093 -0.042 0.068 0.051
βps -0.037 -0.099** -0.095** -0.083 -0.116** -0.160*** -0.166*** -0.183*** -0.121** -0.164** 0.127**
N 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.3.2. Long-Short Portfolio Cumulative Returns
The results reported above hold unconditionally. A natural question to ask is whether the
abnormal returns we uncover are concentrated in a particular period of time or exhibit a
different pattern depending on good vs. bad times.Figure 12 shows the cumulative returns
for $1 invested in the long-short portfolio in the beginning of the sample period in 1974 with
net proceeds at the end of the period reinvested in each subsequent period, for both the raw
returns and the risk-adjusted returns. $1 invested in the risk-adjusted portfolio increases
about 10-fold over the entire sample period, while raw returns increase by 2.5-fold.
2.4. Liquidity Mismatch and Bank Characteristics
Table 14 reported the average characteristics associated with LG-sorted portfolios, cal-
culated on an equally-weighted basis.24 Examining these summary statistics is useful in
narrowing down the potential mechanisms underlying the observed empirical relationships
and testing the robustness of our findings. There are substantial differences in bank char-
acteristics across portfolios. In the data, BHC’s with higher LG tend to be larger, rely less
on deposits and core-deposits as a source of funding, and are more levered according to
both equity and Tier-1 capital. In addition, these BHC’s hold more loans as assets on their
balance sheets relative to liquid and cash-equivalent assets, and have higher risk-weighted
assets. Idiosyncratic risk, as measured by the average 8-quarter rolling standard deviations
of either net income as a fraction of total assets (ROA) or equity (ROE) is also monoton-
ically higher for banks with higher liquidity mismatch. Z-score and credit risk - measured
as the amount of charge-offs less recoveries as a fraction of previous allowances - are also
higher for banks with higher LG. Lastly, these banks are more complex according to a sub-
jective complexity index reported by the Federal Reserve, and have relatively more banking
subsidiaries.
24Panel B of Table (14) presents the descriptive statistics prior to 1991 using COMPUSTAT data. Since
the variables presented in this table are used to create the liquidity profile measure, the monotonic pattern
of each variable with the liquidity gap is to be expected and shows results consistent with the projection
results.
67
Table 18: Returns on Liquidity Gap-Sorted Stock Portfolios - Equally-Weighted
Panel A presents raw excess returns (i) and risk-adjusted returns (α) of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for CAPM
(ii), 3-factor Fama-French(iii), and 5-factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity
factor ps (iv). Panels B-D present the factor loadings on these models. Sample period: 1974 - 2016. Standard errors
are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis. Portfolio returns are annualized and computed
on an equally-weighted basis.
Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Panel A. Alphas
Excess Returns 0.126*** 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.096*** 0.091** 0.035**
(4.74) (3.72) (3.59) (2.92) (2.47) (2.32)
CAPM alpha 0.083*** 0.065*** 0.064** 0.039 0.025 0.058***
(3.79) (2.62) (2.42) (1.44) (0.90) (4.57)
3-factor alpha 0.046*** 0.024 0.019 -0.008 -0.021 0.067***
(2.74) (1.24) (0.91) (-0.40) (-0.94) (5.40)
8-factor alpha 0.037∗∗ 0.015 0.015 -0.012 -0.021 0.058∗∗∗
(2.38) (0.83) (0.80) (-0.64) (-1.07) (4.44)
Panel B. CAPM
βM 0.605*** 0.660*** 0.739*** 0.808*** 0.926*** -0.321***
(13.97) (13.51) (13.27) (14.24) (15.01) (-9.57)
Panel C. 3-Factor Fama-French (regression coefficients)
βM 0.641*** 0.710*** 0.801*** 0.889*** 1.029*** -0.389***
(17.10) (16.63) (18.25) (17.14) (18.01) (-11.79)
βsmb 0.359*** 0.361*** 0.366*** 0.302*** 0.181** 0.179***
(6.06) (5.89) (6.15) (3.85) (2.32) (4.67)
βhml 0.534*** 0.619*** 0.691*** 0.746*** 0.758*** -0.224***
(8.84) (10.67) (10.17) (10.20) (11.07) (-5.80)
Panel D. 5-Factor Fama-French + ltg + crd + ps (regression coefficients)
βM 0.632*** 0.691*** 0.765*** 0.881*** 1.003*** -0.371***
(19.68) (18.57) (18.23) (18.47) (19.62) (-11.38)
βsmb 0.449*** 0.460*** 0.451*** 0.426*** 0.292*** 0.157***
(8.96) (9.21) (7.74) (6.39) (4.01) (3.45)
βhml 0.570*** 0.671*** 0.770*** 0.849*** 0.907*** -0.337***
(9.29) (10.27) (10.05) (9.50) (11.60) (-5.93)
βrmw 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.000
(3.77) (3.72) (2.48) (3.35) (2.36) (0.54)
βcma -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** 0.002**
(-1.30) (-1.61) (-1.80) (-1.78) (-2.49) (2.48)
βltg 0.019 0.001 0.016 0.130 0.188* -0.169***
(0.29) (0.01) (0.18) (1.34) (1.89) (-2.61)
βcrd 0.110 0.168 0.205 0.026 0.012 0.098
(1.02) (1.36) (1.28) (0.15) (0.07) (0.90)
βps -0.067* -0.091** -0.137*** -0.176*** -0.142** 0.075**
(-1.89) (-2.24) (-2.86) (-3.02) (-2.46) (2.12)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Panel A. Value-weighted returns
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Panel B. Equal-weighted returns
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Figure 12: Cumulative Returns for Long-Short Portfolio
This figure plots the cumulative returns for $1 invested in the long-short portfolio of
banks sorted by LG in the beginning of the sample period in 1974 with net proceeds at
the end of the period reinvested in each subsequent period. The figure plots both the
raw returns and the risk-adjusted returns which are the residuals from the regression of
the raw returns on the excess market return, SMB, HML, and a financial sector specific
size factor. The excess market return is also plotted for reference.
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These differences in characteristics could potentially drive the relative underperformance
of high LG banks, thus limiting any liquidity risk effect. In this section, we focus on the
following characteristics exhibiting higher levels of heterogeneity across portfolios: (i) size,
(ii) profitability, (iii) leverage, (iv) charge-offs, and (v) tail risk.25
We attempt to test the robustness of our original results by controlling for such differences
in bank characteristics in two different ways: (i) double sort portfolio exercises and (ii)
cross-sectional regressions in the spirit of Fama-Macbeth (1973).
2.4.1. Size
Gandhi and Lustig (2015) show that size is a key factor for bank stock returns. They argue
that larger banks have an implicit too-big-to-fail guarantee which makes them appear safer
to shareholders, eventually leading to commanding relatively small risk premia. It is thus
critical to control for any potential size effect in our results, especially given that such
characteristic is monotonically increasing in our liquidity risk measure as shown in Table
14. We test the robustness of our findings to bank size considerations through two different
approaches. First, we include a financial-specific size factor, as advocated by Gandhi and
Lustig (2015). Second, we run a double sorting exercise. Note that size is also a control in
our Fama-Macbeth regressions later on.
First, we augment our 8-factor baseline specification with a financial-sector-specific size
factor, constructed along the lines of Gandhi and Lustig (2015) methodology. Results
are reported in Tables 19 and 20 for both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns. In
particular we show that while controlling for a financial-sector-specific size factor does reduce
our alphas by about 1 to 1.5%. These remain relatively high and statistically significant,
with 4.5% α (t-statistic of 2.3) for value-weighted returns, and 5% (t-statistic of 4.1). The
loadings on the financial-size specific factors exhibit an overall declining pattern, suggesting
the prevalence of small banks among the least liquidity-distressed portfolios. This helps
25While we focus here on bank characteristics, the analysis could be extended to account for characteristics
at the stock level, pertaining for example, to trading volume, number of analyst coverage, or institutional
holdings share.
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attenuate the extent of the alpha difference between low and high liquidity gap portfolios.
Also, the large negative loadings associated with the fourth and fifth portfolio is consistent
with the interpretation of Gandhi and Lustig (2015) that market participants perceive large
banks as more likely to receive government subsidies in periods of financial distress.
Table 19: Financial Sector Size Factor (Value Weighted)
This table presents risk-adjusted returns (α) and regression coefficients of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for the 5-
factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity factor ps (specification iv), and
including a financial size factor. Sample period: 1974 - 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags.
t-statistics are in parenthesis. Portfolio returns are annualized and are value-weighted based on market capitalization.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
alpha 0.028 0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.018 0.045**
(1.44) (0.40) (0.41) (0.33) (-0.90) (2.28)
βM 0.701*** 0.728*** 0.716*** 0.702*** 0.868*** -0.167***
(15.87) (14.06) (13.98) (10.15) (14.19) (-3.01)
βsmb 0.311*** 0.383*** 0.355*** 0.308*** 0.274*** 0.038
(4.64) (6.21) (6.05) (3.58) (3.70) (0.52)
βhml 0.516*** 0.661*** 0.801*** 0.733*** 1.022*** -0.506***
(5.62) (9.21) (11.37) (7.55) (10.79) (-3.97)
βrmw -0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001
(-0.06) (3.33) (1.65) (3.57) (1.41) (-1.44)
βcma -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.004** 0.003
(-0.56) (-1.99) (-2.11) (-1.04) (-2.39) (1.51)
βltg -0.040 0.103 -0.005 0.079 0.129 -0.170
(-0.35) (1.00) (-0.06) (0.65) (1.10) (-1.06)
βcrd 0.035 -0.049 0.144 0.036 0.016 0.018
(0.21) (-0.30) (0.90) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09)
βps -0.036 -0.104** -0.149*** -0.191*** -0.169*** 0.132**
(-0.92) (-2.30) (-2.70) (-3.19) (-2.72) (1.99)
βsmb
fin
-0.262*** -0.212*** -0.403*** -0.614*** -0.611*** 0.348***
(-4.28) (-3.77) (-7.64) (-7.74) (-9.78) (4.76)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
As an additional robustness check, we also perform the following double sorting exercise.
We first rank BHC’s according to size (measured by total assets) then rank them by LG
within each size portfolio. Panel A of Table 21 shows that the α’s (computed based on value-
weighted returns and our baseline factor model), for the long-short portfolio by liquidity risk
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are still statistically significant across all bank sizes. Put together, these results confirm
that there is an additional risk factor captured by the liquidity risk measure above and
beyond bank size.
Table 20: Financial Sector Size Factor (Equal-Weighted)
This table presents risk-adjusted returns (α) and regression coefficients of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for the 5-
factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity factor ps (specification iv), and
including a financial size factor. Sample period: 1974 - 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags.
t-statistics are in parenthesis. Portfolio returns are annualized and computed on an equally-weighted basis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
alpha 0.036** 0.011 0.014 -0.008 -0.014 0.050***
(2.34) (0.66) (0.76) (-0.43) (-0.69) (4.05)
βM 0.649*** 0.749*** 0.782*** 0.820*** 0.884*** -0.235***
(16.41) (15.49) (15.63) (15.16) (15.19) (-6.14)
βsmb 0.435*** 0.412*** 0.437*** 0.476*** 0.390*** 0.045
(7.62) (7.20) (6.74) (6.96) (4.66) (0.89)
βhml 0.581*** 0.705*** 0.780*** 0.814*** 0.839*** -0.259***
(9.02) (10.01) (9.53) (8.86) (11.03) (-5.37)
βrmw 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.000
(3.66) (3.43) (2.40) (3.50) (2.66) (-0.32)
βcma -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.003** 0.001*
(-1.38) (-1.88) (-1.81) (-1.47) (-1.99) (1.75)
βltg 0.024 0.018 0.021 0.112 0.154 -0.129**
(0.36) (0.25) (0.23) (1.17) (1.57) (-2.11)
βcrd 0.100 0.134 0.195 0.061 0.082 0.018
(0.89) (1.02) (1.19) (0.38) (0.46) (0.18)
βps -0.069* -0.097** -0.139*** -0.170*** -0.131** 0.062**
(-1.93) (-2.30) (-2.87) (-3.07) (-2.39) (2.03)
βsmb
fin
0.026 0.085 0.025 -0.088 -0.173** 0.199***
(0.61) (1.55) (0.41) (-1.25) (-2.45) (4.20)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2.4.2. Profitability
We also consider bank profitability which we proxy by Return-on-Assets (ROA), defined
as income (or loss) before extraordinary items and other adjustments divided by lagged
assets. Indeed, it is possible that investors may particularly favor banks with low liquidity
risk measures since they have higher ROAs (and ROEs) and thus push their stocks rices
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disproportionately higher. Similarly, we perform a double sort exercise by first sorting
banks on their ROA, then on our liquidity mismatch measure. Results are shown in Panel
C of Table 21. Although, the LS portfolio alphas are statistically significant across all
profitability buckets, they appear to be clearly more pronounced for low to medium ROA
banks.
2.4.3. Bank Risk Characteristics
Another critical concern has to do with banks potentially substituting liquidity risk with
other forms of risk. Although bank may appear as safe from a liquidity risk perspective,
they may still simultaneously engage in other risky behaviors which can ultimately generate
higher financial fragility and command larger risk premia. This may for example encompass
risks at the balance-sheet level through higher leverage, or at the asset side level through
making riskier investments. Even though, the risk characteristics patterns reported in
Table 14 do not suggest the prevalence of this risk substitution, since banks with low
liquidity mismatch also typically have lower levels of leverage, lower charge-offs, and higher
z-scores, we run double sorts in order to test whether the abnormal returns are particularly
concentrated in a particular set of portfolios.
Leverage/Capital ratio. While financial fragility is associated with both excessive lever-
age and higher liquidity mismatch, a bank that facing liquidity shocks might not necessarily
be insolvent. Indeed, large liquidity mismatches on a bank’s balance sheets may a priori
be particulary damaging when associated with deteriorating bank fundamentals. Further-
more, capital ratio is also a key explanatory variable for bank stock returns, as shown in
Bouwman et al. (2017). Summary statistics show that banks with higher liquidity risk mea-
sures also tend to have higher leverage, higher risk-weighted assets, and lower Tier 1 capital
ratios. These characteristics are monotonically increasing in the LG and thus may drive
our results. Panel B of Table 21 presents results from a double-sorting analysis on bank
leverage, which is defined here as the ratio of total asset to equity. Our results show that
the risk-adjusted LS portfolio α’s are particularly important and statistically significant for
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Table 21: Factor Regressions - Double Sorts
This table presents risk-adjusted returns (α) of portfolios double-sorted first by bank characteristic then by LG for
the the baseline 8-factor model. Sample period: 1974 - 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags.
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Portfolio Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Panel A. Size (total assets)
Small 0.025 0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.015 0.040**
(1.19) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.43) (-0.64) (2.55)
Medium 0.011 -0.014 0.006 -0.019 -0.036* 0.047***
(0.61) (-0.68) (0.31) (-0.92) (-1.72) (2.92)
Big 0.004 -0.021 -0.021 -0.051** -0.038* 0.042*
(0.20) (-0.92) (-0.87) (-2.38) (-1.76) (1.85)
Panel B. Leverage (total asset/common equity)
Low 0.008 -0.010 -0.037* -0.018 -0.024 0.032
(0.38) (-0.50) (-1.72) (-1.00) (-1.10) (1.31)
Medium 0.022 0.013 -0.010 -0.022 0.007 0.015
(0.97) (0.56) (-0.40) (-0.93) (0.33) (0.66)
High 0.016 -0.009 -0.014 -0.054** -0.043 0.059*
(0.71) (-0.37) (-0.49) (-2.05) (-1.61) (1.76)
Panel C. Profitability (return-on-assets)
Low 0.046* -0.016 -0.053* 0.003 -0.024 0.071**
(1.84) (-0.65) (-1.77) (0.13) (-0.74) (1.98)
Medium 0.010 -0.001 0.003 -0.018 -0.066*** 0.076***
(0.50) (-0.07) (0.11) (-0.72) (-2.80) (3.10)
High 0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.029 0.043*
(0.72) (-0.46) (-0.64) (-0.79) (-1.36) (1.78)
Panel D. Tail risk
Low 0.040* -0.007 0.009 -0.014 -0.020 0.060**
(1.93) (-0.35) (0.47) (-0.58) (-0.97) (2.55)
Medium -0.009 -0.009 -0.017 -0.036 -0.038 0.028
(-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.81) (-1.40) (-1.45) (0.94)
High 0.003 -0.025 0.017 -0.039 -0.067** 0.069**
(0.10) (-0.95) (0.55) (-1.20) (-2.56) (2.14)
Panel E. Charge-offs (net charge-offs over total assets)
Low 0.026 -0.014 -0.002 -0.034 -0.035 0.061**
(1.08) (-0.56) (-0.09) (-1.29) (-1.56) (2.38)
Medium 0.014 -0.006 -0.012 -0.059** -0.072*** 0.085***
(0.69) (-0.28) (-0.57) (-2.48) (-2.74) (2.71)
High 0.023 -0.008 0.009 -0.010 0.000 0.023
(1.09) (-0.36) (0.40) (-0.45) (0.00) (0.95)
N 516 516 516 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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high leverage banks. Unlike size however, the results are strongest for the BHC’s with high
leverage. This is not surprising as we expect liquidity mismatch to be particularly for banks
with relatively weaker balance sheets.
Asset quality. We explore the importance of asset quality in driving our results, by
analyzing the effect of net charge-offs on bank excess returns. Our double sort results show
that the alpha differential pattern are statistically significant for low and medium charge-off
levels.
Tail risk. We also investigate the importance of bank risk management, which we proxy
with tail risk. We define tail risk as the negative of the average return on a bank’s stock
for the bottom 5% return days per year, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). While the
alpha patterns subsist across the distribution, they appear to be slightly more pronounced
for higher tail-risk banks, again highlighting the strength of the liquidity effect for relatively
weaker banks.
2.4.4. Characteristics Regressions a la Fama-Macbeth (1973)
Let us now turn to cross-sectional regressions in order to determine the importance of
the liquidity gap measure in explaining the cross-section of bank stock returns. We fol-
low the Fama-Macbeth (1973) methodology and proceed in two stages. We first con-
struct time series associated with the factor loadings on the Fama-French three factors
f = [market smb hml] for each individual bank stock, based on 60-month rolling win-
dows:26
ret+1 = β
′
ift+1 + εi,t+1
Second, we run monthly cross-sectional regressions of excess returns on the liquidity gap
measure, the constructed factor loadings [βmarketi , β
smb
i , β
hml
i ]t, and other individual bank
26For simplicity, we omit here both cma and rmw factors given that they are marginally important as our
results show above.
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characteristics, including (i) size, (ii) equity/asset ratio, (iii) net charge-offs, (iv) non-interest
income share, (v) tail risk, (vi) ROA, (vii) z-score, and (viii) book-to-market. We then
average out all the estimated coefficients over the whole sample period. Because we are
interested in testing the effect on liquidity gap on excess returns while controlling for the
bank characteristics listed above, we restrict our sample period to January 1993 to December
2016 (288 months) to make sure that all our independent variables are available. The results
of our tests are reported in Table 22, with column (5) representing the full specification
accounting for all variables and nesting those reported in columns 1 to 4. Across all models,
the liquidity gap enters with a negative sign, as already shown by the portfolio sort results,
confirming that banks with high liquidity gap measure earn negative premia, all else equal.
The associated regression coefficient is relatively stable and varies from -0.063 in model
(3) to -0.094 in model (5). It is statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level across all
specifications with the exception of model (3). Thus, according to specification in column
(5), a one standard deviation increase in liquidity gap (i.e., +0.16) is accompanied with a
110 bps decline in annual returns, holding all other variables fixed. Note also that our full
specification can explain up to 21.30% of the annual variation in bank stock returns, with
the liquidity gap measure accounting for about 0.50% of such variation.
2.5. Discussion: What Drives the Liquidity Risk Anomaly?
What are the determinants behind the relative underperfomance of high-liquidity risk
banks? We attempt to explore potential explanations throughout this section.
2.5.1. Sources of Liquidity Risk
Our measure of liquidity mismatch bundles together two sources of risks that may both
generate distress on a bank’s balance sheet, namely a fire sale risk on the asset side and a
run risk on the liability side. In an attempt to isolate the source of the liquidity effect we
uncover, we disentangle our liquidity risk measure into two components: volatile liabilities
on the one hand and liquid assets on the other. Indeed, the summary statistics reflect
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Table 22: Fama-Macbeth (1973) Cross-Sectional Regressions
This table presents the results for the Fama-Macbeth monthly cross-sectional regressions for bank stock excess returns.
The independant variables include the liquidity gap measure, constructed factor loadings [βmarketi , β
smb
i , β
hml
i ]t,
based on a 60-month rolling windows, and other individual bank characteristics, including (i) size (total assets), (ii)
equity/asset ratio, (iii) net charge-offs, (iv) non-interest income share, (v) tail risk, (vi) ROA, (vii) z-score, and (viii)
book-to-market. The sample period is January 1993 to December 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected
with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Liquidity Gap -0.094* -0.067* -0.063 -0.076* -0.068**
(-1.89) (-1.75) (-1.61) (-1.95) (-2.06)
βM 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.019
(0.32) (0.34) (0.29) (0.44)
βsmb 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.041*
(1.46) (1.36) (1.45) (1.88)
βhml -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.001
(-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.32) (-0.04)
Size 0.0478 0.0382 -0.0125
(0.51) (0.42) (-0.15)
Equity/Assets -0.684** -0.953
(-2.49) (-1.03)
Net Charge-offs -3.604**
(-2.48)
Non-interest Income Share 0.000
(1.22)
Tail Risk -1.274***
(-2.61)
ROA -0.006
(-0.62)
Z-score 0.015***
(2.67)
B/M 0.240
(0.32)
Constant 0.115*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.162*** -0.081
(2.75) (3.33) (3.22) (3.73) (-0.11)
R2 1.14 13.61 14.40 15.41 21.30
Number of observations 70722 70722 69242 69242 64143
Number of periods 288 288 288 288 288
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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similar patterns, in that that banks with higher liquidity gaps have both higher holdings of
volatile liabilities and less liquid assets as a ratio to total assets.
Table 23: Alternative Definitions of Liquidity Gap (Value-Weighted)
This table presents raw excess returns (i) and risk-adjusted returns (α) of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for CAPM
(ii), 3-factor Fama-French(iii), and 5-factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity
factor ps (iv). Portfolio returns are annualized and are value-weighted based on market capitalization. The results
are presented for the period 1992 - 2016, for (i) Liquidity Gap, (ii) Ratio of volatile liabilities to total liabilities, (iii)
ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities. Note that the sorting for (iii) is in reverse order so that portfolio 1 (5) reflects
lower (higher) liquidity risk. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Panel A. Alphas - Liquidity Gap
Excess Returns 0.129*** 0.113*** 0.102** 0.108*** 0.072 0.058
(4.10) (3.02) (2.54) (2.68) (1.38) (1.64)
CAPM alpha 0.077** 0.053 0.040 0.041 -0.020 0.097***
(2.51) (1.54) (1.19) (1.12) (-0.51) (3.32)
3-factor alpha 0.040* 0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.073*** 0.113***
(1.78) (0.27) (-0.32) (-0.43) (-2.95) (4.26)
8-factor alpha 0.047** 0.026 0.029 0.038 -0.015 0.062**
(1.98) (1.04) (0.98) (1.25) (-0.60) (2.53)
Panel B. Alphas - Volatile Liabilities / Total Liabilities
Excess Returns 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.105*** 0.087* 0.085* 0.036
(3.38) (3.18) (2.74) (1.94) (1.82) (1.23)
CAPM alpha 0.068* 0.069* 0.048 0.019 -0.002 0.069***
(1.95) (1.77) (1.38) (0.48) (-0.05) (3.07)
3-factor alpha 0.023 0.018 0.003 -0.038 -0.050** 0.073***
(1.02) (0.68) (0.12) (-1.52) (-2.38) (3.74)
8-factor alpha 0.035 0.031 0.021 -0.005 0.011 0.024
(1.54) (1.07) (0.85) (-0.19) (0.41) (1.04)
Panel C. Alphas - Liquid Assets / Total Liabilities (reverse order)
Excess Returns 0.078 0.087* 0.093** 0.120*** 0.057 0.022
(1.57) (1.69) (2.18) (3.01) (1.09) (0.60)
CAPM alpha -0.018 0.02 0.023 0.054 -0.011 -0.007
(-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.67) (-1.43) (-0.25) (-0.19)
3-factor alpha -0.058** -0.022 -0.029 0.000 -0.064* 0.005
(-2.37) (-0.66) (-1.11) (-0.01) (-1.93) (0.16)
8-factor alpha 0.022 -0.021 0.005 0.036 -0.035 0.057
(-0.69) (-0.55) (0.18) (-1.07) (-1.17) (1.38)
N 300 300 300 300 300 300
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
We perform the same sorting exercise for the period 1992 - 2016 and compare the results to
those obtained with liquidity gap sorting. While similar risk-adjusted return patterns appear
for both parts of the ratio, the results are slightly more pronounced on the liability side.
That said, these remain relatively weaker compared to the full measure. One interpretation
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of this result is that liquidity risk management at the bank level is based on a more holistic
approach jointly considering the liquidity characteristics of both the asset and liability sides.
Thus, only considering one side of the balance sheet is not enough to capture liquidity risk.
2.5.2. Liquidity Risk Anomaly Across Time
The recent financial crisis resulted in various changes to the financial sector. One worry
is that extremely negative valuations especially for large banks can force value-weighted
expected returns downward and mislead the interpretation of our results, especially since
large banks typically have high liquidity risk on their balance sheets. Tables 24 and 25
show our results for both value-weighted and equal-weighted returns across multiple sample
periods: (i) 1974 - 1991 (Panel A), (ii) 1992 - 2007 (Panel B), (iii) 2008 - 2009 (Panel C), and
(iv) 2010 - 2016 (Panel D). The unconditional pattern we uncover is of the same magnitude
and is statistically significant at the 1% level for the periods 1974 - 1991 (8.6%, with a t-stat
of 2.70 for the baseline specification) and 1992 - 2007 (6.8%, with a t-stat of 2.76). During
the financial crisis, the low-liquidity gap banks appear to severely outperform the high-
liquidity gap, even though the pattern seems to be somewhat reversed for our baseline eight-
factor specification. Finally, the risk-adjusted returns of the long-short portfolio appear to
vanish quite significantly over the period 2010 - 2016 (note that our statistical tests are weak
given the short sample period and the alpha patterns are not monotonic as in our previous
results). One interpretation of this result is that investors have now a better understanding
of the implications of funding liquidity risk on a bank’s balance sheet, and appropriately
price in this risk onto stock returns, hinting to potential underestimation and mis-pricing
of the risk due to liquidity mismatch in the period prior to the financial crisis.
2.5.3. Liquidity Risk Factor and Aggregate Market Conditions
Next we examine how the liquidity factor defined as the return on the long-short portfolio
co-moves with aggregate variables. We compute correlations between monthly portfolio
value-weighted returns and a number of systematic factors starting from 1992 until 2016.27
27Results are similar when considering equal-weighted returns.
79
Table 24: Returns for Different Sample Periods (Value Weighted)
This table presents raw excess returns (i) and risk-adjusted returns (α) of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for CAPM
(ii), 3-factor Fama-French(iii), and 5-factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity
factor ps (iv). Portfolio returns are annualized and are value-weighted based on market capitalization. The results are
presented for the following sample periods: A. 1974 - 1991, B. 1992 - 2007, C. 2008 - 2009, D. 2010 - 2016. Standard
errors are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Panel A. Alphas - 1974 - 1991
Excess Returns 0.090* 0.072 0.070 0.027 0.025 0.064**
(1.89) (1.42) (1.33) (0.48) (0.39) (2.19)
CAPM alpha 0.038 0.018 0.008 -0.041 -0.051 0.089***
(1.38) (0.60) (0.28) (-1.27) (-1.45) (3.52)
3-factor alpha 0.009 -0.017 -0.032 -0.060* -0.091*** 0.101***
(0.36) (-0.63) (-1.16) (-1.89) (-2.92) (3.82)
8-factor alpha 0.010 -0.020 -0.009 -0.046 -0.076** 0.086***
(0.35) (-1.09) (-0.33) (-1.13) (-2.25) (2.70)
N 216 216 216 216 216 216
Panel B. Alphas - 1992 - 2007
Excess Returns 0.145*** 0.121*** 0.085* 0.123*** 0.092** 0.053*
(4.00) (3.04) (1.96) (3.31) (2.11) (1.83)
CAPM alpha 0.108*** 0.083** 0.042 0.078** 0.026 0.082***
(2.95) (2.11) (1.03) (2.12) (0.68) (2.87)
3-factor alpha 0.056* 0.017 -0.023 0.021 -0.036 0.093***
(1.84) (0.69) (-0.76) (0.71) (-1.27) (3.43)
8-factor alpha 0.039 0.011 -0.018 0.017 -0.029 0.068***
(1.45) (0.45) (-0.65) (0.60) (-1.07) (2.76)
N 192 192 192 192 192 192
Panel C. Alphas - 2008 - 2009
Excess Returns -0.003 -0.042 0.053 -0.179 -0.255 0.252
(-0.02) (-0.20) (0.23) (-0.64) (-0.58) (0.73)
CAPM alpha 0.054 0.041 0.137 -0.090 -0.102 0.156
(0.43) (0.35) (1.16) (-0.49) (-0.54) (0.89)
3-factor alpha 0.016 0.055 0.139 -0.133 -0.062 0.078
(0.19) (0.69) (1.16) (-1.53) (-0.35) (0.37)
8-factor alpha -0.021 -0.028 0.263* -0.167 0.021 -0.041
(-0.15) (-0.29) (1.78) (-0.97) (0.16) (-0.27)
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
Panel D. Alphas - 2010 - 2016
Excess Returns 0.130** 0.139* 0.154* 0.156** 0.119 0.012
(2.15) (1.91) (1.93) (2.15) (1.49) (0.35)
CAPM alpha -0.017 -0.026 -0.004 -0.016 -0.057 0.039
(-0.43) (-0.47) (-0.08) (-0.32) (-1.02) (1.25)
3-factor alpha 0.001 -0.015 0.010 -0.006 -0.047 0.048
(0.03) (-0.34) (0.23) (-0.17) (-1.18) (1.57)
8-factor alpha 0.047 0.051 0.085** 0.067* 0.017 0.029
(1.58) (1.18) (2.17) (1.78) (0.48) (1.03)
N 84 84 84 84 84 84
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 25: Returns for Different Sample Periods (Equal-Weighted)
This table presents raw excess returns (i) and risk-adjusted returns (α) of liquidity-gap-sorted portfolios for CAPM
(ii), 3-factor Fama-French(iii), and 5-factor Fama-French model augmented with bond factors (ltg, crd) and liquidity
factor ps (iv). Portfolio returns are annualized and are equal-weighted basis. The results are presented for the following
sample periods: A. 1974 - 1991, B. 1992 - 2007, C. 2008 - 2009, D. 2010 - 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West
corrected with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Panel A. Alphas - 1974 - 1991
Excess Returns 0.106** 0.076 0.076 0.054 0.047 0.060**
(2.45) (1.60) (1.49) (1.00) (0.73) (2.16)
CAPM alpha 0.063** 0.025 0.020 -0.009 -0.024 0.087***
(2.27) (0.88) (0.63) (-0.27) (-0.68) (4.29)
3-factor alpha 0.027 -0.016 -0.024 -0.050* -0.073** 0.100***
(1.14) (-0.70) (-0.96) (-1.97) (-2.49) (5.00)
8-factor alpha 0.022 -0.017 -0.012 -0.045* -0.060** 0.082***
(1.00) (-0.97) (-0.66) (-1.70) (-2.19) (3.55)
N 216 216 216 216 216 216
Panel B. Alphas - 1992 - 2007
Excess Returns 0.157*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.153*** 0.136*** 0.021
(4.16) (3.53) (3.24) (3.46) (2.88) (1.11)
CAPM alpha 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.119** 0.122*** 0.096* 0.036*
(3.43) (2.83) (2.57) (2.69) (1.94) (1.79)
3-factor alpha 0.076*** 0.064* 0.052 0.050 0.015 0.062***
(2.64) (1.83) (1.58) (1.59) (0.44) (3.89)
8-factor alpha 0.067*** 0.056* 0.045 0.041 0.011 0.056***
(2.60) (1.85) (1.58) (1.59) (0.39) (3.42)
N 192 192 192 192 192 192
Panel C. Alphas - 2008 - 2009
Excess Returns -0.033 -0.269* -0.315* -0.286 -0.389* 0.356***
(-0.24) (-1.79) (-2.00) (-1.64) (-1.99) (4.33)
CAPM alpha 0.023 -0.197 -0.246** -0.214* -0.301** 0.324***
(0.30) (-1.68) (-2.22) (-1.90) (-2.28) (3.90)
3-factor alpha -0.026 -0.247* -0.301*** -0.267** -0.331** 0.304***
(-0.35) (-1.92) (-2.96) (-2.16) (-2.22) (3.27)
8-factor alpha -0.032 -0.107 -0.193 -0.123 -0.242 0.209*
(-0.26) (-0.67) (-1.36) (-1.15) (-1.44) (2.08)
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
Panel D. Alphas - 2010 - 2016
Excess Returns 0.179*** 0.217*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.187*** -0.008
(3.23) (2.89) (3.18) (2.89) (2.80) (-0.31)
CAPM alpha 0.064 0.097 0.076 0.082 0.058 0.006
(1.53) (1.57) (1.32) (1.29) (1.00) (0.22)
3-factor alpha 0.084*** 0.114*** 0.097** 0.100** 0.074* 0.009
(3.09) (2.71) (2.38) (2.38) (1.81) (0.33)
8-factor alpha 0.108*** 0.141*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.091** 0.017
(3.95) (3.20) (2.84) (2.80) (2.25) (0.61)
N 84 84 84 84 84 84
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 12 shows the cumulative returns of our long-short portfolio, against the VIX index
and the TED spread over the period 1992 - 2016. We note that these returns correlate
positively with the implied volatility on the S&P500 and are statistically significant at
the 1% level, both in terms of levels (0.21) and monthly innovations (0.28). Similarly,
we can show that our liquidity factor is positively correlated with the TED rate (0.19),
which is calculated as the spread between 3-Month LIBOR based on US dollars and the
3-Month Treasury Bill and obtained from FRED, the Pastor-Stambaugh traded liquidity
factor (0.07), and the non-financial sector credit spread of Gilchrist-Zakrajsek (0.09).
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Figure 13: Cumulative Returns Relative to VIX and TED Rate
This figure plots the cumulative returns for $1 invested in the long-short portfolio of
banks sorted by LG in the beginning of the sample period in 1992 with net proceeds at
the end of the period reinvested in each subsequent period. The figure also plots the
VIX index and the TED rate (right axis). The sample period is from 1992 to 2016.
All in all, these results are consistent with a flight-to-quality story where investors sell bank
stocks with high liquidity risk and hold low liquidity risk bank stocks or even other types of
safe assets when uncertainty is high. Times when either market liquidity, aggregate bank
funding conditions, or asset credit quality deteriorate are also the times when the liquidity
risk factor is high. Indeed, as equity holders load up on low liquidity risk bank stocks and
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shy away from high liquidity risk ones during stressful times, our liquidity factor tends to
widen.
2.5.4. Other Potential Explanations
The liquidity risk anomaly that we find in U.S. bank stock returns is reminiscent of the
distress anomaly observed for non-financial firm. We examine here some of the explanations
that have been proposed in this context.
First, a potential rationale for our results may hinge on the fact that our measure of liq-
uidity risk might be correlated with valuation errors of BHC’s, in which case investors may
not have sufficiently discounted the price of high-liquidity gap banks in order to account for
their potential financial fragility. This is a plausible explanation especially in light of the
recent financial crisis when multiple banks experienced severe liquidity shortage and dis-
tress despite seemingly fulfilling their capital requirements. Investors and regulators may
have been more focused on solvency as opposed to liquidity issues, therefore under-pricing
liquidity risk. Simply put, it is possible that market participants may have completely
neglected or underestimated the extent of liquidity shock spillovers and ensuing systemic
within the banking system, or simply relied on inaccurate measures of liquidity. If valua-
tion errors are linked to the difficulty of assessing the soundness of a bank holding company,
then controlling for the degree of complexity of a given bank can be informative. Indeed,
we should observe that more complex banks exhibit larger risk-adjusted alpha differentials
when sorted with respect to the liquidity gap measure. This is to some extent verified
through a double sort exercise performed with respect to a complexity indicator that is as-
signed by the Federal Reserve to BHC’s and reported in the Y-9C data. Reasons for being
classified as complex include material credit-extending activity, issuing a large amount of
debt to the public, engaging in high-risk non-bank financial activities and having complex
management practices. The summary statistics in Table 14 show that banks with high
LG are more complex. Results are provided in Table 26. Controlling for complexity, we
show that the α of a long-short portfolio based on liquidity risk are 2.5% higher relative to
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non-complex banking organizations, even though they remain statistically significant. This
suggests that bank complexity may play an interesting role in conjunction with liquidity
risk by exacerbating potential valuation errors.
Table 26: Factor Regressions - Double Sorts - Complexity
This table presents risk-adjusted returns (α) of portfolios double-sorted first by bank characteristic then by LG for
the baseline 8-factor model. Complexity is 0/1 index is provided by the Federal Reserve, and refers to bank holding
companies with complex include material credit-extending activity, issuing a large amount of debt to the public,
engaging in high-risk non-bank financial activities and having complex management practices. Sample period: 1993
- 2016. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected with 6 lags. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Portfolio Low (2) (3) (4) High Low-High
Not Complex 0.068*** 0.069** 0.042 0.065*** 0.028 0.040**
(3.40) (2.57) (1.54) (2.60) (1.00) (2.32)
Complex 0.043 0.052* 0.017 0.019 -0.021 0.064**
(1.50) (1.82) (0.53) (0.64) (-0.78) (2.20)
N 288 288 288 288 288 288
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
One particular argument that was put forward in the distress literature (see George and
Hwang (2010)), and which is also plausible in our setting has to do with endogenous sorting.
Indeed, it is possible that banks that are most exposed to aggregate liquidity risk may
endogenously choose low levels of liquidity gap on their balance sheet in order to mitigate
their exposure and limit potential distress following adverse liquidity shocks. This story
would thus imply that banks with low LG measures should have been more adversely
affected in the recent financial crisis relative to banks with low LG. However, this was
not experienced during the recent financial crisis as evidenced by Figure 13. Indeed, the
portfolio which is long in low risk banks and short in high risk stocks rose dramatically
over the period 2008-2010, due to a dramatic decline in the returns of the short leg of the
portfolio.
These results call for a deeper explanation related to the endogenous nature of bank liquid-
ity management. Further exploration of mechanisms described in the theoretical banking
literature is necessary. For example, Kashyap et al. (2002) emphasize the dynamic aspect
behind liquidity management and argues that banks that may appear to be highly exposed
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to liquidity shocks are also the ones anticipating higher deposit inflows in periods of distress.
One related channel that is also left for future research has to do with the ease and cost at
which banks can raise inside (equity issuances) or outside liquidity (asset sales) in periods of
turmoil. This ability depends on a number of factors including the likelihood of government
support and access to the Lender of Last Resort, or ownership structure (Acharya et al.
(2013a) argue that banks’ ability to diversify across investors is particularly important in
periods of stress). It also reflects the degree of information asymmetry due to bank opacity
and complexity (e.g., a potential lack of information can deter uninsured depositors and
investors in periods of market confusion and uncertainty (Gorton (2008)), as well as bank
interconnectedness and ability to access trading markets fast enough to avoid large fire sale
discounts.
2.6. Policy Implications
Our results have important policy implications pertaining to the newly implemented bank
liquidity requirements. First, under the assumptions that (i) markets are efficient, (ii) in-
vestors are correctly pricing the relevant risks faced by banks and that (iii) our liquidity
measure is inline with the regulators’, our counterintuitive results (i.e., investors command
premia for risks that are negatively correlated with LG) seem to suggest that market par-
ticipants do not consider the liquidity gap on banks balance sheets (or the net stability
funding ratio for that matter) as a good proxy for liquidity risk. Indeed these measures are
based on static accounting variables that may not fully reflect a banks’ ability to generate
liquidity (either inside liquidity through equity issuances, or outside liquidity through asset
sales) in periods of stress.
An important implication of this is that by focusing only on this form of liquidity measures,
regulators may not fully curtail liquidity risk and ensuing financial fragility of certain banks
and may simultaneously impose stringent and costly balance sheet requirements on banks
with low liquidity risk exposure. Along these lines, the presence of the liquidity risk anomaly
we uncover hints at potential adverse effects on the costs of equity/capital of banks as they
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raise their balance sheet liquidity in order to comply with the new policy requirements.
2.7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the asset pricing implications of liquidity risk. We show that stocks
of banks facing high liquidity risk are associated with lower expected stock returns. We
sort banks according to a measure of liquidity risk, referred to as the Liquidity Gap (LG)
and show that the standard factor models, even when augmented with bond risk, market
liquidity, and financial-size factors, cannot fully explain cross section of bank stock returns.
A portfolio that is long in low liquidity risk banks and short in high liquidity risk banks
delivers a statistically significant α of 6 percent annually. We analyze a number of bank
characteristics and find that these anomalous returns are not driven by size, profitability,
or leverage. They, however, appear to be linked to bank complexity and potential valua-
tion errors. Our results call for a deeper explanation related to the endogenous nature of
bank liquidity management. Further exploration of theoretical mechanisms underlying this
liquidity risk anomaly is left for future research.
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CHAPTER 3 : Shadow Banking and the Real Economy
3.1. Introduction
Shadow banking is often identified as one of the main drivers of the recent financial crisis,
but its broader role in the macroeconomy is still not fully established. While progress
has been made in uncovering its institutional specifics and in identifying the corresponding
risks involved, there is a gap in relating this knowledge to macro variables in the economy.
This paper attempts to narrow the gap by investigating empirical relationships between
traditional banking, shadow banking and the real economy. First, I estimate a measure of
the relative productivity of traditional banking to shadow banking in a two-sector model
that is aligned with the dramatic growth in the latter. Modeling these sectors in a way that
reflects the data is a crucial first step to incorporating a broader picture of the financial
industry in a macroeconomic model. Second, I present important facts that can help guide
the extension of the two-sector model going forward. These facts illustrate that traditional
banking and shadow banking are different from a macroeconomic perspective in a way that
is not necessarily captured by productivity only.
In this paper, traditional and shadow banking are distinguished based on the type of security
that funds them. Traditional monetary aggregates fund traditional banking while money-
like liabilities fund shadow banking. Given this definition, the Flow of Funds shows that
shadow banking has grown to be over one and a half times GDP while money has remained
relatively flat relative to GDP. I explain this structural shift using a simple two-sector
model with non-balanced growth and calculate implied productivities of both traditional
and shadow banking sectors that is consistent with aggregate data on labor, money and
money-like liabilities.
The financial industry has benefited tremendously from advances in technology, yet identi-
fying its productivity is problematic because its output is difficult to measure.1 Instead of
1Components of this output include liquidity services, asset management services or credit and lending
services, all of which are intangible. Output in terms of value-added which is calculated as gross revenues
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looking at the value-added of the financial sector, I analyze the composition between tradi-
tional and shadow banking. In particular, I focus on the inputs of each sector to calculate
a measure of their relative productivities. In this way, I take into account the structural
change that traditional banks issuing deposits have been replaced by shadow banks issuing
money-like claims. This method requires taking a stand on the structure of the finance
industry’s production function. So far studies have used labor and physical capital as the
usual inputs, similar to any other sector in the economy. Output of this sector can be
loans to the economy as in Philippon (2012) or liquidity services to households as in King
and Plosser (1984). What is novel in this paper is to recognize that funds from deposi-
tors and investors can be thought of as an input specific to the financial industry. Money
and money-like liabilities are financial capital that plays a direct role in the production of
financial services.
Shadow banking can be viewed from many angles, but in this paper I draw attention to its
capacity to issue money-like liabilities and to use this financial capital to perform activities
fundamentally similar to traditional banking. This angle is a response to Gorton et al.
(2012) who suggested that safe assets play a transactions role in the economy that is not
yet fully understood. In particular, they highlight that the safe-asset share, defined as the
ratio of safe-assets to total financial assets in the economy, is approximately time-invariant.
In my setting, this corresponds to the cost share of the total of money and money-like
liabilities as inputs into the production of financial services being constant over time.
Philippon (2012) has provided a measure of the efficiency of the financial sector over the past
130 years. I differ from his approach in two ways. First, he employs a user-cost approach
and estimates the marginal cost of assets intermediated by the sector while I specify a two-
sector production function. Second, he measures the efficiency of the overall sector while I
emphasize the difference between traditional banking and shadow banking, and their sector-
specific productivities. Given some assumptions on parameters, I am able to indirectly infer
less intermediate inputs, has steadily risen since the 1940s to about one-fifth of total GDP.
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relative productivity. The estimates will crucially depend on the elasticity of substitution
between the output of each sector and on the labor and financial capital intensities in the
production function. Under reasonable parameters, I find that the technology of shadow
banking relative to the technology of traditional banking started at around 80 percent in
the 1960s but has since increased to about 120 percent in 2011.
It is important to understand the relative productivity of traditional and shadow banking
for several reasons. First, technology in the traditional and shadow banking sectors can be
interpreted in many ways. One possible perspective is that the slowing down of traditional
banking technology and the corresponding growth in shadow banking technology is a result
of regulation. This is consistent with research arguing for regulatory arbitrage as a reason for
shadow banking growth alongside other more straightforward interpretations of technology
such as innovation and specialization. Going forward, limiting activity in this sector may
push financial activities towards another sector that circumvents regulation again. Second,
keeping track of shadow banking productivity is important because its growth is followed by
an increase in the number of bank defaults while does not appear to affect broad measures
of financial risk (see Section 3.6). The recent financial crisis is a salient example of a credit
boom where risks within shadow banking were neglected.
I focus on capturing the shift from traditional banking to shadow banking in a two-sector
partial equilibrium setting to provide a foundation for moving into a general equilibrium
setting. While it is of first-order importance to understand the relative productivities of
the sectors in isolation, it is insufficient for understanding the role of shadow banking in the
macroeconomy. The move to a general equilibrium setting requires a deeper understanding
of the empirical differences in each sector’s relationship to real activity. For this reason, I
present new facts regarding the relationship between shadow banking and the real economy.
I show that (i) the upward trend in debt-to-GDP ratios observed in all sectors of the
economy, is only similarly observed on the domestic real asset side in household real estate,
corporate firm investment abroad and miscellaneous firm assets. Other real assets that can
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potentially back the growth in liabilities have not risen as a ratio to GDP. (ii) Turning
to cyclical patterns, growth in money-like liabilities issued by the shadow banking sector
follows GDP growth, contrary to well-known evidence establishing money growth leads
output growth. In addition, these money-like assets are largely held within the financial
sector and by investors outside the U.S. (iii) Lastly, growth in the shadow banking sector
is followed by an increase in the number of banks defaulting, but does not appear to affect
broad measures of financial risk. These supplementing facts raise questions that have not
been explored in recent macro-finance models and provide direction for extending the simple
two-sector model in this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes related literature.
Section 3.3 defines traditional and shadow banking based on data on money and money-
like liabilities from the Flow of Funds. Section 3.4 describes a simple model to estimate
the relative productivity of traditional and shadow banking while Section 3.5 presents the
results. Section 3.6 presents facts relating shadow banking to real economic variables.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. Related Literature
Since the recent financial crisis, the literature on shadow banking has grown immensely.
Many papers have focused on describing the institutions that engage in shadow banking
activities in great detail (Pozsar et al. (2010)) and on discussing the risks and corresponding
regulation that could be pursued by policymakers as a result (Adrian and Ashcraft (2012),
Adrian and Shin (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2010)).2 There have been fewer contributions
to the literature from the theoretical side. A few papers have analyzed the micro-foundations
and financial frictions arising between agents in a model with shadow banking (Plantin
(2014), Harris et al. (2014), Ordonez (2013), Gennaioli et al. (2013)), while even fewer
papers relate shadow banking to the broader macroeconomy. In Moreira and Savov (2014),
2Many papers have also analyzed specific activities within shadow banking. For example, see Coval
et al. (2009) for structured finance, Gorton and Metrick (2012b), Adam Copeland and Walker (2007) and
Krishnamurthy et al. (2012) for repo markets and Acharya et al. (2013b) for asset-backed commercial paper.
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money and money-like assets have different information sensitivities. Investors first seek
information on money-like assets once a crisis hits, which causes fire-sales of the assets
and amplifies the crisis. Meanwhile, Sunderam (2014) show that investors treated shadow
banking debt as money based on quantity and price predictions of a simple model.
In the monetary economics literature, money has usually been modeled in three general ap-
proaches (Walsh (2010)). First, money balances provide direct utility to the agent (Sidrauski
(1967)). This captures the role of money in providing liquidity services to the asset-holder.
Second, money is also modeled as an asset used for intertemporal transfer (Samuelson
(1958)). This highlights the role of money in storing value over time. Lastly, money
demand can arise because transactions are costly (Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), Clower
(1967)). Here, money is a medium of exchange between agents in the economy. However,
in these three approaches, the role of money is only considered from the household or the
investor’s perspective. This is true for example in Moreira and Savov (2014) and Sunderam
(2014) described earlier, where money and money-like assets both provide liquidity services
to investors.
In this paper, I shift the focus to the financial intermediary who holds money or money-like
assets for its clients. In the context of traditional banking, the clients are depositors. In
the context of shadow banking, clients are more generally investors. While providing funds
to a bank generates liquidity services, an asset for storage or a method of intertemporal
transfer for the depositor or investor, it also gives the financial intermediary funds to invest
into productive projects. Money and money-like assets can then be thought of as financial
capital used by the financial industry as an input to production. Since the analysis is done
in a partial equilibrium setting, I make no assumption on what the output of the financial
sector is. This output can be thought of as asset management services, liquidity services,
or lending activity to firms and entrepreneurs. I do make the assumption that money and
money-like assets are the same form of capital for the financial intermediary. The only real
difference between the two comes from the definition of traditional monetary aggregates M1
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and M2 (described in detail in Section 3.3). Focusing on the allocation of total financial
capital into money and money-like assets sheds light on why shadow banking has grown
over time.
This paper contributes to the macro-finance literature by proposing a different way of mod-
eling the production of financial services that can be incorporated into macroeconomic
models. In particular, both traditional and shadow banking contribute to the production
of financial services. It is more broadly related to the literature analyzing the role of money
in the macroeconomy. This has a long history starting from Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
who at the time identified a stable short-run relationship that money leads output. More
recently, Schularick and Taylor (2012) describe several important institutional changes that
have occurred since the Great Depression which have weakened this relationship. Among
the reasons are increasing leverage within the financial industry and usage of non-monetary
liabilities. While the role of traditional monetary aggregates has slowly diminished over
time, incorporating money-like assets into the analysis reveals a different relationship be-
tween money-like assets and output that requires further understanding. In particular,
growth in money-like assets lag output growth (see Section 3.6).
Lastly, I draw from the theory of non-balanced growth by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
The shift in the allocation of financial capital from traditional banking to shadow banking
is a direct application the production side of their model.
3.3. Definition and Data
It is important to clearly define money and money-like liabilities before moving forward.
In this paper, I define traditional and shadow banking based on the type of security that
funds its activities. This definition draws heavily from the definition of safe assets in Gorton
et al. (2012), which are considered information-insensitive assets (at least prior to the recent
financial crisis).3 I use quarterly data available from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds
3In Gorton et al. (2012), government debt such as Treasuries and T-bills are also part of safe assets, but
here I focus on debt issued by the private financial sector.
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(Financial Accounts).4 On one hand, traditional banking activities are funded by traditional
monetary aggregates, or simply money for convenience. This includes currency (non-interest
bearing government debt) and privately-issued debt in the definition of traditional monetary
aggregates M1 and M2. The corresponding items that can be identified from the Flow of
Funds are checkable deposits and currency, small time deposits and savings deposits. On the
other hand, shadow banking activities are funded by money-like liabilities. This includes
the following relatively safe, information-insensitive and often short-term securities: money
market mutual funds, security repurchase agreements and federal funds, open market paper,
agency- and GSE-securities and financial corporate and foreign bonds.
Table 27: Definition of Money and Money-like Liabilities, trillions $
Item 2007:Q3 2014:Q2
Traditional monetary aggregates
Checkable deposits and currency (M1) 1.5 3.3
Small time and savings deposits (M2-M1) 7.6 8.3
Money-like liabilities
Large time deposits 2.4 1.8
Money market mutual fund shares 2.8 2.5
Federal funds and security repos 3.2 3.8
Open market paper 1.3 0.4
Agency- and GSE- backed securities 7.1 7.8
Corporate and foreign bonds 6.2 4.7
TOTAL 22.1 21.0
Source: Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve)
The term money will be used interchangeably with traditional banking while money-like will
be used interchangeably with shadow banking. Note that the distinction between money and
money-like, hence traditional and shadow banking, is made based on the instrument rather
than the institution that issues it. For example, a bank may engage in both traditional
and shadow banking activities by issuing deposits and commercial paper. Table 27 lists the
items in money and money-like liabilities.
Figure 14 shows the ratio of money and money-like liabilities relative to GDP from 1959
to 2014. M2 (green line) has hovered around 50 percent since the 1960’s. Meanwhile,
4Data for 2014:Q2 was released on September 18, 2014.
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money-like liabilities (red line less green line) have been steadily increasing since the early
1960’s. At its peak in 2008, non-monetary liabilities were valued to be over one and a half
times US GDP while traditional monetary aggregates only amounted to about half of GDP.
The structure of the financial industry has drastically changed during this time as well,
with financial institutions other than traditional banks extending more and more credit to
the economy. There has also been a dramatic growth in securitization since the 1980’s. As
described in the previous section, several papers have documented the growth in this largely
unregulated part of the financial industry. To draw an even tighter parallel between money
and money-like liabilities, the latter are also very heavily used as collateral in repo markets
and were effectively used as currency for repo transactions (Gorton and Metrick (2012b)).
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Figure 14: Money and Money-like relative to Nominal GDP
This figure plots money and money-like liabilities of the financial sector
relative to nominal GDP. Net within the financial sector subtracts asset
holdings within the sector. M1 and M2 data are only avaiable from 1959
onwards while Flow of Funds data is available from 1952 onwards. Data
are quarterly. Source: Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve), BEA.
Why is it important to look at the liabilities side of the balance sheet as opposed to the
asset side? The Flow of Funds reveals that while the composition of asset holdings of
the entire financial industry has shifted towards corporate bonds, corporate equities and
financial assets within the sector, private depository institutions (largely commercial banks)
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have changed the composition of their asset holdings similarly.5 The more dramatic shift in
the composition of asset types has arguably occurred on the liabilities side of the financial
sector. Although a more careful analysis is required on the asset side, this is left as an
extension for future research.
Given the current focus on liabilities, it is also important to understand who is investing in
either money or money-like assets. The Flow of Funds shows that households and firms are
the main investors in money, while the financial sector itself and the rest of the world have
been the main investors of money-like assets. This is described in detail in Section 3.6.
Figure 14 above already suggests a shift away from traditional banking towards shadow
banking. A different way to see this is in Figure 15 which plots the share of money to
the total of money and money-like liabilities. This suggests non-balanced growth in these
two sectors despite issuing the very similar types of liabilities and despite investors’ similar
treatment of these liabilities. In the next section, a two-sector model accommodates the
definitions given above and the shift from traditional to shadow banking. This yields simple
expressions for the relative technology between the two sectors.
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Figure 15: Traditional Money/Total Money
This figure plots the ratio of money to the sum of money and money-
like liabilities. Data are quarterly. Source: Flow of Funds (Federal
Reserve).
5Unreported results.
95
3.4. Model
The following model closely follows the production side of the non-balanced sectoral growth
model in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). The difference is that I switch the interpretation
away from the usual productive firm to the production of financial services Y (t) using capital
raised through money or money-like liabilities and labor as the two inputs. In particular, the
financial sector combines intermediate output of traditional banking (sector 1) and shadow
banking (sector 2) using a CES aggregator
Y (t) = F (Y1(t), Y2(t))
= [γY1(t)
(ε−1)
ε + (1− γ)Y2(t)
(ε−1)
ε ]
ε
ε−1 (3.1)
where ε ∈ [0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the traditional and shadow banking
goods, and γ is the share parameter. Each sector i produces financial goods competitively
using labor Li(t) and financial capital Mi(t) in a Cobb-Douglas production technology
Y1(t) = Z1(t)L1(t)
α1M1(t)
1−α1
Y2(t) = Z2(t)L2(t)
α2M2(t)
1−α2. (3.2)
Here, the financial industry does not use physical capital as in the usual productive firm.
While physical capital can easily be added, I simplify the production function by abstracting
away from it in this baseline set-up. The main assumption is that for the financial industry,
financial capital is relatively more important as an input compared to physical capital.
In the data, value added of the financial industry is easily broken down in the data into
compensation of employees (returns to labor), gross operating surplus (returns to capital)
and taxes (returns to government). When matching the model to the data, I then make the
simplifying assumption that capital only refers to financial capital and I ignore taxes.
The original model can be consistent with the stylized Kaldor facts as long as the capital-
labor ratio is increasing or capital-deepening is occurring over time. In the case of the
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financial sector, Figure 16 shows that the cost shares of labor and capital inputs have been
approximately constant. In addition, total money has grown an average of 2.15 percent per
quarter while labor in the financial sector has grown at an average of 0.52 percent. Note
Figure 16: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
This figure plots value-added (gross output less intermediate inputs),
compensation of employees and intermediate inputs, relative to gross
output for the finance, insurance and real estate industry. Data are
annual. Source: BEA GDP by Industry.
that when α1 = α2, the production function of the entire final service good is Cobb-Douglas,
so I restrict the analysis to the case where ∆ ≡ α1 − α2 6= 0.
Market clearing conditions for financial capital and labor are
L1(t) + L2(t) ≤ L(t)
M1(t) +M2(t) ≤M(t). (3.3)
The final financial service good producer chooses labor and financial capital allocations
L1, L2, M1 and M2 to maximize production in equation (3.1), subject to constraints (3.2)
and (3.3). Maximization yields four constraints: two market clearing conditions and two
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equations equalizing the marginal products of labor and capital between the sectors
γα1
Y1(t)
1− 1
ε
L1(t)
= (1− γ)α2
Y2(t)
1− 1
ε
L2(t)
γ(1− α1)
Y1(t)
1− 1
ε
M1(t)
= (1− γ)(1− α2)
Y2(t)
1− 1
ε
M2(t)
. (3.4)
From these first-order conditions, the model predicts that interest rates on money and
money-like liabilities are equalized. This is clearly seen in the data in Figure 17 which plots
the interest rates on the secondary market of certificates of deposit (CD) and commercial
paper rates published by the Federal Reserve since 1964.6 The interest rates have closely
tracked each other over time, suggesting that money and money-like liabilities represent the
same form of financial capital for traditional banking and shadow banking respectively and
that the modeling assumptions above are reasonable. The only difference is that money
falls under the definition of traditional banking while money-like falls under the definition
of shadow banking.7
3.4.1. Continuous time
This static production model already has implications for the share of financial capital
allocated towards shadow banking given exogenous processes for labor, capital and the
technologies. It is easily mapped to the data as shown in the next section. In a continuous-
time set-up, however, the evolution of the share of financial capital can be characterized
more fully. In particular, let labor L(t), total financial capital M(t) and sector-specific
technologies Zi(t) evolve exogenously according to
L̇(t)
L(t)
= gL
Ṁ(t)
M(t)
= gM and
Żi(t)
Zi(t)
= zi. (3.5)
6Secondary market rates on CDs have been discontinued since July 2013 and commercial paper rates
have been released separately for financial and non-financial firms since January 1997.
7From the investor’s perspective, Sunderam (2014) has shown that investors treated shadow banking debt
as money-like.
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Figure 17: Interest rates on money and money-like liabilities, %
This figure plots the following: 3-Month Certificate of Deposit Sec-
ondary Market Rate (Jun64-Jun13), 3-Month AA Financial Commer-
cial Paper Rate (Jan97-Sep14), 3-Month AA Nonfinancial Commercial
Paper Rate (Jan97-Sep14), 3-Month Commercial Paper Rate (Apr71-
Aug97), 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) based on
U.S. Dollar (Jan86-Sep14). Data are monthly and not seasonally ad-
justed. plots Source: Federal Reserve, IBA.
Define the share of financial capital and labor in sector 1 as µ(t) and λ(t) respectively, which
can be calculated using the first-order conditions above as
µ(t) =
M1(t)
M(t)
=
1 + (1− α2
1− α1
)(
1− γ
γ
)(
Y1(t)
Y2(t)
) (1−ε)
ε
−1
λ(t) =
L1(t)
L(t)
=
(
1 +
(
1− α1
1− α2
)(
α2
α1
)(
1− µ(t)
µ(t)
))−1
. (3.6)
The share of capital follows the following differential equation
µ̇(t)
µ(t)
=
(1− µ(t))(gm − gl − z1(1 + α2)/α1 + z2)
(1− ε)−1 + ∆(µ(t)− λ(t))
. (3.7)
In characterizing the equilibrium, consider the case where the output goods of traditional
banking and shadow banking are gross substitutes, i.e. ε > 1. If both sectors deliver
liquidity and storage of value services equally, then this is reasonable. Also for ease of
exposition, assume that ∆ > 0 or that traditional banking is more labor-intensive than
shadow banking. Given these assumptions, financial capital allocation between the two
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sectors depends on the elasticity between the corresponding goods they produce and on the
difference in labor (or alternatively financial capital) intensities. The model predictions are
very intuitive. Following the analysis of Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), it can be shown
that
d lnµ(t)
d lnK(t)
< 0 and
d lnµ(t)
d lnZ2(t)
< 0. (3.8)
This means that the share of capital allocated towards traditional banking decreases with
an increase in total financial capital when ε > 1. In addition, the share of capital allocated
towards traditional banking decreases with an increase in the technology of shadow banking
when ε > 1.
3.5. Empirical Results
Labor and financial capital allocations satisfy the four equilibrium conditions in (3.3) and
(3.4). This model is characterized by the following parameters: ε, γ, α1, α2. To my knowl-
edge, there are no studies that directly estimate these parameters and it is difficult to
quickly infer these parameters from the data. The share parameter is difficult to identify
separately from each sector’s technology and is set to γ = 12 . I present results for different
values of ε and ∆ = α1 − α2, assuming α2 = 0.2.8
The main exercise in this paper is to estimate the implied technologies of each of the sectors
given the time series on M1,M2 and total labor L. Between 1959:Q1 and 2014:Q2, total
money has grown at an average of gM = 2.15 percent each quarter. Meanwhile, labor in
the financial sector taken from the NIPA data on full-time and part-time employment has
grown at an average of gL = 0.52 percent per quarter since 1959. Note that the data on
full-time and part-time employment is available only until 2011. Three time series alone,
in addition to assumptions on the parameters, yield an estimate for L1 and L2. Lastly, the
conditions also give an expression for Z1Z2 .
8The average cost share of labor in value-added from Figure 16 is 0.23.
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Figure 18: Traditional and Shadow Banking
This figure reports labor allocations, relative technologies and relative
output for traditional banking and shadow banking using time series for
money, money-like liabilities and total labor in the finance, insurance
and real estate industry. C, D and F assume a benchmark growth
rate for the growth rate of traditional banking at 1 percent. ε = 5,
α1 = 0.25 and α2 = 0.2. Source: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 18 shows results for the estimation for ε = 5, α1 = 0.25 and α2 = 0.2. Panel A
shows the ratio of money-like liabilities to money used in the estimation. Panel B shows
the optimal labor allocation of total observed labor supply between traditional banking and
shadow banking. Starting in the 1990’s the model predicts that more of total labor in the
industry is allocated towards the shadow banking sector. For Panels C, D and F, I assume a
benchmark 1 percent growth rate in the technology of traditional banking. Relative to this
rate, shadow banking technology grew at high rates prior to the 1980s (Panel C) and still
consistently higher than traditional banking growth rates since the 1980s (Panel D). This is
confirmed by the increasing, albeit diminishing, relative technology of shadow banking over
time (Panel E). Lastly, Panel F shows that shadow banking outgrew traditional banking
and the output of the entire sector sometime in the late 1980s.
Table 28: Relative Technologies (Z2/Z1)
1959: Q3
α1/ε 0.7 2 3 10 50
0.15 47.01 0.40 0.49 0.63 0.82
0.25 111.43 0.81 0.76 0.88 1.05
0.30 169.76 1.14 0.94 1.03 1.16
0.35 258.01 1.59 1.14 1.18 1.28
1980: Q1
α1/ε 0.7 2 3 10 50
0.15 1.03 0.67 0.79 0.86 0.94
0.25 2.43 1.33 1.14 1.09 1.05
0.30 3.73 1.88 1.37 1.22 1.10
0.35 5.76 2.64 1.63 1.35 1.15
2011: Q1
α1/ε 0.7 2 3 10 50
0.15 0.36 0.81 0.97 1.02 1.07
0.25 0.78 1.48 1.20 1.07 0.96
0.30 1.17 2.02 1.35 1.11 0.92
0.35 1.77 2.77 1.51 1.14 0.88
Table 29: Relative Output (Y2/Y1)
1959: Q3
α1/ε 0.7 2 3 10 50
0.15 0.092 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
0.25 0.100 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.30 0.104 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.35 0.110 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
1983:Q1
α1/ε 0.7 2 3 10 50
0.15 0.764 0.495 0.585 0.640 0.696
0.25 0.799 0.439 0.376 0.358 0.346
0.30 0.824 0.415 0.302 0.268 0.244
0.35 0.857 0.393 0.242 0.201 0.172
2011: Q1
α1/ε 0.7 2 3 10 50
0.15 1.423 3.230 3.889 4.101 4.266
0.25 1.440 2.740 2.228 1.988 1.786
0.30 1.461 2.531 1.688 1.385 1.155
0.35 1.494 2.344 1.281 0.965 0.748
The results for relative technologies and relative output for different values of parameters
α1 and ε are reported in Tables 28 and 29. Snapshots for 1959:Q3, 1980:Q1 and 2011:Q1
are provided. Here α2 = 0.2, and the comparative statics are equivalent to analyzing
∆ = α1 − α2. When ε = 0.7, shadow banking technology is relatively more productive in
the early time periods and this relative productivity has diminished over time. Meanwhile,
when ε > 1, and α1 is relatively low, shadow banking productivity has relatively increased
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over time. As ε is further increased and traditional banking becomes relatively more labor
intensive, shadow banking technology is actually relatively decreasing over time. In terms
of relative output however, the share of output from shadow banking steadily increases over
time for all values of ε and α1. This increase is slower when traditional banking is more
labor intensive (higher values of α1) and when the elasticity between the two goods is higher
(higher values of ε).
3.6. Some Facts on Shadow Banking and the Real Economy
The two-sector financial industry model may be capable of explaining the non-balanced
growth in the traditional and shadow banking sectors. However, this model only captures
activity within the financial sector and does not relate to the rest of the economy. This
section documents three important facts about the relationship between shadow banking
and the real economy that need to be captured in a more comprehensive model that extends
the two-sector model. These facts also give context to the importance of understanding the
role played by money-like liabilities within the financial sector.
3.6.1. Trends
Fact 1. Debt-to-GDP ratios, as reflected in the growth of money and money-like assets,
have increased for all sectors in the economy since the 1980s. This pattern is similarly
observed on the domestic real asset side in household real estate, miscellaneous firm assets,
and corporate investment abroad. Money-like assets are largely held within the financial
sector and by investors outside the U.S.
In this section, I explore how much of the increase in financial assets has been backed by an
increase in different types of real assets. Figure 14 suggests tremendous growth in shadow
banking since the 1980s. After funds flow through many different agents in the economy,
in the end these liabilities should be claims on real assets. To see where the analogous
growth in shadow banking comes from, I estimate trends in assets, liabilities, and net worth
(difference between assets and liabilities) as a ratio to nominal GDP. I split the sample at
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1980:Q1, which is approximately around the time when securitization and alternative forms
of deposit accounts started to develop, and the so-called Great Moderation occurred.9 In
particular, I run the following regression10
yt = γpre + γpost · dummy80 + βpre · t+ βpost · t · dummy80 + εt. (3.9)
Here, yt is either the ratio of assets, liabilities and the difference (net) from the Flow of
Funds to nominal GDP from 1952:Q1 - 2014:Q2 in percent, t is a quarterly time variable,
dummy80 is an indicator variable that is 1 from 1980:Q1-2014:Q2. Since all variables are
normalized by nominal GDP, the description referring to ratios will be hereon dropped for
convenience (for example, ”assets” is the ratio of assets to nominal GDP). Table 1 shows
the estimates of the coefficients βpre and βpost for each sector in the economy, which are in
units of percentage points. Note the slope for the post-1980 sample period is the sum of
βpre and βpost. The last three columns in the table show the p-values of a structural break
(Chow) test of the effect of a break occurring in 1980:Q1. The first value in parenthesis
is the p-value for the test of a the break in the slope coefficients, βpre and βpost, while the
second is the p-value for a break in all estimated coefficients including γpre and γpost.
Balance sheet items of the different sectors in the pre-1980 sample differ considerably from
the post-1980 sample. For the household and non-profit sector, total assets fell by an average
of 0.19 percentage points each quarter pre-1980 but increased relative to this value by an
average of 1.41 percentage points post-1980. This has been largely driven by the increase in
financial assets post-1980. The value of real estate has also changed significantly between
samples, increasing to 0.16 percentage points post-1980. While liabilities also increased by
0.23 percentage points, net worth still relatively increased by 1.18 due to the large increase
in financial asset holdings.
9NOW accounts which were structured to be interest-bearing deposits but were created to avoid Regula-
tion Q were legalized in December 1980.
10Note that I assume a deterministic linear time trend instead of a stochastic time trend in this specifica-
tion.
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Table 30: Flow of Funds Trends
This table shows results for the regression yt = γpre + γpost · dummy80 + βpre · t+ βpost · t · dummy80 + εt. The variable yt is the ratio of assets, liabilities
and the difference (net) from the Flow of Funds to nominal GDP from 1952:Q1 - 2014:Q2. The variable t is a quarterly time variable. The variable
dummy80 is an indicator variable that is 1 from 1980:Q1-2014:Q2. The last set of columns show the p-value of a structural break Chow test of the effect
of dummy80 on the slope coefficients and all coefficients of the regression. Source: Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve), BEA.
βpre βpost Structural break test p-value (slope, overall)
Sector/Asset Type Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net
Household -0.19** 0.15*** -0.34*** 1.41*** 0.23*** 1.18*** (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Real Estate 0.05 . . 0.16*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Non Real Estate -0.02*** . . 0.01 . . (0.09,0.00) . .
Financial -0.22*** . . 1.24*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Non-financial Corporate 0.21*** 0.25*** -0.04 0.01 -0.08*** 0.09* (0.81,0.02) (0.00,0.00) (0.01,0.03)
Real Estate -0.04 . . -0.06* . . (0.03,0.02) . .
Non Real Estate 0.11*** . . -0.20*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Trade Receivables 0.05*** . . -0.07*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Investment Abroad 0.06*** . . 0.05*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Miscellanous 0.09*** . . 0.19*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Other Financial -0.06*** . . 0.09*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Non-financial Non-corporate -0.11*** 0.10*** -0.21*** 0.12*** 0.01 0.11*** (0.00,0.00) (0.20,0.16) (0.00,0.00)
Real Estate 0.00 . . -0.12*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Non Real Estate -0.07*** . . 0.04*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Trade Receivables -0.01*** . . 0.04*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Miscellanous 0.01* . . 0.10*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
Other Financial -0.03*** . . 0.07*** . . (0.00,0.00) . .
State and Local Government† 0.03*** 0.04** -0.01 0.01* 0.07*** -0.06*** (0.02,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Federal Government† -0.03*** -0.28*** 0.25*** 0.03*** 0.45*** -0.42*** (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Rest of the World† 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.00 0.72*** 0.24*** 0.48*** (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Financial†‡ 0.52*** 0.52*** -0.00 1.82*** 1.70*** 0.12*** (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
*, ** and *** show significance levels at the 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
† Assets refer to financial assets.
‡ Financial sector excludes monetary authority.
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For the non-financial corporate sector, real estate assets, non-real estate assets and trade
receivables have declined relative to the pre-1980 sample and exhibit an overall downward
trend. Conversely, investments abroad, miscellanous and other financial assets (including
deposits and investments in credit market instruments) have relatively increased, leading to
an overall upward trend. For non-financial non-corporate firms, real estate and non-real es-
tate assets are overall downward trending since 1980, while trade receivables, miscellaneous
and other financial assets have been relatively higher and are overall upward trending since
1980. Liabilities for corporates and non-corporates have been increasing by 0.13 and 0.11
percentage points, respectively.
State and local governments holdings of financial assets were increasing by 0.03 percent-
age points pre-1980, and have additionally increased by 0.01 percentage points post-1980.
Issuance of municipal bonds has relatively increased by 0.07 percentage points, leading to
relative decrease in net of assets and liabilities of 0.06 percentage points. This pattern is
stronger for the federal government whose liabilities were decreasing on average by 0.28
percentage points pre-1980 but relative to this level increased by 0.45 percentage points
post-1980. The rest of the world has also played a bigger part in the U.S. economy. Its
domestic assets increased from 0.09 percentage points pre-1980 to an additional 0.72 per-
centage points since 1980. While liabilities of the rest of the world have also increased, on
net it has invested in the domestic economy by 0.48 percentage points. Lastly, assets of
financial institutions have dramatically increased from 0.52 percentage points to an addi-
tional 1.82 percentage points post-1980. This is accompanied by an additional increase of
1.70 percentage points in liabilities and only a 0.12 percentage point increase in net worth.
Table 30 suggests that growth in liabilities of the financial sector are only similarly observed
on the real-asset side in the growth in household real-estate, corporate investment abroad
and non-financial firm miscellanous investments. Other real assets that potentially back
the growth in liabilities have not risen as a ratio to GDP.
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Table 31: Holdings in Money or Money-like
This table lists the items included in the definition of money and money-like assets. Column (1) shows the outstanding levels in billions of dollars. Column
(2) is the percent of each item issued by the financial sector. Columns (3)-(7) shows the percentage of each sector’s financial assets held in money or
money-like assets. Panel A shows data in 2014:Q2. Panel B shows data in 1980:Q1. Source: Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve), BEA.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percent Issued by Percent of Financial Assets
Level/GDP (%) Financial Sector‡ Household Non-financial Financial‡ Government Rest of World
Panel B: 1980:Q1
Checkable Deposits and Currency 15.2 73.9 3.3 7.8 0.3 5.3 9.4
Time and Savings Deposits 48.5 100.0 17.6 4.1 1.1 15 8.4
Money Market Mutual Fund Shares 2.2 100.0 0.8 0.3 0.1 0 0
Fed Funds and Security Repos 5.4 100.0 0 0.2 2.3 3.3 0.9
Open Market Paper 5.6 76.7 0.9 5.4 1.6 0 2
Agency- and GSE-Backed Securities 8.9 100.0 0.3 1.1 3.1 14.6 1.7
Corporate and Foreign Bonds 17.2 18.1 1 0 8.2 0 4.3
Total Money and Money-like 103.0 86.8 23.9 18.9 16.7 38.2 26.7
Total Assets/GDP (%) 231.4 52.2 173.2 15.1 15.1
Total in Money and Money-like/GDP (%) 55.3 9.9 28.9 5.8 4.0
Panel A: 2014:Q2
Checkable Deposits and Currency 19.0 58.3 1.7 4.3 0.5 6.3 2.9
Time and Savings Deposits 58.5 100.0 11.3 5.0 0.9 7.4 2.2
Money Market Mutual Fund Shares 14.6 100.0 1.6 2.8 0.7 4.2 0.5
Fed Funds and Security Repos 21.9 68.0 0.0 0.1 3.6 3.3 3.8
Open Market Paper 5.8 38.2 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.8 0.5
Agency- and GSE-Backed Securities 44.9 100.0 0.0 0.1 5.9 12.0 3.8
Corporate and Foreign Bonds 65.7 41.7 1.4 0.0 9.4 4.3 13.0
Total Money and Money-like 230.3 173.5 16.0 12.4 22.0 39.3 26.7
Total Assets/GDP (%) 386.9 119.4 481.6 23.9 128.6
Total in Money and Money-like/GDP (%) 61.9 14.8 106.0 9.4 34.3
‡ Financial sector excludes monetary authority.
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Table 31 reveals which sectors hold specific items within money and money-like liabilities
for 1980:Q1 and 2014:Q2.11 Column (1) shows each item included in money and money-like
from the Flow of Funds as a ratio to Nominal GDP, while Column (2) shows the percentage
of each item issued by the financial sector. Columns (3) - (7) shows the percentage of
total financial assets each sector holds in each of the items within money and money-like
liabilities. This table shows that households and firms hold a large portion of their holdings
in money as opposed to money-like assets. On the other hand, the financial sector and the
rest of the world seem to be the main investors in money-like liabilities. This is a significant
shift, especially since these two sectors combined have increased their holdings in money or
money-like assets by over a 100 percent of GDP. The financial sector has ballooned almost
three-fold with total financial assets increasing from 173 percent to 481 percent of GDP.
The rest of the world’s financial position has surged even more dramatically, with total
financial assets increasing eight-fold from 15 percent to 128 percent of GDP.
3.6.2. Cycles
Fact 2. Growth in money-like liabilities issued by the shadow banking sector follows GDP
growth, contrary to well-known evidence establishing money growth leads output growth.
Because I consider the shadow banking sector that issues liabilities similar to deposits
as an extension to the traditional banking sector, it seems natural to consider the role
of shadow banking from a monetary perspective. In this section, I follow the empirical
literature in monetary economics to analyze the relationship between money-like liabilities
and output. First, I plot cross-correlations between real GDPt and Mt+j in Figure 19 to
better understand short-run dynamics. Here, M is either M1, M2 or money-like liabilities.
Both M1 and M2 growth seem to be positively correlated with and lead GDP growth. On
the other hand, lags of growth in money-like liabilities are much more strongly correlated
with GDP growth but at a lag. The lead-lag relationship with GDP growth is an important
difference between conventional monetary aggregates and other types of financial liabilities
11The snapshot prior to the crisis in 2007:Q4 are similar to the results in 2014:Q2.
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in the data.12
−10 −5 0 5 10
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
M1
C
ro
ss
−
co
rr
el
at
io
n
−10 −5 0 5 10
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
M2
−10 −5 0 5 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Money−like
quarters
C
ro
ss
−
co
rr
el
at
io
n
−10 −5 0 5 10
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Total Money
quarters
 
 
Cross−Correlations
95% CI
Figure 19: Cross-correlations with Real GDP from 1959-2014
This figure plots cross correlations of mt+j (real growth in either
money, money-like liabilities for different leads (+) and lags (-) j)
against GDPt (real growth in output). Source: Flow of Funds (Federal
Reserve), BEA.
Second, to confirm the cross-correlations above, I run the following bivariate vector au-
toregression (VAR) where yt is the 4-quarter growth rate of real GDP, mt is the 4-quarter
growth rate of money-like liabilities
 ∆yt
∆mt
 = Φ
 ∆yt−1
∆mt−1
+ Σ
 εy,t
εm,t
 .
Impulse responses for using the estimated coefficients from the VAR are reported in Figure
20 while variance decompositions are reported below the figure.13 The results are consistent
with the cross-correlations reported above. In particular, a 1-standard deviation shock to
output is followed by a 4 percentage-point increase in money-like growth rates. Conversely,
a shock to money-like liabilities do not lead to any significant change in output growth. The
variance decomposition table shows the percentage of the forecast error based on the VAR
12Cross-correlations for the post-1984 period show similar results. M2 is not as strongly correlated with
GDP as in the pre-1984 period while other money-like liabilities exhibit an even higher correlation with
GDP growth at a lag.
13Shocks are orthogonalized using the recursive assumption (Cholesky decomposition).
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coefficients that is explained by each of the shocks. This shows that around 31 percent of
the forecast error of money-like liabilities are explained by shocks to output. On the other
hand, the effect of shocks to money-like liabilities on the forecast error of output growth is
negligible.
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Output 99.6 0.4
(92.7,99.9) (0,7.3)
Money-like 31.4 68.6
(12.6,49.5) (50.5,87.4)
Figure 20: VAR: Money-like and GDP
This figure reports the impulse response functions and variance decom-
position from the bivariate VAR including 4-quarter real growth rates
of money-like liabilities and GDP from 1959:Q1-2014:Q2. Confidence
intervals are calculated using bootstrapping.
These results are robust to different measures of real activity. Using non-durables and
services consumption, durables consumption, gross private domestic investment, unemploy-
ment, and median house prices as a measure of wealth qualitative lead to the same con-
clusion. That is, money-like liabilities grow after periods of high economic growth. The
results are also robust to the data transformations used (4-quarter growth rates, deviations
from linear trend of logs, cyclical components from HP filter of logs), to lag lengths and the
ordering of the data series in the VAR. Adding other common macro variables in monetary
economics literature such as inflation, federal funds rate, monetary aggregates M1 and M2
does not change the results. Lastly, the results are robust to using each of the Flow of
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Funds items used in the definition of money-like liabilities.14
An important assumption made in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 is that total financial capital are
allocated between traditional banking and shadow banking period-by-period. Results from
the VAR show a fundamental difference between money and money-like liabilities that need
to be captured moving forward. In addition to non-balanced growth between the two sectors
leading to a shift of capital from one to the other, there are also lead-lag relationships of
each of the sectors with overall GDP. An important avenue to be explored is whether the
empirical relationships established in 3.6.1 can match these dynamic short-run relationships.
That money-like liabilities lag output growth may have important implications for policy.
Adjusting the traditional money supply has long been a tool of monetary policy which is
useful for policy makers since growth in traditional monetary aggregates leads GDP growth.
Since money-like liabilities grow after output grows, they may not be as useful of a tool in
conducting monetary policy.
3.6.3. Financial Risk
Fact 3.Growth in the shadow banking sector is followed by an increase in the number of
bank defaults, but does not appear to affect broad measures of financial risk.
Money-like liabilities have translated to a rise in the leverage ratio of the financial sector.
This leads to the important question of whether default probabilities are affected by this
increased level of debt. Moreover, shadow banking is identified to be one of the main
culprits of the recent financial crisis, and regulation of its risk-taking activities is highly
debated by academics and policy makers. Understanding which measures of financial stress
or financial risk it affects helps illuminate this debate. In this light, I extend the bivariate
VAR in the previous section to include broad measures of financial risk. In particular, I
add the Moody’s BAA-AAA credit spread measure. Note that few studies run VARs with
financial variables and those that do analyze how negative financial shocks transmit to the
14Unreported results.
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real economy and treat financial crises as exogenous.15 In contrast, the analysis in this
section is focused on how financial variables are affected by real variables.
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Variance Decomposition
Variable/Shock Output Money-like Default
Output 94.9 0.4 4.6
(80.7,99.3) (0,6.2) (0.3,18.1)
Money-like 30.3 68.9 0.9
(10.9,45.7) (53.2,87.6) (0.1,8.6)
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Figure 21: VAR: Money-like, GDP and BAA-AAA Credit Spread
This figure reports the impulse response functions and variance decom-
position from the 3-variable VAR including 4-quarter real growth rates
of money-like liabilities and GDP and the Moody’s BAA-AAA default
spread from 1959:Q1-2014:Q2. Confidence intervals are calculated us-
ing bootstrapping.
Figure 21 shows that results from the previous section hold: money-like liabilities grow after
growth in economic activity. On the other hand, shocks to money-like liabilities do not lead
to changes in either the credit spread or output growth. The third column of graphs show
that a negative financial shock which corresponds to an increase in the default spread in the
data is followed by lower growth in output (replicating previous studies) and in money-like
liabilities. Turning to the variance decomposition, a shock to money-like liabilities explains
about 1.6 percent of the forecast error variation in credit risk. This result is robust to other
15For example, see Balke (2000) and Tetlow and Hubrich (2013).
112
measures of financial risk such as the BAA-10-year Treasury spread, the 10-year-3-month
Treasury spread and the Cleveland Financial Stress Index.16
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Figure 22: VAR: Money-like, GDP and Bank Default
This figure reports the impulse response functions and variance decom-
position from the 3-variable VAR including annual real growth rates of
money-like liabilities and GDP and the number of bank defaults pub-
lished by the FDIC from 1959-2014. Confidence intervals are calculated
using bootstrapping.
There is widespread evidence that credit booms precede banking crises.17 Yet these booms,
reflected in growth in money-like liabilities, do not seem to have an effect on prices of credit
or financial risk. Despite this, Figure 22 shows that the number of bank defaults are still
affected. This figure reports results from a VAR with growth in money-like liabilities, output
and the number of annual bank defaults reported by the FDIC. A 1-standard deviation shock
to the growth in money-like liabilities is followed by an increase in the number of bank
defaults a few years later. Variance decomposition shows that these shocks now explain
16Unreported results.
17For example, see Schularick and Taylor (2012), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) Boissay et al. (2013).
113
15.3 percent of the variation in the forecast error of bank default. An important caveat
in these results is that FDIC only counts the number of commercial banks that default
but shadow banking includes a wider variety of institutions. The results are suggestive of
increased risk under the assumption that traditional and shadow banking institutions are
highly integrated.
3.7. Conclusion
This paper examines traditional banking and shadow banking, distinguished according to
the type of liability each sector issues. Given the observed allocation of financial capital
between the two sectors, relative productivity can be calculated and depends on assumptions
on the elasticity of substitution and labor intensities. This two-sector model of non-balanced
growth can capture the structural change within the financial industry that has led to the
growth of shadow banking in the last few decades. Policy makers should be wary of the
effects of regulation on the implied productivities of financial institutions since tightening
regulation on shadow banking might lead to an increase in the relative productivity of
a different type of financial sector and cause its growth. Going forward, it is important
to identify the parameters in the model from the data. It is equally important to build
on this model by matching empirical relationships between shadow banking and the real
economy. Shadow banking is different from traditional banking not only through the type of
its funding but also through its investors and its dynamic short-run relationship to output
growth. In particular, households and firms are the main investors in traditional banking
while the financial sector itself and the rest of the world are the main investors in shadow
banking. Money-like liabilities issued by the shadow banking sector also lag output growth
which is contrast to money leading output growth. Lastly, risks in this sector might be
neglected since its growth does not seem to affect broad measures of financial risk but is
followed by an increase in the number of banks defaulting. This cautions against a different
form of shadow banking that may emerge in the future.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Conceptual Framework
In this section, I present a conceptual framework to illustrate how firm objectives and the
ownership structure of a firm affects credit provision during financial crises. I consider
a general problem of a financial firm which nests both the bank and credit union case.
In particular, the objective function allows for both a profit maximizing motive and an
additional motive to provide loans to borrowers. The model is closest to Smith et al.
(1981), who propose a theory of credit unions that provides benefits to both borrowers and
savers. To keep the model simple and to focus on the key mechanism showing differences in
lending behavior depending on the ownership structure, I abstract from many issues that
are important in a model of financial firms.
Consider a partial equilibrium dynamic model of a financial firm in a riskless setting. The
firm is endowed with equity E that is held fixed over time. The firm chooses the amount of
loans to issue L′ to maximize the present discounted value of a weighted average of profits
to equity owners and the utility that borrowers derive from consuming loans:
V (s, L) = max
L′
λU(L) + (1− λ)π(s, L, L′) + βV (s′, L′). (A.1)
The key difference between banks and credit unions is whether the owners of equity are
inside or outside of the firm. In the case of a bank, the owners are completely outside of the
firm and receive profits. In the case of a credit union, the owners are inside of the firm and
derive utility from consuming the loans that are issued. Bank owners and credit owners are
different agents in the economy. The degree to which a credit union provides benefits to its
borrowers is governed by the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1). The weight that the financial firm places
on borrower utility is λ, while the weight on profits π is 1− λ. This determines the type of
a firm: a bank has λ = 0, while a credit union has λ > 0. Assume that U has the properties
of a standard utility function: U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0. The state of the world is given by s > 0.
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The discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1). Define profits as:
π(s, L, L′) = RL(s)L−RD(s)D − sφ(L′) (A.2)
where RL(s) is the return that the firm receives on loans previously issued and where the
profitability of investments depends on state s. RD(s) is the interest payment on deposits,
which may also depend on s, and D are the amount of deposits. The firm faces a balance
sheet constraint L = D+E. φ is the cost function of issuing loans that will provide returns
in the next period. Assume that these costs are increasing and convex costs in the amount
of loans: φ′ > 0 and φ′′ > 0. The total cost to issuing loans depends on the state, and for
simplicity I assume that s is a multiplier on the cost function. Note that higher values of s
denote worse states of the world or financial crises times, when the cost of lending increases
and profitability of investments decreases. The optimality condition is given by:
β
(
λU ′(L∗) + (1− λ)
(
RL(s)−RD(s)
))
= (1− λ)sφ′(L∗) (A.3)
In the case of a bank where λ = 0, this simplifies to:
β
(
RL(s)−RD(s)
)
= sφ′(L∗B) (A.4)
ant L∗B is the optimal lending for a bank. Define the net return to investment on a loan as
RN (s) = RL(s) − RD(s). For a bank, this condition says that the marginal cost from an
additional unit of a loan is equal to the present discounted value of the marginal net return
from that loan. For a credit union, the marginal cost from an additional unit of a loan is
a discounted sum of the marginal utility of loan consumption for the borrower multiplied
by λ1−λ , and the net return on investment for the firm. This simple framework allows us to
compare the lending behavior of banks and credit unions in different states of the world.
Proposition 1. ∂L
∗
∂s < 0 when
∂RN
∂s < 0.
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Proof. Use the implicit function theorem on optimality condition in Equation (A.3) to get:
∂L∗
∂s
=
(1− λ)
(
φ′(L∗)− β ∂RN∂s
)
βλU ′′(L∗)− (1− λ)sφ′′(L∗)
.
Since φ′ > 0, the numerator is positive when ∂R
N
∂s < 0. Since U
′′ < 0 and φ′′ > 0, then then
denominator is negative. Combining, ∂L
∗
∂s < 0.
Proposition 2.
∂L∗B
∂s <
∂L∗CU
∂s < 0.
Proof. Using the expression for ∂L
∗
∂s above, and taking the derivative with respect to λ, we
get:
∂L∗
∂s∂λ
=
−(φ′(L∗)− β ∂RN∂s )(βU
′′(L∗))(
βλU ′′(L∗)− (1− λ)sφ′′(L∗)
)2
Since φ′ > 0 and ∂R
N
∂s < 0, the term inside the first parentheses is positive. Since U
′′ < 0,
the entire numerator is positive. The denominator is positive. Combining, then ∂L
∗
∂s∂λ > 0.
Since λ > 0 for credit unions, then
∂L∗B
∂s <
∂L∗CU
∂s . Combining the result from the previous
proposition, we get the result.
The first proposition says that lending declines in worse states of the world, as long as
profitability declines in worse states (∂R
N (s)
∂s < 0), which is a very reasonable assumption
in reality. This would occur when the profitability of loans RL(s) goes down in bad states,
or when the cost of funding RD(s) goes up in bad states. This is a very intuitive result.
The second proposition shows that credit union lending does not fall by as much as bank
lending when the state of the world worsens. This is the main prediction of the model that
is being tested in the data.
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A.2. Data Construction and Variable Definitions
The following table lists the variable definitions used in the analysis. Bank call reports
(FFIEC 031) are taken from https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/. Credit union call reports (Form
5300) are taken from https://www.ncua.gov. The variables are defined based on closest
possible definitions given in the instructions for the call reports. Start date refers to Q2-
2003, and end date refers to Q4-2013. Variables without listed dates are available from
start to end dates.
CREDIT UNIONS (Form 5300):
ASSETS
Total Assets: acct 010
Cash: acct 730a + acct 730b + acct 730c
Total Investments: acct 799i
Investments Securities and Trading Assets: Securi-
ties Held (acct 797e + acct 796e) + Trading Assets
(acct 965)
Investments in Corporate CU: acct 730b1 +
acct 769a + acct 769b + acct 652c
Net Loans and Leases: Total Loans and Leases
(acct 025b) - Allowance for Losses (acct 719) Loans
for Sale: acct 003
LOANS AND LEASES
Total Consumer Loans: Credit Card Loans
(acct 396) + Lines of Credit (acct 397 + acct 698)
+ Other Consumer Credit (acct 385 + acct 370 +
acct 397a acct 698a)
Real Estate Loans: acct 703 + acct 386
Real Estate Non-Business: Real Estate Loans - Real
Estate: Business
Real Estate Business: acct 718 (start-2004-q2) +
acct 718a (2004-q3-end)
Open-ended Real Estate: acct 708 + acct 708b
Closed-ended Real Estate: acct 704 + acct 705 +
acct 706 + acct 707 (start-2004-q2); acct 704a +
acct 704b + acct 704c + acct 704d + acct 704e +
acct 705a + acct 705b + acct 706 + acct 707 (2004-
q3-end)
Business Loans: acct 400l + acct 400l1 + acct 400
(start-2004-q2); acct 400l + acct 400l1 + acct 400a
+ acct 400b (2004-q3-end)
INVESTMENTS
Investments Government: acct 741c + acct 745
Investments Agency Non-MBS: acct 742c1
Investments Agency MBS: acct 742c2
Investments Agency: acct 742c
Investments Other MBS: acct 732 (start-2008-q2);
acct 981 (2008-q3-end)
Investments Held-to-Maturity Market Less Book
Value: acct 801 - acct 796e
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Total Liabilities and Equity: acct 014
Total Liabilities: acct 860c + acct 825a + acct 820a
+ acct 825 + acct 018
Leverage: Total Liabilities / Total Assets *100
Deposits: acct 018
Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements:
acct 058c
Other Debt (Incl Commercial Paper): acct 883c +
acct 011c
Regular Deposits: acct 902 + acct 657
Equity: Total Liabilities and Equity - Total Liabili-
ties
INCOME
Interest Income on Loans: acct 110
Total Interest Income: acct 115
Non-interest Income: acct 117
Employee Compensation: acct 210
Net Interest Income (after provision for loan losses):
acct 116
Net Income: acct 661a
Net Interest Margin: Net Interest Income / Net In-
come *100
Fee Income: acct 131
Return on Assets (ROA): Net Income(t) / Total
Assets(t-1) *100
Return on Equity (ROE): Net Income(t) / Equity(t-
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1) * 100
Interest Refund: acct 119
Interest Expense on Deposits: acct 380 + acct 381
Return on Deposits (ROD): Interest Expense on De-
posits(t) / Deposits(t-1) * 100
Retained Earnings: acct 940 + acct 602
DELINQUENCIES
Total Delinquencies: acct 041b
Charge-offs: acct 550
Recoveries: acct 551
Net Charge-offs: Charge-offs - Recoveries
OTHER ITEMS
Employees: acct 564a + acct 564b
Members: acct 083
Potential Members: acct 084
Bankrupt Members: acct 971
Branches: acct 566
OFF-BALANCE SHEET
Off-balance Sheet Items: acct 814 + acct 814a
+ acct 811 + acct 812 + acct 813 + acct 815
+ acct 816 (start-2004-q4); acct 814 + acct 814a
+ acct 811 + acct 812 + acct 813 + acct 815 +
acct 816 + acct 822 (2005-q1-2008-q4); acct 814
+ acct 814a + acct 811 + acct 812 + acct 813 +
acct 815 + acct 816 + acct 814a1 + acct 811a +
acct 822 (2009-q1-2009-q3); acct 814 + acct 814a
+ acct 811 + acct 812 + acct 813 + acct 815 +
acct 816 + acct 814a1 + acct 811a + acct 811b +
acct 811c + acct 822 (2009-q4-2009-q4); acct 816a
(2010-q1-end)
BANKS (FFIEC 031):
ASSETS
Total Assets: rcon2170
Cash: rcfd0081 + rcfd0071
Total Investments: rcfd1754 + rcfd1773 + rconb987
+ rcfdb989 + rcfd3545 rcfd2130 + rcfd3656
Investments: Securities and Trading Assets Secu-
rities Held (rcfd1754 rcfd1773) + Trading Assets
(rcfd3545)
Net Loans and Leases Total Loans and Leases:
(rcfd212)- Allowance for Losses (rcfd3123)
Loans for Sale: rcfd5369
LOANS AND LEASES
Total Consumer Loans: Credit Card Loans
(rcfdb538) + Lines of Credit (rcfdb539) + Other
Consumer Credit (rcfd2011) (start-2010-q4); Credit
Card Loans (rcfdb538) + Lines of Credit (rcfdb539)
+ Other Consumer Credit (rcfdk207 rcfdk137) (2011-
q1-end)
Real Estate Loans: rcfd1410
Real Estate: Non-Business Real Estate Loans - Real
Estate Business
Real Estate Business: rcon1415 (start-2006-q4);
rconf158 + rconf159 (2007-q1-end)
Open-ended Real Estate: rcon1797
Closed-ended Real Estate: rcon5367 + rcon5368
Business Loans: rcfd1763 + rcfd1764 (C&I) + Real
Estate Business + rcfd1590 (Agricultural)
INVESTMENTS
Securities Agency Non-MBS: rcfd1290 + rcfd1293 +
rcfd1295 + rcfd1298
Securities Agency MBS: rcfd1699 + rcfd1705 +
rcfd1702 + rcfd1707 + rcfd1715 rcfd1719rcfd1717
rcfd1732 (start-2009-q1); rcfdg301 + rcfdg305 +
rcfdg303 + rcfdg307 + rcfdg313 + rcfdg317 +
rcfdg315 + rcfdg319 + rcfdg325 + rcfdg327 +
rcfdg329 + rcfdg331 (2009-q2-2010-q4); rcfdg301
+ rcfdg305 + rcfdg303 + rcfdg307 + rcfdg313
+ rcfdg317 + rcfdg315 + rcfdg319 + rcfdk143 +
rcfdk145 + rcfdk151 + rcfdk153 (2011-q1-end)
Securities Other MBS: rcfd1710 + rcfd1713 +
rcfd1734 + rcfd1736 (start-2009-q3); rcfdg309 +
rcfdg311 + rcfdg321 + rcfdg323 + rcfdk147 +
rcfdk149 + rcfdk155 + rcfdk157 (2009-q2-end)
Securities Government: rcfd0213 + rcfd1287 +
rcfd8497 + rcfd8499
Securities ABS: rcfdb839 + rcfdb841 + rcfdb843
+ rcfdb845 + rcfdb847 + rcfdb849 + rcfdb851
+ rcfdb853 + rcfdb855 + rcfdb857 + rcfdb859 +
rcfdb861 (start-2005-q4); rcfdc988 + rcfdc027 (2006-
q1-end)
Trading Government: rcfd3531 + rcfd3533 (start-
2007-q4); rcfd3531 + rcfd3533 (2008-q1-end)
Trading Agency Non-MBS: rcon3532 (start-2007-q4);
rcfd3532 (2008-q1-end)
Trading Agency-MBS: rcon3534 + rcon3535 (start-
2009-q1); rcfdg379 + rcfdg380 + rcfdk197 (2009-q2-
end)
Trading Other MBS: rcon3536 (start-2009-q1);
rcfdg381 + rcfdk198 (2009-q2-end)
Investments Government Securities: Government +
Trading Government
Investments Agency Non-MBS Securities: Agency
Non-MBS + Trading Agency Non-MBS
Investments Agency MBS: Securities Agency + Trad-
ing Agency
Investments Agency: Investments Agency Non-MBS
+ Investments Agency MBS
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Investments Other MBS: Securities Other MBS +
Trading Other MBS
Investments Held-to-Maturity Market Less Book
Value: rcfd1771 - rcfd1754
Investments for Sale Market Less Book Value:
rcfd1773 - rcfd1772
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Total Liabilities and Equity: rcfd3300
Total Liabilities: rcfd2948
Leverage: Total Liabilities / Total Assets *100
Deposits: rcon2200 + rcfn2200
Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements:
rconb993 + rcfdb995
Other Debt (Incl Commercial Paper): rcfd3190
Regular Deposits: rcon2215
Equity: Total Liabilities and Equity - Total Liabili-
ties
Dividends: riad4470 + riad4460
Dividends to Equity (DOE): Dividends(t) / Equity(t-
1) *100
Tier-1 Capital: rcfd8274
INCOME
Interest Income on Loans: riad4010 + riad4065
Total Interest Income: riad4107
Non-interest Income: riad4079
Employee Compensation: riad4135
Net Interest Income (after provision for loan losses):
riad4074 - riad4230
Net Income: riad4340
Net Interest Margin: Net Interest Income / Total
Assets(t-1) *100
Fee Income: riad4080 + riadb492
Return on Assets (ROA): Net Income(t) / Total
Assets(t-1) *100
Return on Equity (ROE): Net Income(t) / Equity(t-
1) * 100
Interest Expense on Deposits: riad4508 + riad0093
+ riada517 + riada518
Return on Deposits (ROD): Interest Expense on De-
posits(t) / Deposits(t-1) * 100
Earnings Before Taxes: riad4301
Taxes: riad4302
Effective Taxes Paid: Taxes / Net Income *100
Retained Earnings: Net Income - Dividends
DELINQUENCIES
Delinquencies Real Estate: rcon2759 + rcon2769
+ rcon3492 + rcon3493 + rcon3494 + rcon3495
+ rcon5398 + rcon5399 + rcon5400 + rconc236
+ rconc237 + rconc229 + rconc238 + rconc239
+ rconc230 + rcon3499 + rcon3500 + rcon3501
+ rcon3502 + rcon3503 + rcon3504 + rcfnb572
+ rcfnb573 + rcfnb574 (start-2006-q4); rconf172
+ rconf174 + rconf176 + rconf173 + rconf175
+ rconf177 + rcon3493 + rcon3494 + rcon3495
+ rcon5398 + rcon5399 + rcon5400 + rconc236
+ rconc237 + rconc229 + rconc238 + rconc239
+ rconc230 + rcon3499 + rcon3500 + rcon3501
+ rconf178 + rconf180 + rconf182 + rconf179
+ rconf181 + rconf183 + rcfnb572 + rcfnb573 +
rcfnb574 (2007-q1-end)
Delinquencies Deposits: rcfd5377 + rcfd5378 +
rcfd5379 + rcfd5380 + rcfd5381 + rcfd5382
Delinquencies Agriculture Loans: rcfd1594 +
rcfd1597 + rcfd1583
Delinquencies C&I Loans: rcfd1251 + rcfd1252 +
rcfd1253 + rcfd1254 + rcfd1255 + rcfd1256
Delinquencies Consumer Loans: rcfdb575 + rcfdb576
+ rcfdb577 + rcfdb578 + rcfdb579 + rcfdb580
(start-2010-q4); rcfdb575 + rcfdb576 + rcfdb577
+ rcfdk213 + rcfdk214 + rcfdk215 + rcfdk216 +
rcfdk217 + rcfdk218 (2011-q1-e) Delinquencies For-
eign Loans: rcfd5389 + rcfd5390 + rcfd5391
Delinquencies Other Loans: rcfd5459 + rcfd5460 +
rcfd5461
Delinquencies Leases: rcfd1257 + rcfd1258 +
rcfd1259 + rcfd1271 + rcfd1272 + rcfd1791 (s-2006-
q4); rcfdf166 + rcfdf167 + rcfdf168 + rcfdf169 +
rcfdf170 + rcfdf171 (2007-q1-end)
Delinquencies Other Debt: rcfd3505 + rcfd3506 +
rcfd3507
Total Delinquencies: Real Estate + Deposits + Agri-
culture + C&I + Consumer + Foreign + Other +
Leases + Other Debt
Charge-offs: riad4635
Recoveries: riad4605
Net Charge-offs: Charge-offs - Recoveries
OTHER ITEMS
Employees: riad4150
OFF-BALANCE SHEET
Off-balance Sheet Items: rcfd3816 + rcfd3818
+ rcfd3814 + rcfd3815 + rcfd6550 + rcfd3819
+ rcfd3821 vrcfd3411 (start-2006-q4); rcfdf164 +
rcfdf165 + rcfd3818 + rcfd3814 + rcfd3815 +
rcfd6550 + rcfd3819 + rcfd3821 + rcfd3411 (2007-q1
-2009-q4); rcfdf164 + rcfdf165 + rcfdj457 + rcfdj458
+ rcfdj459 + rcfd3814 + rcfd3815 + rcfd6550 +
rcfd3819 + rcfd3821 + rcfd3411 (2010-q1-end)
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A.3. Additional Robustness Tests
A.3.1. Bank consolidation and defaults
Mergers and acquisitions are widespread in the banking industry and might affect our results
if such activity systematically increases or decreases LG across banks. As a result, we might
attribute differences in liquidity risk and consequently differences in expected returns to
changes in M&A activity. In our data, beginning in 2003, BHC’s are required to report the
total assets of an acquired institution if the acquiree’s assets are more than $10 billion or
more than 5 percent of the acquiring parent company, whichever is smaller. We observe
199 such events in the data and the change in LG for the parent holding company before
and after the acquisition range from -0.19 to 0.17, with an average statistically insignificant
from 0. This reassures that our results are not driven by M&A activity. From CRSP, we
observe 266 delistings, 93 percent of which cite mergers as the reason for delisting and none
of which overlap with the observed consolidations in the Y-9C reports. All of the stocks
that report performance-related changes as the reason for delisting have available returns.
As in Campbell et al. (2008), we use the returns of delisted stocks when they are available.
Otherwise, delisted stocks are assumed to be sold in the month prior to the delisting and
proceeds are reinvested in the portfolio.
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Table A1: Data Series
Item Start End Mnemonic
Liabilities
Deposits in domestic commercial subsidiaries (DC)
Noninterest bearing balances, DC 1981-Q2 Present BHCB2210
Interest bearing balances, DC 1986-Q2 Present BHCB3187
Money market deposits and other savings accounts, DC 1981-Q2 Present BHCB2389
Time deposits < 100k, DC 1986-Q2 Present BHCB6648
Time deposits > 100k, DC 1986-Q2 Present BHCB2604
Domestic non-commercial subsidiaries (NDC)
Noninterest bearing balances, NDC 1986-Q2 Present BHOD3189
Interest bearing balances, NDC 1986-Q2 Present BHOD3187
Money market deposits and other savings accounts, NDC 1986-Q2 Present BHOD2389
Time deposits < 100k, NDC 1986-Q2 Present BHOD6648
Time deposits > 100k, NDC 1986-Q2 Present BHOD2604
Deposits in foreign offices 1986-Q2 Present BHFN6631 + BHFN6636
Overnight federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to resell 1988-Q2 1996-Q4 BHCK 0278 + BHCK 0279
1997-Q1 2001-Q4 BHCK2800
2002-Q1 Present BHDMB993 + BHCKB995
Trading Liabilities 1989-Q3 1993-Q4 BHCT3548
1994-Q1 Present BHCK3548
Other borrowerd money (including commercial paper) 1981-Q2 2000-Q4 BHCK2309 + BHCK2332 + BHCK2333
2001-Q1 Present BHCK3190
Subordinated debt (notes and debentures) 1981-Q2 Present BHCK4062
2005-Q1 Present BHCKC699
Other liabilities 1981-Q2 Present BHCK2750
Equity 1986-Q2 Present BHCK3210 + BHCK3000
Liquid Assets
Cash and balances due from depository institutions
Non interest bearing balances, currency, coin 1981-Q2 - Present BHCK0081
Interest-bearing balances in US offices 1981-Q2 Present BHCK0395
Interest-bearing balances in foreign offices, etc 1981-Q2 Present BHCK0397
All securities (investment securities, held to maturity and available for sale) 1981-Q2 1993-Q4 BHCK0390
1994-Q1 Present BHCK1754 + BHCK1773
Trading assets 1976-Q4 1994-Q4 BHCK2146
1995-Q1 Present BHCK3545
Overnight federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell 1988-Q2 1996-Q4 BHCK0276 + BHCK0277
1997-Q1 2001-Q4 BHCK1350
2002-Q1 Present BHDMB987 + BHCKB989
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Table A2: Data Series
Variable Definition
Assets BHCK2170
Market Cap SHROUT*abs(PRC)
Book-to-Market Assets divided by (Size plus Total Liabilities)
Deposits Non-interest bearing deposits (BHDM6631 + BHFN6631) plus Total interest-bearing deposits (BHDM6636 + BHFN6636)
Core Deposits Total Demand deposits (BHCB2210) plus NOW, ATS and other transaction accounts (BHCB3187+BHOD3187)
plus Non-transaction savings deposits (BHCB2389+BHOD2389) plus Total time deposits less than $100k
(BHCB6648 + BHOD6648) plus Non-interest bearing balances in domestic offices of other depository institutions
(BHOD3189) less Brokered deposits issued in denominations of less than $100k (BHDMA243 + BHDMA164)
Leverage (Equity/Assets) Total equity capital (BHCK3210) plus Minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries and similar items (BHCK3000), divided by Assets
Loans BHCK2122
Real Estate Loans BHCK1410
C&I Loans BHDM1766
Consumer Loans BHDM1975
Net Interest Margin BHCK4074
Nonint. Income/Income Total non-interest income (BHCK4079) divided by Total interest and non-interest income (BHCK4107 + BHCK4079)
Return on Assets Income (Loss) before extraordinary items and other adjustments (BHCK4300), divided by lagged Assets
Return on Equity Income (Loss) before extraordinary items and other adjustments (BHCK4300), divided by lagged Equity
Bad Loans Total loans, leasing financing receivables and debt securities and other assets,
past due 90 days or more and still accruing (BHCK5525) and non accrual (BHCK5526)
divided by lagged Assets
Charge-offs/TA Charge-offs on allowance for loan and lease losses (BHCK4635), divided by lagged TA
Tier-1 Capital BHCK8274
Risk-weighted Assets BHCKA223
Credit Risk Charge-offs on allowance for loan and lease losses (BHCK4635) less Recoveries on allowance
for loan and lease losses BHCK4605, divided by Allowance for loan and lease losses (BHCK3123)
Tail Risk the negative of the average return on a bank’s stock for the bottom 5% return days per year, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)
Z-score log(Return on Assets plus Tier-1 Capital divided by Standard deviation of return on assets)
No. of Banking Subsidiaries RSSD9146
Complexity RSSD9057
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Table A3: Projection of liquidity gap measure on Compustat variables
This table presents results from regression of liquidity gap on Compustat variables normalized by total assets (TA).
(1) is an OLS regressions and (2) is a panel regression with bank level fixed effects. Source: Federal Reserve Y-9C
reports and Compustat.
(1) (2)
mismatch mismatch
CEQTA 0.0723 0.0981
(2.99) (3.92)
CHTA -0.596 -0.370
(-19.21) (-11.99)
DLCTA 1.332 1.252
(118.46) (104.33)
DLTTTA 1.160 1.070
(102.66) (82.06)
IVAOTA -0.744 -0.518
(-71.37) (-42.29)
RECTTA 0.314 0.551
(32.27) (47.73)
SALETA 0.195 0.0260
(5.04) (0.68)
Constant -0.367 -0.559
(-38.71) (-54.58)
N 5478 5478
R2 0.909 0.876
t statistics in parentheses
CEQ= Common Ordinary Equity - Total; CH= Cash; DLC= Debt in Current Liabilities - Total; DLTT= Long-Term
Debt - Total; IVAO =Investment and Advances - Other; RECT=Receivables - Total; SALE= Sales Turnover (Net).
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Table A4: Performance of Out-of-Sample Projection
This table presents the out-of-sample performance of the projection exercise to extend the sample back from 1991 to
1974. First, we run regressions of liquidity mismatch calculated from Y-9C on accounting variables from Compustat
from 2000-2014. We use the estimated coefficients to calculate predicted values from 1991-1999 for which both
Compustat and Y-9C data are still available. (1) shows the correlation between the actual and predicted values of
the liquidity profile ratio from an OLS regression while (2) shows the correlation between actual and predicted values
of the liquidity profile ratio using a panel regression with fixed effects. t statistics in parentheses.
(1) (2)
Actual Actual
Predicted, OLS 1.018***
(129.29)
Predicted, with FE 1.055***
(121.88)
Constant -0.00505** 0.00508**
(-2.27) (2.10)
N 2730 2730
R2 0.860 0.845
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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